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The failure to find generalization in many applied 
studies with children has provided impetus for the 
development of both the self-instructional training (SIT) 
paradigm and the metacognitive training paradigm. Process 
research is lacking in both paradigms, given the array of 
training components within which verbalization training is 
typically embedded. 
The present study asked this fundamental question: Was 
generalization enhanced by training children to verbalize 
task requirements as they engaged a task series, relative to 
training multiple exemplars alone? Another question 
followed: If rule training did facilitate generalization, 
were the effects attributable to the training of rules per 
se, or to the problem-solving behavior specified by the 
rules? 
Thirty-eight preschoolers were trained with four sets 
of matrix completion tasks in a pre-post design. The 
multiple exemplar group (ME) received minimal instructions 
and feedback across training tasks, as did all groups. The 
rule training condition (RT> additionally required children 
to verbalize a rule and then perform specified problem-
solving responses. The problem-solving control group (PSC) 
Isolated the impact of the rule training per se, by 
requiring problem-solving responses alone. Rule discovery 
training (RD) encouraged the child to verbalize task 
requirements. 
Results indicated that only the maintenance items 
revealed group differences on an unprompted posttest. 
Groups RT and FSC were comparable to each other and superior 
to group ME. 
On generalization items of the prompted posttest, 
groups RT and PSC were comparable to each other, and 
superior to groups RD and ME, which also were comparable. 
The problem-solving responses taught to RT and PSC children 
may have mediated generalization. Problem-solving responses 
increased in frequency from unprompted to prompted posttest, 
and were predictive of correct answers on a trial-to-trial 
basis. 
Rules taught to RT children did not appear to function 
as readily emitted responses. RT children emitted rules 
infrequently at unprompted posttest, and did no more 
problem-solving than PSC children. The prompts of the 
prompted posttest appeared necessary to do what it was hoped 
the rule training would do: promote high frequencies of 
problem-solving responses. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
The generality of the effects of experimental 
intervention upon nontargeted as well as targeted responses 
has become the focus of substantial empirical and 
theoretical work in the applied arena. Until recently, 
generalization was viewed merely as a failure to 
discriminate. But data generated by various theoretical 
paradigms and covering a wide range of tasks, behaviors, 
settings, and population samples, have often revealed little 
or no generalization across surprisingly similar contexts. 
These findings encouraged some writers to suggest that 
generalization was best considered a theoretically important 
process to be studied in its own right (Stokes & Baer, 1977; 
Kirschenbaum and Tomarken, 1982). 
Stokes and Baer (1977) categorized the procedures that 
have been used to obtain generalization in an effort to 
offer a preliminary technology of generalization. Most 
often cited were methods of "train and hope,n and sequential 
modification, unsystematic and restrictive methods that did 
not truly contribute to a technology of the programming of 
generalization. Although Stokes and Baer and Dick and 
Roberts (1982) called for the teaching of antecedent verbal 
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mediators as a logically promising means of inducing 
generalization, work of this nature has for the most part 
been neglected in the applied analysis of behavior in favor 
of more conventional reinforcement paradigms that targeted 
solution responses. 
Failure to obtain substantial generalization has not 
been confined to studies in behavior analysis, however. 
Data generated from the study of the ontogeny of memory have 
yielded parallel results. For example, the responses of 
young mentally retarded and normal preschool children do not 
generalize broadly as compared with the behavior of normal 
or older children. These difficulties appeared on testing 
tasks that were slightly different structurally, had 
slightly different response requirements, were administered 
in different settings, or were administered by different 
persons. If, however, training included feedback about the 
value of the mnemonic or strategy monitoring skills, 
learning disabled, retarded, and very young children 
sometimes applied mnemonic strategies across situations and 
tasks. These results led some researchers to conclude that 
a deficit in awareness of appropriate strategy usage, rather 
than a strategy deficit, was responsible for poor 
generalization. For writers such as Flavell (Flavell & 
Wellman, 1977) and Brown (1975), memory awareness and 
monitoring are critically important skills which tap into 
3 
executive control processes crucial to generalized strategy 
application. 
Brown (1979) recently called for memory training which 
explicitly teaches children to ask themselves questions 
about the nature of task demands, to monitor their success 
as they apply task strategies, and to assess the quality of 
their performance in the hope that such broadly worded 
verbalizations will maximize the chances of generalized 
effects. Brown acknowledged the similarity of this training 
to many self-instructional training (SIT) packages within 
the cognitive behavior modification (CBM) paradigm. SIT 
derived its impetus from the failure of conventional 
behavioral interventions to yield generalized effects. 
Although several SIT studies or SIT-like studies 
produced response generalization across settings (e.g., 
Meichenbaum & Goodman, 1971; Bornstein & Quevillon, 1976) 
and across tasks or responses (Palkes, Stewart, and Kahana, 
1968; Palkes, Stewart, and Friedman, 1972), others found no 
such generalization across settings (Friedling & O'Leary, 
1979), nor across tasks or responses (Douglas, Parry, 
Martin, & Gaston, 1977; Lovitt & Curtiss, 196S; Robin, 
Armel, & O'Leary, 1975). It is important to note that 
particularly in this paradigm, the relationship between 
training and generalization tasks in many of these studies 
was not systematically varied on logical grounds. Rather, 
generalization was sought in some instances between tasks 
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with virtually no overlapping response requirements (e.g., 
analogue academic to reading). 
The approaches of both the metacognition and CBM 
paradigms suffer in their implicit theoretical or procedural 
assumptions. In the case of traditional memory research, it 
is unwarranted to assume that the verbalization of 
supposedly metastrategic rules gain access to higher-order 
and qualitatively different executive processes than do 
task-specific rules. 
While CBM does not ascribe special theoretical status 
to generally phrased rules or self-questioning strategies, 
those who have adopted the approach have typically been 
equally remiss in assuming that the rules will exercise 
functional control over behavior. The inconsistent outcome 
results which plagued the SIT literature may partially be a 
result of this assumption. To this writer's knowledge, 
virtually no CBM studies have explicitly manipulated 
children's learning histories with rules. 
The present approach ascribed no special status to 
abstractly worded rules, rules which avoided the inclusion 
of task-specific referents, or rules which specified self-
checking or self-monitoring responses. While some rules may 
specify and control a larger or different set of responses 
than others as a function of prior learning, there is no 
need to infer a qualitatively different process. Thus, it 
is not necessary to assume that if children fail to 
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spontaneously (in the absence of explicit prompts) behave in 
accord with newly-learned task-specific strategies on a 
transfer task, they will behave in accord with newly-learned 
metastrategies on that transfer task. In each case it may 
be necessary to ensure, at least initially, that verbal 
rules exercise functional control over behavior. 
Categorizing instructed verbalizations in terms of 
their specification (or lack of specification) of response-
reinforcer contingencies or problem-solving responses is 
superior to many labels commonly employed to describe 
different experimental instructions such as concrete and 
conceptual (Kendall & Wilcox, 1980), or general and 
specific. Only by being precise about rules for identifying 
and classifying verbalizations can the effects of 
intervention themselves be generalized to other population 
samples or contexts. Descriptions of instructed 
verbalizations as general and specific (e.g., Schleser, 
Cohen, & Thackwray, 1983) are particularly troublesome as 
they appear to describe the effects of training rather than 
the occasion for the effects, and hence may easily encourage 
investigators to offer circular accounts of generalized 
effects. It is a present thesis that different rules are 
neither general nor specific: they may exercise varying 
degrees of control over responding as a function of the 
responses and contingencies they specify, the conditions 
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under which they are emitted, and the child's history with 
these and similar verbalizations. 
In the present study, generalization was examined 
across tasks that were logically related. Drawing from 
Becker (1971) and Carnine and Becker's (1982) discussions of 
generalized concept learning, while the examination of 
generalization and derivation of functional response classes 
is a matter of the evaluation of experimental investigation, 
the programming of generalization is as well a matter of 
logical considerations. The logical considerations made by 
an experimenter during his investigation of generalization 
deserve greater attention. So too, does the possibility of 
further extending generalization via the experimental 
manipulation of verbal antecedents. Finally, in agreement 
with Meichenbaum & Asarnow (1979), perhaps failures to 
spontaneously employ verbal mediators in learning or 
generalization are best viewed not as deficiencies within 
the child to produce or mediate, but as instructional 
deficiencies on the part of the experimenter. Indeed it is 
the experimenter who is responsible for programming an 
environment that will ultimately maximize the probability of 
learning and generalized learning. 
The present study examined the influence of rules upon 
the generality of training effects. Most basically, it 
addressed the effects of programming a sequence of tasks 
upon performance on task instances both within the training 
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task range and without. The tasks differed systematically 
from each other along an objectively specifiable continuum. 
The question was to what extent did rule training promote 
learning (including acquisition, maintenance, and 
generalization) over and above the programming of multiple 
exemplars (ME). Of interest was a comparison of two methods 
of engaging young children in rule emission. The first 
method was to prompt, in a noncoercive manner, verbalization 
of task rules as children engaged the tasks. The second 
method was to directly model and instruct children's 
verbalization of task rules. The rules specified problem-
solving responses and the contingency between such responses 
and task outcome. The present study further examined this 
second method by experimentally distinguishing the training 
of children in the use of rules from the training of 
behavior the rules specified. 
Generalization 
This discussion of generalization begins with a 
definition of terms. For Stokes and Baer (1977) 
generalization was said to be the occurrence of relevant 
behavior, "under different non-training conditions without 
the scheduling of the same event in those conditions as had 
been scheduled in the training conditions (p. 350)." The 
non-training conditions may be across subjects, settings, 
people, behaviors, and/or time. Stokes and Baer wrote, 
Thus, generalization may be claimed when no 
extratraining manipulations are needed for 
a 
extratraining changes; or may be claimed when some 
extra manipulations are necessary, but their cost or 
extent is clearly less than that of the direct 
intervention (p. 350). 
The present author endorsed this definition of 
generalization and concerned himself primarily with 
generalization across tasks (in which both task stimuli and 
response requirements varied between training and testing) 
and generalization across time. 
Stokes and Baer categorized techniques designed to 
assess, or implement generalization. Of greatest relevance 
to the present study were the methods of train and hope, 
sequential modification, sufficient exemplars, and mediate 
generalization. In the "train and hope" method, which 
characterized nearly half of the experiments they reviewed, 
generalization across one or more dimensions was noted but 
not actively programmed. In sequential modification, if 
generalization did not occur, intervention was explicitly 
programmed for that setting, person, behavior, or time. One 
illustration of this method cited by Stokes and Baer was 
that of Meichenbaum, Bowers, and Ross (1968) who found an 
absence of behavior changes from an afternoon intervention 
period to the morning period in a classroom for adolescent 
offenders. Generalization to the morning period required 
that the same intervention be applied in that setting. 
Another illustration of sequential modification was 
provided in a study by Lovitt and Curtiss (1968), who found 
that successful intervention for one-digit subtraction 
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problems did not generalize to two-digit subtraction 
problems. Nor did the same intervention, after successful 
application to two-digit mathematics problems generalize to 
mathematics problems of a slightly more complex format. The 
definition of this method (the application of intervention 
to each condition in which generalization is desired) itself 
implied an absence of generalization. If intervention must 
address every situation in which generalization is desired, 
then no generalization has taken place. 
In Stokes and Baer's method of training sufficient 
exemplars, sufficient examples of the same generalization 
lesson are taught until the induction is formed (i.e., until 
generalization occurs sufficiently to satisfy the problem 
posed). Note that the difference between this method and 
sequential modification is typically a measurement 
difference and not a procedural one. Sequential 
modification is usually concerned with generalization to 
only a few untrained conditions, and after its completion, 
generalization to other untrained circumstances often 
remains unexamined. With the training of sufficient 
exemplars, as Stokes and Baer pointed out, 
Generalization to untrained stimulus conditions 
and to untrained responses is programmed by the 
training of sufficient exemplars (rather than all) of 
these stimulus conditions or responses (p. 355). 
Just as the procedural definition for sequential 
modification implies that generalization to untrained 
conditions has not occurred, the procedural definition for 
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training sufficient exemplars implies that generalization 
has been obtained. 
Training multiple exemplars and looking for and 
measuring changes in untrained situations has been shown to 
be a successful means of producing generalization, 
particularly when the exemplars are stimulus exemplars and 
the stimuli are experimenters. For example, Stokes, Baer, 
and Jackson (1974) found that the training of retarded 
children's greeting responses by two experimenters (but not 
one) was sufficient to produce generalization of the 
response to over 20 members of the institution staff who had 
not participated in the response training. The efficacy of 
training response exemplars or stimulus exemplars in a form 
other than experimenter exemplars is theoretically 
promising. But the training of multiple exemplars have not 
been subjected sufficiently to experimental investigation, 
except perhaps in the realm of generalized concept learning 
(Becker, 1971; Carnine & Becker, 1982). Two exceptions 
follow. 
Baer, Peterson, and Sherman (1967) examined 
generalization across response exemplars. They found that 
reinforcing a subset of children's motor imitations of 
puppets produced imitative responses that had never 
previously been trained or reinforced. Solnick and Baer 
(1984) highlighted the importance of empirical evaluation of 
functional response classes. These writers reasoned that 
such evaluations might guide attempts at training sufficient 
exemplars and contribute to their efficacy. Solnick and 
Baer monitored preschoolers' performance on five formats of 
number-numeral correspondence problems. They found that 
intervention in perhaps one, two, or at most three problem 
formats ensured generalization to the remaining untrained 
formats. Stokes and Baer lament the paucity of research on 
training multiple exemplars. 
It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of 
studies in the behavior analysis literature subsumed under 
the generalization categories described above as well as 
others (i.e., introduce to natural maintaining 
contingencies, use indiscriminable contingencies) intervened 
via manipulation of response-reinforcer contingencies. The 
systematic manipulation of antecedents, and in particular 
verbal antecedents was rarely explored as a means of 
inducing ge»n«?ralization. This is surprising, as self-
verbalizations constitute responses that can be emitted 
relatively independent of the immediate environmental 
conditions. Verbal responses may have stimulus control 
functions. Thus, the potential for generalization is 
promising. As Skinner (1966) wrote, 
It is much easier to construct useful 
discriminative stimuli in verbal form. [Verbal 
responses are] easily recalled and capable of being 
executed anywhere. The verbal response makes it easier 
to learn to discriminate...to retain the discrimination 
over a period of time...to respond appropriately when 
the original discrimination is forgotten (p.231). 
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Similarly, Stokes and Baer <1977) wrote, 
Language is a response, of course; it is also, 
equally obviously, a stimulus to the speaker as well as 
to the listener. Thus it meets perfectly the logic of 
a salient common stimulus, to be carried from any 
training setting to any generalization setting that the 
child may ever enter (p.361). 
Stokes and Baer explicitly cited mediate generalization 
as a means of securing generalization. For these writers, 
mediated generalization required establishing a response as 
part of the new learning that was likely to be utilized in 
other problems as well, and constituted sufficient 
commonality between the original learning and the new 
problem to result in generalization. The most commonly used 
mediator is language, but self-control and self-management 
procedures also exemplify it. 
Stokes and Baer cited Risley and Hart (1968) as an 
example of an analysis of mediated generalization. These 
writers initially found that contingent reinforcement for 
four-year olds' reports (true or untrue) of play with a 
particular item, increased the occurrence of such reports, 
but did not influence actual play with the item. In a next 
phase, reinforcement was contingent upon true report only 
(the children had to both play with item X and report it to 
earn reward). In most instances, this procedure produced 
correspondence between saying and doing with play behavior 
increasing to meet the occurrence of its report. 
In a second experiment, the reinforce content--
reinforce correspondence sequence was repeated over a series 
of five additional items or activities. By the time the 
children encountered the third or fourth item, reinforcing 
content alone yielded substantial increases in the 
occurrence of nonverbal as well as verbal behavior. Risley 
and Hart concluded that generalization had been demonstrated 
over the course of the items, as verbal behavior began to 
control non-verbal behavior, such that saying would lead to 
doing. 
Two comments about this study as it bears on 
generalization deserve mention. First, even in the phases 
of the study in which generalization was purported to occur, 
reinforcement contingencies (i.e., intervention) for content 
were still in effect. When the reinforcement contingency 
was later switched to a new item, reports and usage of the 
previous item approached baseline. According to Stokes and 
Baer, generalization may be claimed when no extratraining 
manipulations are needed for extratraining changes, or when 
some extra manipulations are needed but their cost or extent 
is clearly less than that of the direct intervention. 
Risley and Hart's manipulations thus met this criterion, as 
over the course of training, reinforcing content alone 
yielded results that were initially obtainable only by 
reinforcing both content and behavior, a definite savings. 
However, this constituted a more liberal example of 
generalization than typically encountered in self-
instructional training paradigms, where prompts and 
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contingencies for self-verbalization are discontinued during 
testing. 
Second, differential reinforcement of saying led to 
doing in novel item instances not solely as a function of 
contingencies applied to corresponding verbal and nonverbal 
behavior. A likely critical element to the generalization 
that was obtained was the programming of multiple verbal-
nonverbal response exemplars. Though not emphasized by the 
writers, the multiple exemplar component was most likely 
necessary for generalized effects. 
Lovitt and Curtiss (1968) also trained a verbal 
response to bridge the learning from one set of conditions 
to another. Lovitt and Curtiss offered the observation that 
in comparison with the usual formal evaluation of response-
reinforcer contingency manipulations, teachers often 
manipulate antecedent events in the form of instructions or 
mnemonics, and evaluations of such instructions are 
generally casual. Their intervention consisted of simply 
instructing and modeling the verbalization of arithmetic 
problems before putting down an answer. During baseline, 
there was no such verbalization demand. For all three 
formats of single digit, double digit, and complex format 
subtraction problems, this intervention substantially 
reduced error rate and increased accuracy rate. Further, 
when baselines were reinstated and the child was discouraged 
from verbalizing, the behavioral effects of intervention 
(accuracy and error rates) maintained. 
However, generalization from problem type to problem 
type was not evident. That is, as mentioned earlier, high 
accuracy rates and low error rates did not transfer from 
one-digit subtraction problems to two-digit subtraction 
problems, nor from two-digit subtraction problems to one-
digit subtraction problems of a more complex format, despite 
the similarity of the problems. Thus, the intervention 
which immediately targeted problem verbalization, produced 
no generalization across highly similar tasks. The effect 
of verbalization generalized over time, though it might have 
been the case that reinforcing solution responses would have 
led to comparable maintenance effects. 
Lovitt and Curtiss did not explicitly address this 
question of the comparative effects of reinforcing solution 
responses versus manipulating verbal antecedents, but 
experimenters who did were Grimm, Bijou, & Parsons (1973). 
This study employed an operant problem-solving model to help 
two boys learn the concept of number. The arrangement of a 
one-to-one learning context, in which tutors provided 
continuous reinforcement for correct responses (outcomes) 
failed to increase accuracy rates above baseline for either 
child. Subsequently, training was initiated in which the 
covert, early part of the response chain was made overt 
(i.e., verbally identifying the written numerals, verbally 
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counting the symbols, and pointing to symbols while 
counting). Social reinforcement for each class of chaining 
response was eliminated over the course of training, until 
the only overt response the child was explicitly reinforced 
for was the circling solution response. 
Training produced high rates of accuracy which remained 
high after training was faded out. This study's importance 
lay in its explicit demonstration of the value of training 
problem-solving techniques versus response-outcome 
consequation in acquiring the concept of number. 
Implicitly, it highlighted the usefulness and versatility of 
language as a means of targeting typically covert problem 
solving responses that occur early in the response chain. 
This targeting of early, covert responses facilitated 
acquisition. But how then, might the training of verbal 
mediators facilitate generalization? Dick and Roberts 
(1982) addressed just this question with respect to response 
generalization. They wrote that, 
Two behaviors may be topographically related 
because both share highly relevant components. The 
keystone behavior is defined as that shared component. 
Once taught, it serves as an antecedent which affects 
the subject's skill level for a number of different 
responses. A program which teaches antecedent keystone 
behaviors may hold more promise for response 
generalization than programs which consequate terminal 
responses (p.3). 
It might be noted at this point that the limits of 
generalization may be topographically determined, but need 
not necessarily be so. Solnick and Baer described the 
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variety of task formats that they presented to children ae 
exemplars of the concept of number-numeral correspondence, 
and implied that what may have functionally "held" response 
classes together were their shared problem-solving response 
requirements. For example, Solnick & Baer suggested that 
their preschoolers' performances in formats 4 and 5 (versus 
1 through 3) appeared as a response class because in both 
cases the solution involved counting while simultaneously 
holding or attending to the target numeral. In other words, 
a greater memory requirement was present in formats 4 and 5 
than in 1 through 3. 
For the learning of tasks and concepts, then, where 
various task instances present both structural differences 
and response requirement differences, training verbal 
antecedent mediators may serve to cue common response 
requirements that occur relatively early in attentional and 
problem-solving phases. This might pave the way for a 
greater degree of response generalization than that which 
typically results from an operant reinforcement paradigm. 
Training verbal mediators is a method for obtaining 
generalization that has been infrequently explored within 
the applied analysis of behavior. 
A review of the behavior analysis literature as it 
addressed generalization, suggested that the procedures 
adopted by investigators were typically either unsystematic 
(e.g., train and hope) or failed to constitute valid 
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instances of generalization (e.g., sequential modification). 
The method of training sufficient exemplars, both stimulus 
and response, appeared quite effective though its 
demonstration within this literature was confined largely to 
multiple stimulus exemplars with experimenters as stimuli. 
The training of verbal mediators and verbal problem-
solving responses yielded dramatic effects upon response 
acquisition and maintenance. Though such methods have great 
theoretical potential for generalization, they only rarely 
addressed the generalization issue. One study (Risley & 
Hart, 1968) that did address the issue did not permit a 
separate evaluation of the effects of verbal mediation from 
that of multiple exemplars upon the generalization that 
resulted (a difficulty not uncommon to generalization 
studies born of other theoretical paradigms as well, to be 
discussed below). This kind of evaluation might prove quite 
useful from both conceptual and applied perspectives. 
Cognitive Behavior Modification 
Bornstein and Quevillon (1976) noted that frequently 
employed operant procedures such as response cost, 
contingency management, and timeout have been shown to 
improve the behavior of hyperactive and disruptive children. 
However, these procedures often produced limited effects. 
Some procedures failed to affect the behavior of a 
percentage of the subjects treated (Kazdin, 1973) or failed 
to yield training effects over time or across untrained 
conditions (e.g., Bornstein & Hamilton, 1975; O'Leary & 
Kent, 1973). 
Such results, along with Luria's (1961) model of the 
development of verbal self-regulation, and behavioral 
formulations of self-control, encouraged a variety of self-
instructional training (SIT) studies with children. To 
those working in the CBM paradigm, training children in 
verbal mediational skills was likely to produce a set of 
self-control skills that the child might apply in a wide 
range of situations. Meichenbaum and Goodman's (1971) oft-
cited study is prototypical of the SIT studies (in terms of 
both procedures and outcomes) and thus is reviewed in some 
detail. 
Citing the verbal mediation literature, Meichenbaum and 
Goodman suggested that a training program designed to 
improve task performance and engender self-control should 
provide explicit training in the comprehension of the task, 
the spontaneous production of mediators, and the use of such 
mediators to control nonverbal behavior. In their initial 
experiment, impulsive second grade children were exposed to 
either cognitive training or to one of two control 
procedures, applied to tasks tapping a range of skills from 
sensorimotor to complex problem-solving. Cognitive training 
featured a sequence of steps which progressed toward 
increased independence: the trainer initially performed a 
task, talking aloud while the child watched; eventually the 
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child performed the task while verbalizing covertly. The 
verbalizations which the trainer modeled and the child 
subsequently used included: 
(a) questions about the nature and demands of the 
task so as to compensate for a possible comprehension 
deficiency; (b) answers to these questions in the form 
of cognitive rehearsal and planning in order to 
overcome any possible production deficiency; (c) self-
instructions in the form of self-guidance while 
performing the task in order to overcome any possible 
mediation deficiency; and (d) self-reinforcement 
(Meichenbaum & Goodman, 1971, p. 117). 
The results indicated that the self-instruction 
(cognitive training) group improved relative to control 
groups at one-month follow-up on a variety of analogue 
measures including the Picture Arrangement subtest of the 
WISC and response latency on the MFF, but not on MFF errors, 
Block Design, or Coding subtests. This resulted despite the 
similarity of training and testing tasks. Nor did treatment 
effects generalize to the classroom, as indicated by 
behavioral ratings of appropriateness and attentlveness. 
Douglas, Parry, Marton, and Garson (1976) applied a 
training paradigm similar to that of Meichenbaum and 
Goodman's to a variety of tasks with 8-10 year-old 
hyperactive boys. Relative to the no-training control 
group, the trained group showed significantly greater 
improvement at posttesting and three-month follow-up on a 
variety of cognitive tasks such as listening, spelling, and 
oral comprehension tests. Children did not improve however, 
in terms of behavioral rating scales within the classroom, 
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nor was much evidence found for generalized improvement in 
arithmetic and reading skills. 
Camp, Blom, Herbert, and van Doorninck (1977) employed 
a "Think Aloud" program to improve self-control in six-to-
eight year old aggressive boys. The procedures were 
reported to be very similar to those described by 
Meichenbaum and Goodman (1971) in emphasizing the modeling 
of cognitive strategies and developing answers to the 
following four basic questions: "What is my problem?; What 
is my plan?; Am I using my plan? and; How did I do?" (p. 
160). Training tasks included cognitive tasks, 
interpersonal problem-solving games, and a complex version 
of "Simon says", among others. This training produced 
substantial improvement relative to controls on a variety of 
cognitive and psychomotor measures and in terms of classroom 
behavior as indicated by teacher ratings. 
Palkes, Stewart, and Kahana (1968) taught hyperactive 
nine-year old boys a set of self-directed verbal commands, 
which essentially asked that they, "Stopl Listen, Look, and 
Thinkl Beforel I answer." (p.821). While generalization of 
training effects to the classroom was not examined, the 
effects of training generalized from the training tasks 
(MFF), Embedded Figures Test (EFT) and Trail Making Test 
(TMT) to the posttest measure (Porteus Mazes). 
Kendall and Finch (1978) trained impulsive children 
within a clinical population of emotionally disturbed 
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children in verbal self-instructions via modeling with 
response-cost contingent upon errors during training. 
Relative to a control group which did not receive training 
in verbal self-instruction nor contingent response cost, 
intervention effects generalized from training tasks to the 
MFF and to teacher ratings of classroom behavior. Effects 
maintained at follow-up, two months after posttreatment 
evaluation. 
Robin, Armel & O'Leary (1975) taught five- and six-
year-old kindergartners with supposed writing deficiencies 
to print using either self-instructions or direct training 
(feedback and reinforcement only). A no-treatment control 
group was also included. Four upper case letters were used 
for training while the remaining letters of the alphabet 
were sampled to test for generalized effects of training. 
While SIT proved superior to direct training and the control 
condition in terms of acquisition on the previously trained 
letters, the effects of training did not generalize to any 
untrained target letters. 
Bornstein and Quevillon (1976) used a self-
instructional training package with three overactive four-
year-old boys in a multiple baseline design across subjects. 
Training effects generalized from the training tasks, which 
included tests of simple sensory-motor skills and more 
complex tasks such as block design and conceptual grouping, 
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to on-task behavior within the classroom. Treatment gains 
were maintained 22 1/2 weeks after baseline was initiated. 
Friedling and O'Leary (1979) attempted to replicate the 
work of Bornstein and Quevillon with older children. They 
exposed seven and eight year-old hyperactive children to 
either a self-instructional training group or an attention-
practice control group which omitted the self-instructional 
component. 
The initial self-instruction, relative to the control 
condition, produced generalized effects to easy mathematics 
problems, but not to other academic measures nor to on-task 
behavior within the classroom. A subsequent program of 
contingent reinforcement for on-task behavior within the 
classroom, did not influence any of the academic measures 
but did yield substantial increases in on-task behavior. 
To quote Meichenbaum and Asarnow (1979), 
As one surveys the CBM literature with children 
who manifest self-control problems, the evidence for 
treatment efficacy is promising, but the evidence for 
treatment generalization, especially across response 
modes and settings is less convincing and often 
equivocal (p. 11). 
What accounted for these often disappointing results 
with respect to generalization? Several of the studies 
mentioned above (Meichenbaum & Goodman, 1971; Douglas et 
al., 1977) were particularly vague in their specification of 
training tasks, and the relationship between such tasks and 
the dependent measures on which generalization was sought. 
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What thus appeared to be at least an implicit 
assumption of several of these studies was that intervention 
would engender problem-solving strategies that exercised a 
functional autonomy independent of the task context. That 
problem-solving skills exist independent of the task has 
been debated (Skinner, 1966; Engelmann, 1971). 
It is suggested here that if one is to train children 
under one set of circumstances or conditions and test in 
another (our defining characteristic of generalization) one 
must have some model or guideline by which he or she can 
reasonably expect generalization and justify probing for it, 
a priori. To illustrate, in looking at generalization 
across tasks, the hypothetical common stimulus components or 
common response demands might be presented (e.g., Solnick & 
Baer, 1984). In looking at generalization across responses, 
particularly responses whose topography is quite divergent, 
the hypothesized keystone response components might be 
explicated. Empirically deriving the limits and 
directionality of functional response classes may prove to 
be a very worthwhile endeavor (Dick & Roberts, 1982; Solnick 
& Baer, 1984). Natural contingencies operative in the test 
setting that might "trap" targeted behavior and thus foster 
generalization might be explicated (Friedling & O'Leary, 
1979). 
A theoretical model of the training and generalization 
conditions, the corresponding response requirements, or the 
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interaction of these variables with the characteristics of 
the learner, might function to make generalization more 
predictable and controllable. The model might help avoid 
unrealistic efforts that, for example, trained children on 
modified intelligence tests and examined generalization on 
academic achievement tasks (e.g., Douglas et al., 1976) or 
trained analogue task performance in a one-to-one setting 
and examined generalization to on-task behavior in the 
classroom (Meichenbaum & Goodman, 1971). 
A second question was how to interpret the inconsistent 
results of the SIT training, given that virtually all 
studies described above cited the original Meichenbaum and 
Goodman (1971) study as the model for their training 
procedures. Relatedly, SIT may be conceptualized as 
encompassing numerous treatment components, only a subset of 
which entail the self-instructions per se. How confident 
can one be, in the case where intervention was successful, 
that such success could be attributed to children's 
verbalization of instructions, and not the reinforcement 
contingencies, nor behavioral modeling, nor even the 
modeling of self-instructions? Other SIT components 
typically included overt and covert rehearsal, prompts to 
self-instruct, fading of prompts, feedback regarding self-
instructions and outcome, and social and material 
reinforcement contingencies to shape and maintain self-
instruction. In all fairness, it should be noted that some 
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researchers whose immediate focus was on the outcome of SIT 
intervention, acknowledged their failure to address process 
questions and the need to do so in the future (Douglas, et 
al., 1976; Camp et al. , 1976). 
In some instances, to complicate matters further, 
elements of intervention not typically included within the 
SIT package and elsewhere implicated in fostering 
generalized treatment effects, were paired with SIT. For 
example, the Douglas et al. study included elements of 
training multiple stimulus exemplars in the form of 
trainers, teachers, and parents. To increase the likelihood 
that techniques generalized, Camp et al. encouraged 
children's development of alternative plans, solutions, and 
outcomes, a package itself shown to yield generalized 
effects (Shure & Spivack, 1980). In both of these studies, 
then, it was quite possible that training components other 
than the conventional self-instruction per se were 
responsible for generalization. In other studies, it was 
demonstrated with some certainty that generalized effects 
were due not to the rule-based intervention per se, but to 
other components. As we saw, Friedling and O'Leary failed 
to obtain generalization from the training of intelligence 
task performance to on-task behavior in the classroom, until 
such behavior was explicitly consequated, an example of 
sequential modification. Kendall and Finch (1978) found a 
direct correlation between response cost occurrences and 
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behavioral improvement in the classroom, and suggested that 
the response cost enactments were causally responsible for 
the generalized effects in the classroom. 
The conventional SIT package has been subjected to some 
process research in an effort to tease apart the degree of 
contribution of various components to training and 
generalization effects. For example, in a second experiment 
in the original Meichenbaum and Goodman study, SIT was 
compared to an attentional control group and a cognitive 
modeling group. The latter included all treatment 
components as SIT except for the training and instruction in 
self-instructions. This controlled for the influence of 
cognitive modeling per se. Results indicated that children 
trained in self-instruction showed greater generalization to 
the MFF in terms of response latency and errors than 
children in the remaining two conditions. 
Complementing and further delineating these results, 
Palkes, Stewart, and Freedman (1972) trained hyperactive 
boys to vocalize aloud the self-directed commands or 
instructed them to read the commands silently, as they 
worked with the MFF, the Embedded Figure Test (EFT), and the 
Trail Making Test (TMT). Results indicated that only the 
children who vocalized aloud showed treatment effects which 
generalized to the Porteus Maze posttest, though this 
difference did not maintain at a two-week delayed retest. 
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While Robin, Armel, & O'Leary's (1975) study did not 
experimentally dismantle SIT components, process questions 
were nonetheless addressed. In contrast to the two studies 
cited above, these researchers cast some doubt on the 
utility of targeting children's self-verbalizations. In 
this study, children's rates of spontaneous, overt self-
instruction were recorded as a means of providing an 
outcome-independent check on the effectiveness of self-
instruction. While seven of ten children in the self-
instruction group spontaneously self-instructed on the 
target letter posttest, none did so on the generalization 
posttest. Further, correlations between percent correct 
letter performance and the rate of self-instructions were 
nonsignificant. Moreover, it was observed that. 
While some subjects self-instructed correctly, 
they were simultaneously observed to make incorrect 
writing responses, suggesting that their verbal and 
motor response systems were often functionally 
independent (p. 185). 
Roberts and Mullis (1980) found that impulsive first-
grade children who received self-instructional training with 
arithmetic problems outperformed an instructions only and a 
control group on a test of arithmetic performance. However, 
they did not outperform children assigned to a behavioral 
modeling or a verbal modeling group, the latter differing 
from SIT only with respect to the self-verbalization 
component. Kendall and Braswell (1982) assigned non-self-
controlled problem children, who ranged in age from eight to 
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twelve years, to a cognitive-behavioral (SIT) treatment, a 
behavioral treatment which differed from SIT only in the 
absence of the cognitive modeling and self-instruction 
components, or an attention-control condition. 
The results of posttreatment and ten-week follow-up 
indicated that the cognitive-behavioral treatment was 
superior to the other conditions on teachers' blind ratings 
of self-control and non-blind therapist ratings of 
improvement, while both the cognitive-behavioral and 
behavioral treatments were comparable to each other and 
superior to the controls on teacher ratings of hyperactivity 
and WRAT spelling performance. While claim was made that 
other academic measures and MFF performance showed 
cognitive-behavioral and behavioral conditions to be 
superior to controls, and that only the cognitive behavioral 
treatment showed improvements in children's self-report of 
self concept, these claims were made on the basis of post-
hoc statistical analyses of trials effects, in the absence 
of conditions effects or trials x conditions interaction. 
A summary of the results of the CBM literature reviewed 
thus far is tentatively offered at this point. Results are 
reviewed first with respect to outcome, distinguishing 
between generalization across tasks (analogue or academic) 
and settings, and subsequently with respect to process. In 
terms of treatment outcome, CBM-SIT intervention more often 
than not yielded behavior change (e.g., observer ratings of 
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on-task behavior) across settings. A fair amount of 
generalization across tasks from training to testing 
conditions was observed when the tasks were analogue 
performance tasks (e.g., MFF, Porteus Mazes, or modified 
intelligence test tasks) but generalization was far less 
common, and perhaps somewhat surprising when training and 
generalization tasks were academically relevant ones. 
Several writers have indicated that the effectiveness of SIT 
in generating generalized effects over tasks may well hinge 
upon task analyses that take into account the degree to 
which the target skills already fall within the child's 
repertoire (Robin, Armel, and O'Leary, 1975; Feinberg and 
Roberts, I960), the degree to which targeted behaviors are 
accompanied by stable ability factors <Bornstein & 
Quevillon, 1976), and the degree to which the tasks entail 
motoric response components (Roberts & Dick, 1982). These 
factors may partly account for the moderately greater 
success SIT has had in yielding generalized results across 
analogue versus academic measures. Subject factors have 
also been implicated in mediating successful SIT effects, 
most notably that of self-attribution, which will be 
addressed below. 
In terms of process, the results of studies reviewed 
above favored an interpretation that self-instruction, most 
conservatively taken to include instructions to self-
instruct, and modeling, prompting and chaining of self-
instructions, was more effective in yielding generalization 
than treatments which did not include these elements. Less 
conservatively, there were occasional studies that 
implicated the self-instructing element per se, versus the 
modeling of self-instruction, and the overt versus covert 
rehearsal elements, as essential. However, given the 
inconsistency of the outcome data, more process research of 
this nature is needed. The SIT paradigm has yielded some 
promising results, but it has not been a panacea for 
failures to generalize, as originally anticipated. 
Self-instructional content. It is somewhat surprising, 
given the strong conceptual impetus for SIT studies provided 
by the Soviet cognitive-developmental theorizing of Vygotsky 
(1962) and Luria (1961), that relatively little process 
research has attended to the nature or content of the self-
instruct ione. Luria, for example, expounded a verbal-
developmental self-regulatory progression, the first stage 
of which was characterized by the inability of the child's 
own speech to control behavior, and by the ability of 
adults' speech to exercise inhibitory but not excitatory 
control. The child progresses to the point where his or her 
own speech may initiate behavior but not inhibit it, and 
finally to the point where it is purely the semantic aspects 
of the child's own speech rather than the motoric, which 
come to control his or her behavior. Thus, the emphasis 
during the preschool years is on the child's newly 
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developing and semantically based verbal self-regulatory 
skills. 
The validity of the Lurian model of developmental self-
regulation has been the subject of considerable debate and 
empirical scrutiny (e.g., Wozniak, 1973). In the present 
context, the model is widely acknowledged to have served as 
an important heuristic device in providing the original 
conceptual impetus for a host of CBM studies. 
If the goal then, of self-instructional training 
programs is to teach children a set or repertoire of 
verbalizations that will serve as stimuli to control a large 
class of responses or multiple classes, what exactly is it 
that we wish to teach children to say? The original SIT 
paradigm of Meichenbaum and Goodman featured: 
(a) questions about the nature and demands of the 
task, to compensate for a child's failure to comprehend 
the nature of the problem; (b) answers to these 
questions in the form of cognitive rehearsal and 
planning, to overcome a possible deficiency in the 
spontaneous production of mediators; (c) self-
instructions in the form of self-guidance while 
performing the task, in order to overcome a failure to 
mediate or regulate overt behavior verbally, and; (d) 
self-reinforcement (p. 117). 
Very few direct attempts have been made to 
experimentally compare various types of self-instructions as 
conceptualized by Meichenbaum and Goodman or others, for 
that matter. 
Three recent studies that did experimentally vary the 
nature of the self-instructions and looked at the effects 
upon generalized learning were those of Kendall and Wilcox 
(1980), Feinberg and Roberts (1980), and Schleser, Meyers, 
Cohen, and Thackwray (1983). Kendall and Wilcox compared 
the effectiveness of self-instructional training that 
featured "conceptual" versus "concrete" statements in 
working with non-self-controlled problem children, 8 to 12 
years of age. These writers reasoned that, "corresponding 
to notions of metacognitive development, where the focus is 
on awareness of the thinking process," (p. 81), the 
conceptual labeling/training procedures were thought to be 
more likely to affect behavior change and facilitate 
generalization of treatment effects. 
Differential results were not evident on several 
performance measures (MFF, Porteus Mazes) or subject self-
report. However, the conceptual SIT yielded greater 
generalization than remaining conditions as indicated by 
teachers' blind ratings of self-control and hyperactivity. 
This study was the first attempt to experimentally vary and 
examine the nature of the instructions typically employed 
within the SIT paradigm. It can, however, be criticized on 
a number of grounds. First, the authors failed to 
explicitly attend to the relationship, if any, between tasks 
used in training and tasks used as indices of 
generalization. The training tasks, from which 
generalization was sought, were described in little more 
detail than, "various psychoeducational exercises." (p. 83). 
These writers at worst, appeared to be presupposing that 
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their intervention would be effective independent of the 
task context in which the verbalizations were trained. At 
best, they insufficiently explicated the stimulus or 
response requirement commonalities between training and 
transfer tasks. Doing so might have provided a logical 
basis from which generalization could have been posited to 
occur as a function of verbal training. 
Second, Kendall & Wilcox wrote that, 
The 'concrete' directions were worded so as to 
apply specifically only to the task at hand, the 
'conceptual' directions, by contrast, were worded more 
globally and abstractly, in such a way that they could 
apply to a wide range of situations (p. 82). 
Examples of concrete and conceptual statements were 
given, but the above was as close to a definition of the 
statements as Kendall and Wilcox came. The difficulty with 
their definition was the ease with which it led toward 
circular explanations of differential treatment effects. 
The effect of intervention became its own explanation. 
Hence, if a "conceptual" or "general" approach yields 
greater generality of training effects, it is the result of 
the general training. And we know the training was general 
because it yielded stronger generalization effects. Clearly 
an account of this nature contributes little to an 
understanding of the generalization process. The results of 
studies of generalization which employ rule-based or 
verbally-based interventions can themselves be generalized 
only to the extent that a conceptual framework is explicated 
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that identifies the commonalities within various sets of 
rules and verbalizations. This must not be done solely on 
the basis of the differential effects such sets of rules or 
verbalizations might have upon behavior across tasks and 
time. 
One model which might prove useful in this respect is 
the problem-solving model of Grimm, Bijou, and Parsons 
(1973) which will be discussed below. Feinberg and Roberts 
(1980) experimentally varied the nature of the self-
instructions within an SIT paradigm in an attempt to 
replicate Kendall and Wilcox. These writers trained first-
through fifth-grade learning disabled children to employ 
either concrete or conceptual self-instructional statements 
as they worked with phonics, vocabulary, and reading-related 
tasks. Although a generalized effect to mathematics tasks 
was not found for either the concrete or conceptual training 
nor for the direct instruction control, differential effects 
were found on the Spache Reading Test. 
Mildly deficient children profited more from the 
conceptual intervention than did children in the other two 
groups, while severely deficient children profited more from 
the direct instruction control than did children in the 
other two conditions. This finding was consistent with 
others that have implicated the role of available response 
repertoires as determinants of SIT outcome (Higa, Tharp, & 
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Calkins, 1978; Robin, Armel, & O'Leary, 1975; Bornstein & 
Quevillon, 1976). 
With regard to the current discussion, Feinberg and 
Roberts objectively anchored their distinction between 
concrete and conceptual statements by adopting their 
concrete statements from the task directions in elementary 
textbooks and workbooks which provided the training tasks. 
The conceptual statements were adopted from those employed 
by Palkes et al., (1968; 1972) and Camp et al., (1977). 
While this attempt to objectively differentiate the 
conceptual and concrete statements was a step in the right 
direction, the general (conceptual) and specific (concrete) 
labels still encourage circular explanations. Also, as with 
the Kendall and Wilcox study, generalization was sought 
across widely divergent tasks without sufficient explanation 
of common stimulus elements or response requirements between 
tasks upon which the verbally based intervention might 
operate. 
Schleser, Meyers, Cohen, & Thackwray (1983) included 
comparisons between treatments which featured, 
...specific content instructions designed to 
provide an optimal strategy for successful performance 
on a math training task, Cor a] broad problem-solving 
strategy applicable to a variety of tasks but not 
anchored to a particular task (p. 954). 
The results pertaining to these two experimental 
conditions indicated that the specific content self-
instructions proved superior to the general instructions on 
a task similar to training (FIAT Math) but the general 
instructions were superior to the specific on untrained 
generalization measures (PIAT Spelling and General 
Information). As with the previous two studies, no model 
was offered a priori to distinguish and independently 
validate the "specific" and "general" content self-
instructions. Nor was an account offered which might have 
explicated the common task variables or task-approach 
variables upon which intervention might have successfully 
operated. 
One model that might prove useful in this regard is the 
problem solving model proposed by Grimm, Bijou, and Parsons 
(1973). These writers suggested that problem-solving is not 
simply concerned with emitting a solution but with the 
techniques of finding the solution. 
A problem-solving sequence begins with an external 
stimulus having a discriminative function, goes through 
a series of observable and nonobservable stimulus-
response-stimulus interactions, and ends with an 
external response and a reinforcement (p.27). 
Failure to emit the complete problem-solving sequence 
including the solution response might occur because the 
response is unavailable, the conditioned reinforcers in the 
chain are not functional, or because stimuli in the chain do 
not exercise discriminative control. Grimm et al. applied 
their model to the learning of number-numeral correspondence 
problems in a single subject design with two boys enrolled 
in a class for retarded and emotionally disturbed children. 
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Focusing on the discriminative control element, 
training was initiated in which the covert part of the 
response chain was made overt so that mediating responses 
could be monitored and reinforced. This intervention led to 
high degrees of accuracy, whereas prior reinforcement of 
correct solution responses alone, did not. 
Though not emphasized by these writers, making the 
covert part of the response chain overt entailed verbal 
training, specifically the verbal identification of written 
numerals and counting symbols aloud. That verbal training 
might be a particularly useful means of strengthening a 
problem-solving sequence was implied by Winokur (197S) who 
asked, 
Can the mander and the reinforcement mediator be 
one and the same person? It seems that they can. As a 
results of having been conditioned to (a) mand and (b) 
mediate, by someone else, we play both roles to others 
and ourselves. Adults as a accomplished manders-
compliers, seem to approach everything as if it were a 
verbal problem, and they use the verbal responses as 
discriminative stimuli to cue nonverbal responses (p. 
38). 
Teaching children to verbalize stimulus elements, mand 
their own behavior, or state partial or full contingencies 
might prove to be an effective means of establishing 
problem-solving sequences of behavior. The problem-solving 
model of Grimm et al. importantly highlighted the need to 
attend to early overt or covert task requirements in the 
problem-solving sequence. Lloyd (1980), citing the Grimm et 
al. study among others, called for "attack strategy 
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training," (p. 59), to promote generalization. This 
training featured the training of specific strategies as 
opposed to training in self-verbalization and self-
instruction which Lloyd deemed unnecessary. He wrote that 
task-specific strategies appear to have a better chance of 
promoting generalization than general strategies at least in 
the realm of academics. 
There is no logical reason, however, to dismiss self-
verbalization training if one favors an approach which 
stresses the training of attack strategies. As already 
pointed out, the Grimm et al. study employed verbal training 
as a means of making implicit, covert, and specific problem-
solving responses explicit and overt. Verbal training may 
well be an important means of fostering generalization by 
strengthening "specific" problem-solving responses common to 
a range of tasks. This model with its distinction between 
problem-solving and solution responses, in addition to 
guiding task analyses, may also help discourage 
nonconstructive conceptualizations of general and specific 
statements. 
In sum, few studies directly examined the differential 
influence of the self-instructional content. The handful of 
studies that did yielded sharply diverging results for the 
effectiveness of the conceptual/general training relative to 
the concrete/specific. These ranged across studies from an 
absence of generalization effects for academic measures 
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(Feinberg and Roberts, 1980) to generalization on behavioral 
rating scales only (Kendall & Wilcox, 1980) to substantial 
generalization effects across widely different academic 
measures (Schleser et al., 1983). 
All three studies can be faulted on two common grounds. 
First, they offered labels for their categories of 
verbalization training that may encourage circular accounts 
of the effects they tried to explain. Second, they failed 
to explicate adequately the relationship between training 
and transfer tasks. Both may hinder an understanding of the 
training and task circumstances that do or do not lead to 
generalization. 
Grimm, Bijou, & Parsons (1973) offered a conceptual 
framework for problem-solving that may be useful in 
objectively anchoring verbal self-instructions and devising 
task analyses. It is also quite compatible with Stokes and 
Baer's (1977) concept of mediated generalization. A 
problem-solving response may form a common core for a range 
of tasks. As discussed above, verbal training has been 
proposed to be a theoretically important means of 
strengthening a problem-solving response and sequence. 
Training a verbal response which specifies this common 
problem-solving response would then be a potent means of 
securing generalization, and would fall within the realm of 
operations discussed earlier as mediated generalization. A 
response is established as part of the new learning that is 
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likely to be utilized in other problems as well, because it 
specifies a shared response component that enhances the 
probability of solving the problems. 
Metacoanitlve Development 
Discussion will now, for the moment, turn away from 
cognitive-behavioral and behavioral conceptualizations and 
remediations of the generalization problem and turn toward 
applied investigation and conceptualization of metacognition 
and its development. Metacognitive development operates 
from a paradigm conceptually distinct from traditional 
behavioral and cognitive-behavioral approaches. It is 
concerned with the acquisition of knowledge and cognition 
about cognitive development. 
Brown (1975) made a distinction between knowing how to 
know and knowing about knowing. The former referred to 
mnemonic strategies which were deliberately instigated for 
the purpose of remembering. In reference to the latter, 
which encompassed metamemory, Brown wrote that young 
children do not realize a need to memorize: they are 
oblivious to the limitations of their memory capacity. For 
Brown, it is the intention to use an appropriate strategy, 
"subordinated to the goal of remembering" (p. 113), that is 
deficient in the developmentally young, and not any specific 
memorial skill per se. 
Flavell and Wellman (1977) suggested that sensitivity 
to instructions to remember and subsequently employ a 
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mnemonic is an index of metamemory. They suggested that 
young children seldom deliberately try to retrieve or 
prepare for future retrieval, in response to situations that 
commonly elicit precisely those sorts of cognitive efforts 
in mature individuals. 
Brown (197S) described the metacognitive processes as 
including: (a) prediction and planning which precede 
problem-solving attempts; (b) checking and monitoring which 
are subsequently performed to evaluate the outcome of these 
attempts; (c) checking outcomes for internal consistency and 
against common sense criteria. In short, such processes as 
checking, planning, self-questioning, self-testing, and 
monitoring ongoing attempts to solve problems are viewed as 
central components of metacognitive development. 
For the present writer, the concept of metacognition 
became clearer as data that gave rise to notions of 
metastrategic failure were reviewed, and interventions which 
allegedly tapped metacognitive awareness were examined. For 
example, citing Heichenbaum and Asarnow (1979), while 
kindergartners know that a memory task is harder if it has a 
large number of items, only older children know that a 
recall task is harder if one has to learn two sets of words 
that are easily confused. According to Brown (1978) third-
graders were said to demonstrate metacognition when 95% of 
those queried reported that they would prefer to phone a 
friend's number right after getting it rather than get a 
43 
drink of water first. Kindergartners generally failed to 
demonstrate awareness of planful behavior, as only 40'/. 
preferred to phone immediately. Brown reported that if the 
task is sufficiently simple, evidence of planful 
(metastrategic) behavior can be seen in children as young as 
three. For example, Wellman, Ritter, and Flavell (1975) 
inferred metacognitive awareness on the part of three-year 
olds who, when asked to remember the location of a toy 
subsequently hidden by a cup, touched the cup or pointed to 
it, as a means of correctly responding. 
Brown and Barclay (1976) claimed to implicitly address 
metamemorial processes in their intervention when they 
instructed children to look at the stimulus pictures as long 
as they wanted, and only when they knew them very well, to 
ring the bell and say them back, on a recall of common 
objects task. Kendall, Borkowski, and Cavanaugh (1980) were 
said to train metastrategies when with paired associated 
picture tasks, they taught children to verbalize a 
relationship (e.g., the nurse holds the toaster). and give a 
reason for the relationship. Metastrategy training also 
featured the provision of feedback as to the value of the 
strategy. 
According to Brown and DeLoache (1978) these 
metastrategies of checking, planning, question-asking, self-
testing, and self-monitoring are basic characteristics of 
efficient thought, and one of their most important 
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properties is that they are transituational. If so, then 
what better way to engender generalizable training effects 
than to train these strategies? Meichenbaum and Asarnow 
pointed out the similarity of Brown's description of the 
elements of metacognitive processes and the content of the 
self-instructions as typically formulated by CBM 
interventions such as those of Palkes et al., (1968; 1972) 
and Camp et al. (1976). Brown, Campione, and Barclay (1979) 
also acknowledged the similarity and have in fact explicitly 
called for self-interrogatory training with the eventual aim 
of training the child to think dialectically, as fostered by 
a socratic teaching method. These authors endorsed 
providing the child with a routine set of questions to ask 
himself before proceeding, for example: (a) Stop and Think! 
(b) Do I know what to do? (c> Is there anything more I need 
to know before I can begin? and (d) Is there anything more I 
need to know that will help me (i.e., is this problem in any 
way like one I have done before)? 
This routine is strikingly similar to that proposed 
originally by Meichenbaum and Goodman and many of the other 
SIT reformulations reviewed above. Thus, two distinct 
conceptual paradigms studying children's behavior or memory 
performance on quite dissimilar tasks and often in divergent 
settings with different population samples, converged in 
their implication of self-interrogatory strategies as a 
promising means of promoting generalization. 
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This section thus far has attempted to provide the 
reader with a working understanding of metacognitive 
training by offering some background in its 
conceptualization and instances of its application. Recent 
redirections of its application were also discussed. 
This leads to a discussion of the empirical impetus for 
metastrategy training and a review of the results and 
implications of select studies which featured metastrategic 
interventions. The following section will attempt to 
integrate the empirical data and address the conceptual 
status and utility of the metamemory approach in comparison 
to a behavioral or cognitive-behavioral approach. 
As with the CBM-SIT approach discussed above, the 
empirical impetus for studies of metastrategy training came 
from more conventional studies which often yielded training 
effects of surprisingly limited generality. These studies 
typically entailed training children in the use of various 
mnemonic strategies and testing for recall at another time, 
on another task, or in another context. Mentally retarded 
or learning-disabled children were often the population from 
which the sample was drawn, but parallel results were found 
with younger (typically preschool) children. 
Brown (1978) wrote that slow learners and retardates do 
learn mnemonics, do improve their recall and that these 
effects can be maintained over time, but evidence for 
generalization is difficult to find. Brown and Barclay 
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(1976) found that explicit training in a suitable mnemonic 
was sufficient to improve and sustain the performance of 
older retardates on a serial recall of pictures task, but 
lasting effects were not found for younger retardates (mean 
MA, 6 years, S months). Brown interestingly and anecdotaliy 
reported that her lab never found reliable differences 
between experienced and naive subjects entering a new 
experiment. This informal observation offered an 
independent substantiation of the narrowness of children's 
learning within Brown's experiments. But results of this 
nature are not limited to samples of retarded children. 
Studies of preschool, kindergarten, and second-grade 
children found that transfer on discrimination learning 
tasks did not occur when the task format changed from 
successive to simultaneous discrimination or the reverse 
(Campione & Beaton, 1972; Campione & Brown, 1973). Crisafi 
and Brown (19S3) working with normal two, three, and four-
year olds on a series of increasingly difficult inferential 
reasoning tasks, found no generalization across tasks for 
two-year olds and only limited generalization across tasks 
for three-year-olds. The extent of generalization for the 
latter group of children, limited as it was, was attributed 
to the stimulus similarity of two of the three tasks. 
Brown and Barclay (1976) in a study referred to briefly 
above, "implicitly confront ted] the executive control 
problem," (p. 73), in teaching young (mean MA, 6-8) and old 
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(mean MA, 8-5) retardates to recall the names of pictures of 
common objects. The design compared the effectiveness of a 
label condition, an anticipation condition, and a rehearsal 
condition,the latter two of which were described to entail a 
critical self-test element. 
Results indicated that on a prompted posttest the day 
after training all children in the anticipation and 
rehearsal conditions outperformed children in the label 
condition, but for the younger children these differences 
did not maintain two weeks later on an unprompted posttest. 
Some process (observational) data indicated that the younger 
children in the anticipation and rehearsal conditions still 
used their trained strategies during the unprompted 
posttest, prompting these writers to conclude that the 
younger subjects did not abandon the strategy, "but failed 
to monitor Cits] efficient use." (p. 78). For Brown and 
Barclay the strategy was no longer, "subordinated in a 
meaningful way to the goal of the metamemory task." (p. 79). 
Nonetheless, the results of the study were promising 
for older children at least, and invited Brown, Campione, 
and Barclay (1979) to continue and extend the investigation 
with the same children. With respect to maintenance of 
intervention effects on the training task, it was found that 
one year later and without prompts, the same reliable group 
differences maintained for the older children. For the 
younger children, no such differences were found and 
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performance remained at very low levels. When children were 
reminded of their formerly trained strategies, differences 
emerged for the younger children but once again did not 
persist. 
During a generalization phase three months later which 
entailed the older children only, children in the 
anticipation and rehearsal groups outperformed those in 
label and control conditions. The task required them to 
recall the gist of reading passages, as measured by ratings 
of the importance of the idea units recalled. While Brown 
et al. called this study their first successful attempt in 
teaching a generalized cognitive skill in EMR's on a quite 
dissimilar recall readiness task, there were some 
difficulties with the study. Claimed group differences 
during the generalization phase were apparently not 
substantiated with appropriate post-hoc analyses, and as the 
authors point out, observational data did not rule out the 
amount of training as a confound. Implicating 
contingencies, by telling children that it "helps some 
people to underline, mark the paper, take notes, etc., to 
check if they are ready for a test," (p. 507), did not 
improve recall nor did it lead to increased note-taking, 
underlining, etc., in this sample of EMR children. 
That such intervention might prove helpful was 
indicated by the work of Kennedy and Miller (1976) with 
normal 6-7 year olds. Following training to verbally 
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rehearse on a serial recall task, those who subsequently 
failed to spontaneously rehearse were divided into feedback 
and no feedback conditions. Only children in the feedback 
condition, who received information about the value of the 
verbal strategy, maintained its usage. 
"Information," however, included verbal reinforcement, 
prompting, feedback, and had strong demand characteristics 
(e.g., "My goodness you did so much better when you 
whispered those names over and over. I guess whispering 
helped you remember the pictures better. Right?" p. 567). 
Kennedy and Miller properly highlighted the need to look at 
the effects of such feedback both across tasks and time. 
Belmont, Butterfield, and Borkowski (1978) worked with 
12-15 year olds on letter recall tasks with sequential 
letter presentation. All children were trained to use an 
appropriate mnemonic strategy on a first task, but on a 
second and highly similar task half the children were given 
"generalization training." The results two weeks later 
indicated that the generalization training was superior in 
terms of far generalization (to a letter position probe 
task) and long-term near generalization. A problematic 
aspect of this study was the vagueness with which the 
generalization training was described. The authors briefly 
described the strategies taught and their intent to "have 
the child understand the harmony of input and output 
processes and the similarities and differences between [the 
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different strategies]," (p.421), but they were imprecise in 
their account of how such strategies were taught (e.g., via 
verbal instruction with rules, verbal modeling, verbal 
prompting, reinforcement, etc.). Another difficulty was 
that the generalization group received twice as much 
training as its control, and hence the amount of training 
was inextricably confounded with the nature of such 
training. 
Kendall, Borkowski, and Cavanaugh (1980) trained EMR 
children (Mean MA = 6.9 years) on paired-associate picture 
tasks and tested them on the training items (retention), new 
paired associates lists (maintenance) and paired-associated 
triads (generalization). Results indicated that relative to 
two control groups one of which importantly received 
comparable task exposure, the interrogative training group 
was superior at retention and maintenance test for low MA 
children, and superior to controls at maintenance and 
generalization for high MA children. Interrogative 
training, as mentioned earlier, consisted of: training the 
children to verbalize the relationship (e.g., the nurse 
holds the toaster); training them to formulate a reason for 
the relationship; and verbal feedback regarding the value of 
the strategy. 
Once again, a component analysis is called for to tease 
apart the relative contributions of the various elements of 
the interrogative training. Although interrogatory training 
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yielded generalization effects over tasks and time, it is 
noteworthy that there were no differential effects of 
training on a metamemory questionnaire administered pre- and 
posttest, leading these authors to suggest that "a limited 
set of memory experiences will elevate only task-relevant 
metamemory." (p. 269). 
A study by Lodico, Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, and Bell 
<1983) was impressive in the degree of generalization 
obtained across markedly divergent tasks with second 
graders. These writers proposed to experimentally 
manipulate the metacognitive processes only implicitly 
addressed by studies along the lines of Brown, Campione, and 
Barclay. During an initial phase, the experimental group 
was prompted to draw a circle both freehand, and with a 
cookie cutter, and was then asked which was better and why, 
and given feedback regarding their responses to those 
questions. Inferior and superior strategies were similarly 
trained on a letter jumble task again with questioning and 
feedback. A control group practiced the same strategies on 
the same tasks but received no instructions about the value 
of monitoring their performance or selecting the best 
strategy. 
All children were subsequently trained to use both an 
inferior and a superior strategy on paired associate and 
free recall tasks, and were subsequently permitted to use 
the strategy of their choice. Results indicated that more 
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experimental than control children utilized the more 
effective strategies when given a forced choice for both 
tasks. These writers concluded that instruction in general 
memory-monitoring principles was sufficient to effect a 
change in strategy usage, and that when first- through 
third-graders were given feedback regarding the strategy's 
usefulness, it maintained. 
Although the generalization of training from circle-
drawing to free recall was quite impressive, the results 
called for one caveat to be made. The .experimental children 
exhibited recall performance superior to the controls on the 
paired associate tasks before the forced-choice (test) 
trial, and this, "motivational superiority" (p. 273), could 
have carried over to the forced-choice trial, and could not 
be ruled out as a confound. Lodico et al. wrote that their 
study provided direct experimental support for the presumed 
relationship between metacognitive knowledge and subsequent 
strategy use. 
In the present writer's opinion, however, this 
statement was too strong and its implicit inferences 
unnecessary. Lodico et al. 's study effectively and, given 
the tasks employed creatively pointed to the utility in some 
instances of training skills in strategy-monitoring, or 
learning to discriminate the effectiveness of various 
strategies for various tasks. Hot only was little gained by 
attributing the success of training to its impact upon 
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metacognitive knowledge, but accounts of this nature may 
lead away from precise formulations of training elements or 
processes necessary and sufficient for highly generalizable 
training effects. Lodico et al.'s metacognitive study was 
not unique in drawing excessive inferences about cognitive 
processes from the data. This discussion of metacognitive 
conceptualization will resume following review of one other 
generalization study subsumed under the rubric of 
metacognitive training. 
The last study to be reviewed in this section is that 
of Crisafi and Brown (1983) who tested the commonly held 
assumption that preschoolers are particularly poor at 
transferring information. In a cognitive-developmental 
study, normal two, three, and four-year olds were trained 
and tested on a series of increasingly difficult inferential 
reasoning tasks, on which for example, they were first 
trained to obtain either a penny or dime from a purse or 
piggy bank, and second, to use that coin to obtain a gumball 
from a gumball machine. More difficult versions of the task 
used novel coin containers, tokens, reinforcers, 
reinforcement containers, and required different 
topographical responses to obtain secondary and generalized 
reinforcers. Children were trained on the two phases of 
each task separately, and then tested with all stimuli 
present to determine if they could emit the entire motoric 
sequence. Four experiments were performed which examined 
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the impact upon generalization of: the easy to hard sequence 
of task presentation (multiple task exemplars) alone; the 
sequence plus verbally emphasizing the similarity of the 
tasks, and; the sequence plus teaching children to verbalize 
task rules. 
The results of this series of experiments indicated 
that the easy to hard sequence alone, in comparison to a 
sequence in which two irrelevant tasks preceded the third 
inferential reasoning task, produced: no generalization in 
two-year olds; some in three-year old when the problems were 
structurally very similar, and; transfer in four-year olds 
even when the problems were dissimilar. Providing hints 
that the tasks were similar and teaching children to state 
task rules, each superimposed over the easy-to-hard 
sequence, facilitated transfer relative to the sequence 
alone in children as young as two and three. 
This study was important and unique in its 
demonstration of the power of a verbally based intervention 
in conjunction with multiple exemplars to promote 
generalization across tasks in comparisons with a more 
conventional and established means of doing so via the 
training of multiple task exemplars alone. As such, it 
constituted a process study, much needed within the 
literature. Crisafi and Brown also chose to examine 
generalization across a series of tasks bonded by common 
conditional discriminations and response requirements. This 
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served as a structural basis from which Crisafi and Brown 
could reasonably and logically expect that their rule-based 
intervention might generalize. 
As with much of the metastrategy training literature 
and the CBM training studies as well, the verbally based 
interventions in which task similarity was stressed and task 
rules were prompted, entailed many different training 
elements. These included instructing the children that the 
tasks were the same, the experimenter's verbal specification 
of initial response requirements, sometimes with strong 
demand characteristics and sometimes not, verbal prompting 
for the child to verbalize task rules, and so forth. Also, 
no mention was made of the experimenter's role in the case 
of poorly formulated rules. Were these rules ignored, 
corrected, differentially reinforced, shaped, etc.? Given 
the multiplicity of elements in the rule-based 
interventions, it was unwarranted of Crisafi and Brown to 
attribute generalization effects to the self-verbalization 
element per se. Nonetheless, the study remains one of the 
most important demonstrations of the influence of rule based 
interventions in addressing the learning of generalized 
skills. 
Belmont, Butterfield, and Ferretti (1982) reviewed 
transfer of training studies, largely within the memory 
literature, and concluded that important transfer could be 
achieved only if general skills such as goal setting, 
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strategy planning, and self-monitoring were trained in 
addition to the specific skills whose transfer was sought. 
Metaproceesing was conceptualized by these writers to be a 
superordinate function, qualitatively different in process 
than the specific skills to be controlled. These writers 
offered the observation that six of seven studies reviewed 
that produced substantial transfer not only instructed 
subordinate skills but led children to, "see the wisdom" (p. 
150), of metastrategies such as defining goals, designing 
plans, and monitoring implementation and outcomes of those 
plans. 
It is acknowledged that several of the metastrategy 
training studies are promising in their demonstration of 
generalization across tasks, and have involved procedurally 
inventive and important interventions. However, this 
literature is subject to criticism as well. It is argued 
that the invocation of the construct of metacognition and 
the demand for metastrategy training which follows involve 
unnecessary degrees of inference, which, rather than 
throwing light on the phenomena under study may, 
unfortunately, maintain vague explanations of generalization 
effects. 
More specifically, it is argued here that deference to 
metacognition need not be made on occasions when 
operationally, children are taught to discriminate the 
products or process of their own behavior, and perhaps 
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verbalize the discrimination as well. Relatedly, no special 
status is attributed to awareness, on whatever basis it is 
inferred, as a primary cause of behavior. Verbal report, as 
verbal behavior like other behavior, may have stimulus 
functions which set the occasion for subsequent behavior, 
overt or covert. There is no need, however to attribute 
special status, or assume a qualitatively different 
cognitive process has been engaged when one rule-based 
intervention is more successful than another, or when the 
child is trained to discriminate and report aspects of his 
own behavior. To do so entails unnecessary inference at the 
expense of parsimony. 
This is not to say that the success of such training is 
not of both applied and theoretical interest. Verbally 
based interventions need to be subjected to process research 
to determine what components are critically implicated in 
acquisition, maintenance, and generalization processes. 
Explanatory accounts which take verbal and non-verbal 
behavior at face value offer greater parsimony, and in this 
writer's opinion are Implicated by much of the data from 
metastrategy training studies themselves. For example, 
Salatas and Flavell (1976, cited in Brown, 1978) indicated 
that although children were aware of the need for strategic 
intervention, they did not apply such strategies 
successfully. The failure of Kendall et al.'s interrogative 
training condition to yield differential training effects on 
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a metamemory questionnaire led them to speculate that a 
limited set of memory experiences will elevate only task-
relevant metamemory. Recall that metamemory was discussed 
by its advocates as a superordinate process which transcends 
the particulars of the task at hand and is broadly deficient 
in the very young. The concept of task relevant metamemory 
is thus self-contradictory and illogical. That awareness, 
as indexed by verbal report, is not necessary for 
acquisition of a response was additionally supported by many 
studies of human operant conditioning (Hefferline & Keenan, 
1963) though this finding was not undisputed (DeNike & 
Spielberger, 1963). Different sets of skills and behaviors 
may control different sized sets of responses. What is 
critical to learning and generalization may be the learning 
of relevant problem-solving responses that facilitate 
solution responses for a given problem or class or problems. 
Verbal training methods may serve as useful means to learn 
relevant problem-solving responses, but verbal report of 
conditional discriminations, or other indices of 
metacognition may only accompany learning and generalized 
learning and not cause it. In fact, as we have seen, such 
verbal report may not even accompany it. For many operating 
within the metacognitive training paradigm (e.g., Brown & 
Barclay, 1976) if B fails to affect C (given sufficient 
levels of other necessary factors such as attention, 
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motivation, etc.), a deficit at A is presumed and targeted 
for intervention (see figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Metacognltlve Approach to Strategy Training 
A C 
Metastrategy Metaknowledge Outcome 
training performance 
B 
Strategy Strategy 
training knowledge 
If the strategy is trained and successfully used in one 
set of (training) conditions, but not used in another 
(maintenance or generalization) set of conditions, then a 
failure in strategy monitoring or awareness is postulated, 
and metastrategic intervention devised and implemented. An 
alternative and more precise conceptualization is offered by 
a behavioral account which ascribes no special status to 
awareness. In this account, reliance is placed upon direct 
observation and minimal inference in an attempt to remain 
objectively close to the data. Thus, the metacognitive 
psychologist's discussion and examination of strategic 
knowledge, for the behaviorist becomes a discussion and 
examination of strategic behavior and verbal report of such 
behavior or conditional behavior (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 
Behavioral Approach to Strategy Training 
Train conditional 
strategies 
A 
Discriminate strategic 
behavior 
C 
Outcome 
behavior 
Train to verbalize 
conditional strategies 
Report of discriminated 
strategic behavior 
Train strategies 
B 
Strategic behavior 
Train to verbalize 
strategies 
Report of strategic 
behavior 
In this account, verbal and nonverbal behavior are 
viewed as independent streams of behavior (Roberts, 1979) 
which may or may not, depending on the circumstances, affect 
appealing to contrary notions of "task-relevant metamemory" 
(Kendall et al., 1980, p. 269), we can discuss the 
relationship, if any, between children's report of strategy 
usage in one set of circumstances and their report of 
relationship between strategic behavior in one set of 
circumstances and in another. 
If metamemory is not commonly demonstrated except on 
the particular task or class of tasks targeted for training 
(Kendall et al., I960), if metamemory or at least its 
training is demonstrated sometimes to fail to affect 
strategic behavior (Salatas & Flavell, 1976), and if 
successful strategic behavior has no necessary accompanying 
each others probability of occurrence. Rather than 
strategy usage in another And we can examine the 
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metaawareness (Kendall et al., 1980), then its conceptual 
status as a higher-order, executive process superordinate to 
and distinct from strategic processes is dubious. This 
position would likely be endorsed by Engelmann <1971), who 
wrote, 
The notion of non-specific operations is rejected. 
An operation is applicable only to certain concrete 
problems. The subject must somehow be able to see that 
certain aspects of the problem imply a particular 
operation. Without this assumption, the operation 
would be used either universally or randomly. If it is 
used in a discriminated manner, there must be a basis 
for discrimination, which means that the operation is 
specific to a certain set of cues. The operation can 
be applied to a wide variety of situations, but the 
operation still remains quite specific (p. 463). 
Loper (1980) suggested that asking children to monitor 
themselves with, "Do I understand?" may be effective if 
children have sufficient metacognitive awareness to ask if 
they are progressing. This implied that if the intervention 
proved unsuccessful, children had insufficient metacognitive 
awareness: its success would implicate sufficient 
metacognitive awareness. Clearly, in this instance, 
stopping at the construct of metacognitive awareness as an 
explanatory account of behavior is unsatisfactory and 
circular. It might prove more fruitful to ask, under what 
circumstance, with what kind of learning history with both 
verbal and non-verbal stimuli might such self-questioning or 
self-monitoring strategies prove effective? This leads to a 
brief summary and discussion of both the CBM-SIT studies and 
the metastrategy training studies. Before proceeding, 
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however, it should be acknowledged that the preferences of 
metacognitive researchers to employ cognitive constructs 
such as metacognition as causal accounts of behavior, and 
for behavioral and cognitive-behavioral researchers to avoid 
or minimize the use of such constructs, reflect paradigmatic 
differences which entail different underlying theoretical 
assumptions about the nature of the human organism. 
The present discussion of the various paradigmatic 
approaches to the issue of generalized learning does not 
presume to decide that one set of assumptions more 
truthfully addresses the nature of human learning than the 
other. Nor is the present study being touted as a critical 
test that will help decide the validity of one paradigm 
versus the other. It is suggested, however, that a 
behavioral or cognitive-behavioral approach more exactly 
deals with the data at hand and less often invokes 
explanatory accounts which stop at the level of inferential 
constructs. Such accounts may conceal more complex 
relationships between verbal and non-verbal behavior in a 
particular learning context, given the child's verbal and 
non-verbal learning history. 
CBM-SIT and Metacognitive Training Studies 
Acquisition and generalization studies operating out of 
the CBM-SIT and metacognitive training paradigms did what 
relatively few behavior analytic studies have attempted to 
do: examined the influence of rule-based and verbally-based 
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interventions upon learning and generalization, primarily 
across tasks and time. As noted above, a distillation of 
the results of the CBM-SIT studies indicated that 
generalization was more commonly observed across tasks when 
the tasks were analogue rather than academic, and subject 
factors such as the child's relevant behavioral repertoire, 
were implicated. Generalization of on-task behavior across 
settings was often but not always observed. 
With regard to the metacognitive training studies 
discussed above, generalization across tasks was often 
achieved, sometimes across tasks strongly divergent in terms 
of response requirements and stimulus features. Studies 
operating from both paradigms often failed to examine 
critical process questions. This was particularly true for 
the metacognitive training studies, though in fairness, this 
training represents a newer endeavor. It behooves the 
investigator to design his or her study around experimental 
questions that not only ask, "Does it work?", but "Why does 
it work?" The SIT and metacognitive training paradigms are 
clearly far too complex procedurally for a single process 
study to definitively tease apart unnecessary, necessary, 
and sufficient training elements, but each study should 
minimally attempt to isolate and scrutinize one facet of 
training. In this manner, various studies might build upon 
one another and converge to implicate critical treatment 
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elements and processes, as was the case, for example, with 
the study of systematic desensitization (Marks, 1978). 
One criticism common to the vast majority of both SIT 
and metacognitive training studies was that they typically 
assumed that the presentation of rules or training of self-
verbalizations would control the behavior or strategies they 
specified. Relatedly, it was further assumed that whereas 
the trained verbal strategy or behavior might fail to 
maintain across conditions, the trained metastrategy or 
general, verbal problem-solving skill would itself maintain 
and subsequently control behavior. 
That verbalization training alone may not be sufficient 
to control specified behavior was repeatedly demonstrated in 
the literature on verbal-nonverbal correspondence training, 
even when the responses specified by the verbal self-
instructions were well within the child's repertoire CRisley 
& Hart, 1968; Israel & O'Leary, 1973; Feinberg & Roberts, 
1982; 1984). For example, in the Risley and Hart study 
mentioned earlier, the enactment of reinforcement 
contingencies for preschoolers' reports of play, true or 
false, did not increase rates of play behavior, except when 
reinstated following a period in which only true reports of 
play were reinforced. 
A study by Carnine, Kameenui, and Maggs (1982) more 
germane to the academic arena, is also illustrative. In a 
dismantling paradigm, these experimenters trained one group 
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of first-graders on a task requiring a classification and 
discrimination sequence, to verbalize both the concept and 
the rule. A second group was additionally trained to 
classify in accord with the concept, while a third group 
received all training the above two groups received but 
additionally were trained to behave in accord with what the 
rule specified. Results indicated that only the last 
group's performance was significantly above chance. This 
suggested to these writers that for complicated rules, 
ensuring that primary students issued concept and rule 
statements did not guarantee that the students learned to 
apply the concepts. 
For the training of children's verbalizations to have 
the generalized effects hoped for, it may prove helpful to 
explicitly assure that the verbalizations control the 
behavior and strategies specified. The role of this aspect 
of SIT and metacognitive studies in promoting generalization 
has typically been either neglected procedurally or only 
very casually acknowledged. 
Targeting Verbal Antecedents: Process 
Thus far, emphasis has been placed on the content, or 
stimulus control function of self-instructions as typically 
employed within the SIT and metacognitive training 
paradigms. Equally deserving of attention, however, may be 
the process by which children are led to verbally identify 
task stimuli, response requirements, or contingencies. Data 
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generated from studies representing a variety of theoretical 
paradigms bear importantly on this issue. Studies to be 
discussed include those of: Tennyson, Youngers, and 
Suebsonthi (1983) and Richards and Siegler (1981) operating 
from a cognitive-developmental perspective; Schleser et al. 
(1983) operating from a cognitive-behavioral paradigm; 
Catania, Matthews, & Shimoff (1982) operating from a basic, 
operant approach, and Guthrie (1967) operating from an 
applied-educational perspective. 
Tennyson, Youngers, and Suebsonthi (1983) compared four 
methods of teaching third grade children the concept of a 
regular polygon. In a 2 x 2 factorial design, presentations 
of polygons emphasized either best examples of polygons or a 
statement of the critical attributes. The polygon examples 
or statements of attributes were presented in either 
expository and interrogatory form or interrogatory form 
only. Results indicated that, in terms of children's 
ability to properly classify new regular polygon instances, 
the presentation of best examples along with a definition 
facilitated prototype formation more than did a statement of 
the critical attributes along with the definition. 
Also, an interrogatory strategy that required children 
to respond (classify) and then provided feedback, was 
inferior to one that featured both an interrogatory and 
expository format. An earlier study by this lab (Tennyson 
et al., 1981, cited in Tennyson et al., 1983) similarly 
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showed an additive effect of an instructional presentation 
that used both expository and interrogatory examples in 
comparison to either presentation alone, in classifying new 
concept instances. In neither study did the interrogatory 
training alone result in maximal gains in terms of 
children's generalization of their classification skills to 
new concept instances. 
The results of this study also bear on the earlier 
discussion of the implementation of multiple exemplar 
training and rule-based intervention as means of 
facilitating generalized learning. It appeared from the 
results of the Tennyson et al. (1983) study, that children 
learned mathematical concepts more readily from an approach 
which emphasized the presentation of multiple exemplars of 
concept instances, than one which emphasized rules governing 
those concept instances. The presentation of rules 
specifying concept properties was not prerequisite to 
generalized concept classification. 
Also operating from a cognitive-developmental 
perspective, Richards and Siegler (1981) compared the 
effectiveness of training children "to take an analytic 
attitude," (p. 1319) with a control group in teaching three-
year olds to predict which side of a balance scale would 
descend. Balance scale problems varied in terms of the 
distances of weights from the fulcrum and the amount of 
weights on each side of the scale. Results indicated that 
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children trained to take an analytic attitude produced more 
correct answers than control children who were only given 
right/wrong feedback after each training problem. After 
each answer during training, children in the analytic 
attitude condition were told to, 
...look carefully at the balance scale, and see if you 
can tell why (this side went down) (it stayed 
balanced). See if you can figure out what made it (go 
down to this side) (stay balanced), (p. 1319). 
It is unclear procedurally whether or not children's 
verbal responses to this prompt were prompted further or 
explicitly required, and if so, whether particular verbal 
responses were consequated or corrected. 
A study by Schleser, et al. (1983) was discussed above 
in reference to the process studies of the content of the 
self-instructions employed within the SIT paradigm. In 
addition to the specific or general content self-
instructions, a condition called specific content self-
instruction via directed discovery was also compared to the 
control condition. In this discovery condition, 
Children were led, through a question-and-answer 
socratic dialogue with the experimenter, to 'discover' 
the [specific content] strategy statements... The 
experimenter rephrased the child's responses if 
necessary and had the child cumulatively rehearse all 
discovered statements (p.954). 
Results indicated that the training which featured 
directed discovery was not different from the specific 
content training and superior to the two remaining 
conditions on arithmetic tasks similar to the training 
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tasks. Directed discovery training was superior to both 
specific and general content training on the MFF, which 
served as an index of generalization. Further, only the 
directed discovery training yielded generalized effects to 
the PIAT Reading Recognition subtest. 
The potency of this directed discovery procedure 
appeared very impressive in its demonstration of generalized 
training effects from arithmetical training tasks to 
generalization tasks which assessed spelling, reading, and 
even general information skills. Schleser et al. attributed 
the success of the directed discovery training to having 
taught these children not just what to think, but how to 
think (Meichenbaum & Asarnow, 1979). Such might not be the 
case, however, as children in the directed discovery 
condition differed from the other two conditions not only in 
the manner in which they were led to verbalize self-
instructions, but also in terms of the fading of self-
instructions. Only the directed discovery training required 
that children's discovered statements remain at an overt 
level throughout training, while the task-specific and 
general problem-solving training used the standard overt-to-
covert fading procedure of Meichenbaum (1971). What was 
prerequisite to generalization then might not have been the 
process of discovering specific statements but simply 
arranging for such statements to be emitted overtly 
throughout the course of training. It was conceivable that 
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children in the two training conditions that featured fading 
of self-instructions were no longer producing verbal 
mediators by the end of training. If so, mediated 
generalization could not be expected to occur. 
A second question addresses the ease and the means by 
which children in the directed discovery condition were led 
to "discover" the specific statements which the 
investigators had a priori identified. Recall that Crisafi 
and Brown had no success in getting children to emit 
remotely appropriate rules for their training tasks, albeit 
their children were very young. Schleser et al. wrote that, 
"the experimenter rephrased the child's responses if 
necessary and had the child cumulatively rehearse all 
discovered statements," (p. 954). But how many children 
required their responses to be rephrased? For those who 
did, how different was this directed discovery procedure 
from the specific content self-instructional training? 
Finally, it might be asked by what means the directed 
discovery method facilitated generalization across tasks 
which encompassed requisite responses as diverse as 
arithmetic and general information. Schleser et al. do not 
spell out their conceptualization of the means by which the 
directed discovery procedure yielded such a considerable 
degree of generalization. 
In a human operant study, Catania, Matthews, and 
Shimoff (1982) reinforced college students' slow or fast key 
presses on one of two reinforcement schedules. Students 
were frequently required to write down their guesses as to 
what pressing behavior earned reinforcement. On some 
occasions, students' guesses were instructed (e.g., told to 
guess that slow presses earned reinforcement), on some 
occasions guesses were shaped, and on some occasions guesses 
were not differentially reinforced. The influence of this 
instructed, shaped, and non-reinforced verbal behavior upon 
the non-verbal key pressing behavior was examined, as was 
the reverse. Results indicated that consistent control of 
pressing rates by guesses occurred when guesses were shaped 
but not instructed. In general, shaped guesses controlled 
pressing rates regardless of the button-pressing 
contingencies, with rates conforming to guesses. Catania et 
al. also reported that control operated in the other 
direction as well, with pressing controlling guessing when 
guessing was nondifferentially reinforced or instructed. 
They concluded that verbal behavior was more likely to 
determine subsequent nonverbal behavior when it was shaped 
than when it was instructed, implying to these writers the 
clinical importance of changing private thought. 
In the present context, these results suggest that 
shaped verbal behavior has greater potential for the 
maintenance of behavior it specifies than instructed or 
nondifferentially reinforced verbal behavior, in the face of 
competing contingencies that would otherwise dictate other 
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behavior. These results further validate the need discussed 
earlier in the Schleser et al. study to objectify the degree 
to which verbalization of task rules is left for the child 
to discover, or is rephrased. Also of interest in the 
Catania et al. study was the difficulty the authors had in 
shaping verbalization of "press slow" and, "press fast." 
These guesses were successfully shaped in not quite half of 
the cases attempted, despite the simplicity of the targeted 
guesses and the sophistication of the subjects (college 
students). 
In an earlier section, it was mentioned that subject 
variables have been implicated as mediators of the 
effectiveness of self-instructional training, one such 
variable being subjects' locus of control. Catania et al. 
suggested that their distinction between shaped and 
instructed verbal behavior related to the locus of control 
construct. They wrote that, in the terms of social 
psychology, 
Students whose guesses were shaped, unaware of the 
source of control, attributed them to their own 
behavior and thus responded in accordance with verbal 
behavior they believe they had generated themselves. 
[But] ...such an account begins by assuming what the 
present data show experimentally, that the students may 
say things to themselves that affect their subsequent 
nonverbal behavior (p. 246). 
Guthrie (1967), from an applied educational 
perspective, compared various instruction sequences in 
teaching college seniors to decipher cryptograms. In the 
example-rule group, cryptogram examples were presented to 
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criterion, following which subjects were taught to verbalize 
the rule upon request. The reverse sequence occurred in the 
Rule-Example (Expository) group. An Example (Discovery) 
condition consisted of presenting only examples of 
cryptograms to criterion. A control group which featured 
training on an irrelevant task was included as well. 
Following each training trial, all subjects received 
feedback which consisted of presenting the cryptogram with 
the correct word beside it. 
Results indicated that the expository instruction 
facilitated retention relative to the remaining three 
conditions. The expository instruction brought subjects to 
criterion during training in roughly half the trials 
required of the other conditions, but actually impeded 
remote transfer, as the Discovery, Example-Rule, and even 
the control group had lower error scores on a remote 
transfer test. The discovery method did not facilitate 
retention but facilitated transfer, as subjects in this 
condition outperformed control and expository subjects on a 
near transfer test, and all other subjects on the remote 
transfer test. 
Procedurally, Guthrie's discovery training was most 
analogous to multiple exemplar training, since subjects were 
presented with instances of cryptograms without accompanying 
rule training. In contrast to the other studies discussed 
in this section, Guthrie did not instruct, prompt, or shape 
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subjects' emission of task rules. Thus, there was no 
empirical evidence, even indirect, that subjects 
"discovered" rules in this condition. Their behavior, as 
they learned the cryptograms, may have been consistent with 
task rules, but was not necessarily controlled by these 
rules at either a covert or overt level. This study then, 
interestingly suggested that, at least with respect to this 
set of tasks and subject sample, multiple exemplar training 
alone yielded a greater degree of generalization across 
tasks than such training which included training in rule 
verbalization—even when this rule verbalization training 
was shown to be facilitory on the directly trained task. 
When the structure of the task was changed, such that 
trained rules no longer specified appropriate problem-
solving responses, this rule training component may have 
interfered with emission of newly-relevant problem-solving 
responses. On the other hand, when only multiple task 
examples were given, this may have evoked, as Guthrie 
speculated, searching, exploratory behavior that was 
reinforced and facilitated problem solution on the transfer 
tasks. 
The studies discussed above were inspired by widely 
divergent conceptual paradigms, employed different 
methodologies with different population samples, and offered 
various rationales for teaching people to verbally identify 
what they were doing or needed to do. Yet their results for 
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the most part converged to suggest that encouraging people 
to verbally identify task requirements was a promising means 
of promoting generalization, provided the responses 
specified were appropriate to the range of tasks. If we 
accept the implications of writers such as Vygotsky (1962) 
and Winokur (1976) that older children and adults typically 
and spontaneously engage a novel problem with a good amount 
of covert verbal problem-solving, then all the studies 
presented in this section are consistent with a position 
which calls for training children to verbalize task rules as 
they engage the tasks. 
Specifying Contingencies 
In an earlier section, it was suggested that the 
conceptualization of instructions and self-instructions as 
general or specific should be abandoned and reliance placed 
on a problem-solving model which comprised attending, 
problem-solving, and problem-solution phases, with emphasis 
upon establishing stimulus control within the problem-
solving phase in particular (Grimm, Bijou, & Parsons, 1973). 
Self-instructions could then be conceptualized in terms 
of whether they specified and targeted attending, problem-
solving, or solution responses. Instructions and self-
instructions, as verbal responses, may specify stimuli or 
reinforcers or contingencies as well, and still constitute 
functional problem-solving responses. Training the verbal 
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identification of response-outcome contingencies has been 
subjected to limited experimental examination. 
Q'Leary (1980) wrote that the restatement of 
contingencies was a promising but relatively unevaluated 
procedure. To the present writer's knowledge, the only 
applied experiments that addressed this issue as either the 
focal point or sidelight of their studies were made by 
Kennedy and Miller (1976), Belmont, Butterfield, & Borkowski 
(1978), and Kendall, Borkowski, and Cavanaugh (1980). While 
children were not explicitly trained to verbalize the 
contingency between strategy use and outcome, the 
contingency was presented to children by the experimenter. 
Both the Kennedy and Miller study and the Belmont, 
Butterfield, and Borkowski study found that training which 
included feedback about the usefulness of the strategy led 
to maintenance of the strategy. In the latter study, such 
training yielded generalization across divergent tasks. 
Unfortunately, in neither of these studies was the role of 
feedback regarding the strategy's utility procedurally 
isolated from a variety of additional components. 
The study by Kendall, Borkowski, and Cavanaugh did 
explicitly manipulate the strategy feedback element, within 
the interrogatory training condition which was the 
intervention of primary interest. In this case, strategy 
feedback versus its absence did not make a difference on 
children's paired associate recall. But, as the authors 
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themselves acknowledged, all children had earlier received 
feedback about the value of the rehearsal strategy, perhaps 
negating the influence of the feedback element. 
None of the studies that provided children with verbal 
feedback about the contingencies between responding and 
outcomes were successful in experimentally isolating this 
element of training. Training packages that included this 
element, however, yielded fair amounts of generalization 
across tasks. This training element deserves further 
experimental evaluation. 
Matrices 
The training and testing tasks used in the present 
study were, for the most part, borrowed directly from Bryant 
(1983) who acknowledged their similarity to the Raven 
Progressive Matrices and especially the Coloured Progressive 
Matrices (RCPM), the latter tailored for preschool children. 
It might be useful then, to briefly discuss the utility and 
validity of the RCPM. A pair of factor analytic studies 
(Carlson & Wiedl, 1976; Schmidtke & Schaller, I960) of 
preschool and/or early elementary school children suggested 
that the RCPM is a measure of abstract reasoning, and the 
latter study described it further as testing both perceptual 
closure on the one hand, and the completion of homogenous 
patterns and recognition of given elements on the other. In 
Garrity and Donoghue's (1976) study of preschoolers, RCPM 
scores correlated with Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 
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(PFVT) scores, at least with respect to the sample of 
preschool girls. Court <1983), in a review of the 
literature on RCPM and sex differences, described the RCPM 
as perhaps the best measure of "g", the general intelligence 
factor. Finally, Valencia (1984) citing his own work and 
that of others, called the RCPM a promising nonverbal 
intelligence measure when used with children of culturally 
and linguistically diverse backgrounds. 
The present study called for training children to 
attend to and monitor up to two stimulus dimensions relevant 
to matrix completion. All children were tested on similar 
problems and some that even included a third relevant 
dimension. From a developmental perspective, it was 
important to examine the empirical evidence bearing on 
several procedural and task parameters, to help assure that 
tasks were not inordinately difficult and hence 
inappropriate. Relevant questions included: what evidence 
was there that some dimensions were easier for young 
children to attend to or label than others?; how many 
dimensions or attributes could young children successfully 
monitor and respond to? and; was it best for a problem-
solving strategy within each matrix to target all dimensions 
of each stimulus before proceeding to the next stimulus, or 
to target one dimension of all stimuli before proceeding to 
the next dimension? 
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Much child developmental research has addressed the 
first question of the relative salience or preference 
exhibited towards various stimulus dimensions in preschool 
children. The importance of dimensional preference or 
salience paradigms lies in the predictive relationship 
between children's preferences and learning rate on problem-
solving tasks in which the preferred dimension is relevant 
to task solution (Smiley, 1972; Odom & Guzman, 1972). 
Typically, young children's preferences have been assessed 
on only two dimensions, usually color and form. Early 
discussions of this literature (e.g., Suchman & Trabasso, 
1966) were consistent in suggesting that after the age of 
six, children choose largely on the basis of form and before 
six, usually color. But more recent research has made this 
relationship between age and dimensional preference less 
clear. Offenbach (1983) found that most of their preschool 
(4-5 year old) children classified similarity on the basis 
of form and not color. Unlike earlier studies, Seitz and 
Weir (1971) found that a large number (just over 50'/.) of 
their subjects responded equivalently to both color and form 
dimensions. Roughly equal numbers of the remaining children 
exhibited color or form preferences. According to Smiley 
(1972) although very young (preschool) children make more 
color responses than older children do, form choices tend to 
predominate at all ages. The results of these studies were 
not sufficiently consistent to permit generalizations to be 
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drawn at least with respect to young (preschool) children. 
These studies revealed a predominance of color, form, and 
mixed preference preschoolers. There was thus no a priori 
reason to suspect that the present study's presentation of 
matrices with both color and form (shape) relevant to 
solution would favor one dimension or the other for the 
children as a group. 
With respect to the dimension of size, Suchman and 
Trabasso (1966) found that on subtests with the preferred 
stimulus removed, 3-6 year olds who preferred color, chose 
form over size and this preference increased with age. 
Form-preferring subjects, however, chose size as often as 
color at all age ranges. Given that nearly two-thirds of 
their children between 2-10 and 4-11 were form-preferring, 
size did indeed appear to be very nearly as salient a 
dimension as color in this age range in this study. 
The fourth dimension manipulated in the present study, 
pattern within stimuli, has not to this writer's knowledge 
been experimentally investigated in these dimensional 
salience or preference paradigms. Thus there is no 
empirical base from which to estimate the relative salience 
of the pattern dimension. However, color and form have been 
simultaneously compared with other dimensions such as number 
(stimulus frequency) and position (Odom & Guzman, 1972), and 
results indicated that young children found the latter two 
dimensions to be substantially less salient than form and 
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color. The degree to which the salience of color and form 
overshadowed the salience of number and position suggests 
that pattern might be relatively low salience, as well. 
Granted, in the absence of empirical data on the pattern 
dimension, this is little more than conjecture. 
On the basis of the data discussed above, it was 
anticipated that preschoolers would find color and form 
dimensions the most salient and discriminable, closely 
followed by the size dimension, and lastly the pattern 
dimension, in the absence of any verbal instruction that 
might affect the probability of responding to dimensions. 
A second question concerned the feasibility of training 
preschool children on two or more stimulus dimensions. Data 
that bear on this issue were reported by Odom and Guzman 
(1972), albeit the youngest children they worked with were 
kindergartners (mean age, five years, eight months). 
Following their salience test, children were administered an 
identity (problem-solving) task on which the correct choice 
matched all four dimensional values and an incorrect choice 
matched only three of four. The low incidence of errors to 
all items combined indicated that children were responding 
under the control of two or more dimensions, and that four 
dimensional identity problems were within these children's 
repertoires even without minimal right/wrong feedback. 
Schuepfer and Gholson (1980, cited in Gholson, 1980) 
studied children's response hypotheses on no-feedback trials 
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interspersed between feedback trials. The task required the 
child to identify the dimensional value (e.g., large) 
arbitrarily deemed correct by the experimenter. Results 
indicated that 65 of 71 preschoolers reached criterion on 
two-dimension problems and subsequently all of these 
children learned four-dimension problems in just one or two 
daily sessions. Schuepfer and Gholson in a second 
experiment suggested that in contrast to elementary school 
children, preschoolers as a group were far lees systematic 
in eliminating dimensions, but they also acknowledged that 
their training did not focus on teaching strategy systems. 
They wrote that, "Whether preschoolers can be induced to 
exhibit sequences of hypotheses that correspond to the 
strategy categories remains to be investigated." (p. 76). 
The tasks employed in the present study most likely 
fell in between the tasks of Odom and Guzman, and Schuepfer 
and Gholson in terms of difficulty. In comparison to the 
former's tasks the matrices demanded not only attention to 
relevant dimensions but stimulus patterns as well. In 
comparison to Schuepfer and Gholson, given that all stimuli 
on each matrix were presented simultaneously, the memory 
requirement in the present study's task was probably lesser. 
The work of Schuepfer and Gholson (1980, cited in 
Gholson, 1980) addressed the last question: whether it was 
better strategically within each matrix to teach the 
monitoring of all dimensions of one stimulus before 
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proceeding to the next stimulus, or to teach the monitoring 
of one dimension of all stimuli before proceeding to the 
next dimension. The superiority of the latter strategy was 
suggested by their data from elementary school children 
which showed that competent hypothesis testers tested one 
dimensional attribute before proceeding to another. 
Before concluding this section, two studies which 
addressed children's problem-solving of RCPM or RCPM-like 
tasks will be briefly presented. While the studies were not 
conceptualized by their authors in either cognitive-
behavioral or metacognitive terms, and did not address the 
generalization issue per se, their interventions were 
similar to many called cognitive-behavioral and had similar 
aspects to the intervention employed in the present study. 
Turner, Hall, and Grimmett (1973) subjected kindergartners 
to one of three interventions or a control (no feedback) 
condition as they worked on a derived RCPM-like task: 
Verbal (right/wrong) feedback; visual feedback (E placed 
correct choices in the empty space), and; explanation 
feedback (verbal feedback and an explanation, e.g., that's 
right, the lines match up; that's wrong, think about the 
shape). Testing on the RCPM revealed that all three 
interventions were superior to the control condition, and 
not different from each other. Providing strategies was no 
more effective than verbal (right/wrong) feedback. The 
authors concluded that the children failed to use the 
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strategies because they were too young to benefit from such 
limited instruction, or the strategies themselves were 
deficient. These results offer another substantiation of 
the need to procedurally assure that verbal strategies 
control the specified nonverbal behavior. 
Bethge, Carlson, & Wiedl (1982) administered the RCPM 
to third-graders via one of three methods. Children 
received either standard (no feedback) administration, 
elaborated feedback, or problem verbalization. Elaborated 
feedback entailed verbal right/wrong feedback, and informing 
the child why he was correct or not. The problem 
verbalization condition required the child to first describe 
the main stimulus pattern before making a response, and then 
to explain why the particular solution was chosen. Results 
on the RCPM indicated that the elaborated feedback and 
problem verbalization conditions were each superior to the 
control condition and not different from each other. 
Process data indicated that the elaborated feedback and 
problem verbalization interventions versus control yielded 
more systematic and planful strategies. This was indicated 
by reduced numbers of omissions of comparing both rows of 
alternatives to the main pattern, and increased duration and 
frequency of eye fixations to main stimulus patterns and 
answer alternatives. The results thus showed the 
superiority of the two interventions in terms of process, as 
well as outcome data. Unfortunately, the validity of these 
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results was called into question by a research design which 
failed to include any pretest measures which might have 
assured that group differences were a function of treatment 
and not extraneous factors. Further, as with many of the 
metastrategy training and "discovery" training studies, 
Bethge et al. were not very explicit about the degree to 
which children's verbalizations were prompted, shaped, 
consequated, or corrected in the problem verbalization 
condition. As such, it is difficult to generalize the 
results of their intervention beyond the immediate study. 
These methodological shortcomings aside, the results of the 
Bethge et al. and Turner et al. studies suggested that 
children's matrix performance was no more facilitated by 
interventions which entailed self-verbalization of stimulus 
patterns or verbal feedback specifying problem-solving 
responses, than it was by simple verbal (right/wrong) 
feedback or elaborated feedback. 
Several caveats in addition to the methodological 
criticisms offered above suggest that it may be premature to 
abandon rule-based interventions as a means of promoting 
generalization on RCPM-like tasks. First, it should be 
recalled that neither of these studies explicitly addressed 
the generalization issue. It is conceivable that each 
study's interventions might have manifested differential 
effects had a series of logically related but diverse 
matrices been presented. Second, both studies worked with 
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older children: kindergartners in the Turner et al. study 
and third graders in the Bethge et al. study. Crisafi and 
Brown <1983) showed that on an inferential reasoning task, 
only the younger (three but not four-year old) children 
transferred more efficiently when encouraged to describe 
task requirements than when presented simple multiple 
exemplars with feedback. For older children, it was 
sufficient merely to present them with the easy-to-hard 
exemplar sequence and verbal feedback. Perhaps, then, 
children in the Turner et al. and Bethge et al. studies had 
developmental learning histories sufficiently extensive to 
allow them to learn from feedback and elaborated feedback 
alone. 
Finally, the work of Bryant (1983) addressed rule-based 
interventions for the learning of RCPM-like tasks. Although 
her study specifically addressed the relationship between 
learning and transfer abilities and general measures of 
intelligence, it suggested that four- and five-year old 
children profited considerably from adults' verbalization of 
rules or hints as they solved the matrices. 
In sum, the tasks employed in the present study were 
derived from a task that has enjoyed theoretical and 
empirical support as a valid measure of intelligence. 
Developmental work in this age range suggested that: (1) at 
least three of the four stimulus dimensions were relatively 
high salience in the absence of instruction directed toward 
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those dimensione; (2) children, with training, were likely 
to respond under the control of three stimulus dimensions, 
and; <3) a problem-solving strategy that targeted one 
dimension of all stimuli before proceeding to the next 
dimension was likely to be more effective than one which 
targeted all dimensions of each stimulus before proceeding 
to the next stimulus. Experiments featuring rule-based 
intervention with the RCPM did not examine generalization 
per se. 
Summary 
The frequent failure to find generalization effects 
across time, settings, responses, and tasks in many 
conventional behavior modification studies and mnemonics 
training studies led to reconceptualizations of 
generalization as an active process worthy of greater 
theoretical and empirical scrutiny. It provided impetus for 
the theoretical development of both the cognitive-behavioral 
self-instructional training paradigm and the metacognitive 
training paradigm, which despite different underlying theory 
and rationale, share an applied philosophy of training 
children to carry on verbal dialogue with themselves as a 
means of fostering generalization. Applied behavior 
analysis as well has implicated the importance of training 
verbal mediators as an aide to generalization, though its 
investigation within this paradigm has been relatively 
infrequent. 
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As a whole, SIT investigations of generalization across 
settings and tasks have yielded equivocal results. 
Hetacognitive training studies have been somewhat more 
successful in effecting generalization across tasks, though 
process research in both paradigms is lacking, given the 
array of training components self-verbalization is typically 
embedded within. Both paradigms also subscribe to notions 
of general and specific self-statements which lead to 
circular explanations of generalization effects. The 
theoretical paradigm of metacognition may be faulted for 
attributing higher-order status to metastrategy training, at 
the expense of parsimony and perhaps in opposition to the 
data as well. 
A behavioral approach places greater reliance on 
observables and assumes that different sets of verbal 
responses have stimulus properties that control variously 
sized classes of behavior. The maintenance of behavior and 
maintenance of generalized behavior is a function of the 
reinforcement schedule it was established under and the 
degree to which such behavior continues to be contingently 
reinforced by either arranged or natural consequences. It 
is also a function of the presence of controlling stimuli in 
the new conditions. 
It has been established that the breadth of learning as 
assessed across tasks is a function of the range of tasks 
and stimuli used in training. Another theoretically 
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important but scarcely tested means of promoting this type 
of generalization is to train children to verbally mediate 
generalization. If the interest is in generalization across 
tasks, the extent to which the trained verbal mediators 
specify shared problem-solving response components 
determines the success of generalization. 
Rather than classify instructions and self-instructions 
as general or specific, it is more profitable, borrowing 
from an operant problem-solving model, to discuss them in 
terms of their specification of responses in attending, 
problem-solving, or problem-solution phases. Verbal 
training may focus on the specification of stimulus 
properties or response-reinforcer contingencies, the latter 
of which may be an important element in achieving 
generalization. 
In addition, the process by which children's self-
instructions come to be emitted may have implications for 
generalization effects. There is some evidence that 
prompting and shaping versus instructing task rules may lead 
to greater maintenance and generalization of behavior 
specified by those rules. 
Hypotheses 
The present study addressed this fundamental question: 
Is generalization facilitated by teaching children to 
verbally identify task requirements as they engage a series 
of tasks, relative to the training of multiple exemplars 
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(differential feedback for solution responses across tasks)? 
The answers to two more focused questions were sought as 
well: (a) In teaching children to verbally identify task 
requirements as they engage a series of tasks, is 
generalization enhanced more by training (instructing, 
modeling, and prompting) predetermined statements or by 
encouraging children to induce their own rules?; <b) If 
teaching children to verbally Identify task requirements is 
facilitative relative to multiple exemplars, can the 
differential effects be attributed to rule training 
(teaching a contingency-specifying rule via instructing, 
modeling, and prompting) per se, versus the training of 
problem-solving behavior specified by the rule? 
The hypotheses which bear on these questions were 
generated largely on the basis of two sets of assumptions 
regarding conditions which contribute to training effects 
which generalize over tasks and time. It has been 
demonstrated that the programming of multiple stimulus and 
response exemplars is an effective means of promoting 
generalization across tasks. It is assumed however that 
training verbal mediators may further enhance 
generalization. Verbal mediators may be trained to act as 
problem-solving responses in a sequence to cue other 
problem-responses and facilitate acquisition on the directly 
trained task. To the extent that the mediators cue response 
components shared by various tasks, generalization is 
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facilitated. Generalization is enhanced in this manner, 
given that the mediators continue to be emitted, overtly or 
covertly in the new conditions. Verbal responses are easily 
recalled, and make it easier to retain discriminations over 
time (Skinner, 1966). Verbal responses in the form of rules 
may thus serve as readily emitted responses with stimulus 
functions. In later stages of learning, the verbal 
mediators may no longer be facilitory and drop out of the 
sequence. 
The second assumption is that the process by which 
rules come to be emitted is also important in determining 
the maintenance and generalization of behavior specified by 
the rules. When the contingencies change with a new task 
such that problem-solving responses are no longer effective, 
training which has encouraged children to examine the 
outcomes of their own behavior and induce effective 
strategies should yield the greatest degree of 
generalization to this new task. 
The multiple exemplar condition (ME) exposed children 
to a series of increasingly difficult but related tasks, and 
examined maintenance on these tasks and generalization to 
other tasks. Beyond this, the rule training (RT) condition 
trained children to verbalize the contingency between 
problem-solving responses and task outcome, and then 
perform shared problem-solving responses. The problem-
solving control (PSC) condition isolated the impact of the 
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rule training per se by controlling for the modeling and 
performance of problem-solving responses specified by the 
rule. The rule discovery condition (RD) required the child, 
with some external guidance, to derive his or her own task 
rules. 
Children were trained and tested on matrix completion 
tasks. Eleven sets of matrices (training variants 1, 1.5, 
2, 3 and testing variants 1 through 7) differed on the basis 
of the number of dimensions that varied and the orderliness 
with which each dimension varied. All, however, shared 
required problem-solving responses. Training was conducted 
with training variants 1 through 3 on training days 1 
through 3. Children were tested during posttests on the 
training variants (maintenance), testing variants 1 through 
7 -(generalization), and the Raven's Coloured Progressive 
Matrices (far generalization). 
Given these questions, assumptions, and procedures, the 
following hypotheses were offered regarding acquisition, 
maintenance, generalization, and far generalization: 
1. With respect to acquisition, it was hypothesized 
that children in the rule training (RT) and problem-solving 
control (PSC) conditions would require fewer trials to 
criterion than children in the remaining conditions on the 
training tasks. In these two conditions, the immediate 
training of problem-solving responses would be sufficient to 
facilitate task solution. Children in conditions ME and RD 
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did not receive explicit training in problem-solving. The 
rules RD children came to emit would likely depend on 
feedback over the course of trials. In contrast, the 
problem-solving responses of RT and PSC children were 
ensured from the very first trial. Thus, on trials to 
criterion during training the ordering of the groups was 
predicted to be: RT = PSC > RD = ME. 
2. Regarding maintenance or generalization over time, 
on tasks earlier subjected directly to training, it was 
hypothesized that children in the rule training condition 
would outperform children in the rule discovery condition, 
who in turn would outperform children in the remaining two 
conditions. Group RT was predicted to select the correct 
choice more often than group RD, who in turn would select 
the correct choice more often than groups PSC and ME on 
training variants 1 through 3 during posttests. Training 
children to verbalize task rules in conditions RT and RD 
offered the possibility that these verbalizations, as 
readily emitted responses, would mediate generalization in 
untrained conditions. To the extent that RD children 
learned to identify useful rules their performance would 
approach that of RT children. 
3. Regarding generalization to testing tasks (which 
lay beyond the range of training tasks in terms of the 
number of stimulus dimensions that systematically varied), 
the same hypothesis was offered as with maintenance: Group 
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RT would select the correct choice more often than group RD, 
who in turn would select the correct choice more often than 
groups PSC and ME on testing variants 1 through 7 during 
posttests. Training children to verbalize task rules in 
conditions RT and RD increased the possibility that on 
similar testing tasks, these verbalizations as easily 
emitted responses with stimulus functions, would mediate 
generalization. To the extent that RD children learned to 
identify useful rules their performance would approach that 
of RT children. Thus, during posttest, the ordering of the 
groups for measures of both maintenance (training variants 1 
through 3) and generalization (testing variants 1 through 7) 
was predicted to be: RT > RD > PSC = ME. 
4. With respect to generalization to a task (RCPM) 
which required some different (not just additional) problem-
solving responses than the training tasks, it was 
hypothesized that children in the RD condition would 
outperform children in the ME condition, who in turn, would 
outperform children in the remaining two conditions. 
Training children in the RD condition to verbally identify 
task requirements would facilitate their performance on a 
new task, to the extent that children continued to verbally 
explore their behavior. Training children with rules and 
problem-solving responses that were no longer appropriate 
(instrumental) to the new task, as in RT and PSC conditions, 
was expected to interfere with performance to the extent 
95 
that problem-solving responses continued to be emitted at an 
overt or covert level. Thus, during the posttests the order 
of groups on the far measure of generalization (the RCPM > 
was predicted to be: RD > ME > RT = PSC. 
SB 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 62 children enrolled in three 
preschool classrooms at the Kamehameha Schools (Ulupono, 
Nanaikapono, and Nanakuli) and a fourth nearby preschool (Na 
Lei). All were private schools. Children ranged in age 
from 4 years, 6 months to 5 years, 4 months, with a mean age 
of 5 years, 0 months. At the request of the experimenter, 
teachers from each classroom identified preschoolers whom 
they thought lacked skills in labeling common colors, 
shapes, and sizes (small, medium, and big). These children 
were excluded from further participation. 
The labeling skills were assessed with remaining 
children using an informal screening device. Those who met 
criterion (described below) at screening were assigned to 
one of the four training conditions and one of four trainers 
including this experimenter. Assignments were made 
randomly, with the following consideration: Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test (PPVT) scores were balanced across the 
training conditions. 
The matrix completion tasks which comprised the pretest 
doubled as a second screening device, as those children 
performing at a rate of 50X correct or greater on particular 
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sets of items were also dropped from the study. Table 1 
shows the number and IQ scores of preschoolers withdrawn 
from the study prior to and following assignment to 
conditions, and the reasons for their withdrawal. Table 2 
shows, for each training condition, the number of children 
withdrawn and a more detailed description of the reasons for 
withdrawal. 
Of the five children withdrawn after assignment to 
conditions, only one child's withdrawal was clearly specific 
to his training demands, and hence it is concluded that the 
assumption of randomness in each training condition was not 
violated. The remaining 38 children who successfully 
participated were distributed among training groups, 
preschools, and trainers as displayed in table 3. 
While an attempt was made to evenly distribute children 
among trainers and conditions, withdrawals and practical 
considerations rendered this distribution somewhat uneven. 
The Multiple Exemplar (ME) condition, Rule Discovery (RD) 
condition, Problem-Solving Control (PSC) condition, and Rule 
Training <RT) condition had 9,9,10, and 10 children in each 
group, respectively. The respective mean ages for the 
groups were: 4 years, 10 months; 5 years, 1 month; 4 years, 
11 months, and; 5 years, 1 month. 
The mean PPVT IQ scores for the groups were: 97.6; 
98.3; 104.1, and; 103.3, respectively. A one-way analysis 
of variance on these scores revealed that they did not 
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differ eignificantly among the four training conditions, 
F(3, 34) = 0.995, q>. 25, table 4). 
Materials 
The children were trained and tested using matrices 
modeled after the Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices and 
originally used by Bryant (1983). The tasks were well-
suited to the purposes of the present study, as various 
stimulus properties could be manipulated along objective 
dimensions. This permitted the selection of task 
instances, and in particular variants, to be made on logical 
versus strictly intuitive grounds. It also guided the 
composition of verbal rules which were likely to facilitate 
learning. 
The task domain employed to meet these criteria 
consisted of sets of 3x3 matrices of geometric stimuli 
printed on poster board. For each example of these stimulus 
cards, the lower right hand stimulus was missing and was to 
be chosen from a card of 4 to 6 stimuli situated in front of 
the child (see figure 3). All forms on this solution card 
were manipulable so that the child could select by hand the 
correct form and place it in the missing lower right-hand 
position of the stimulus card. The location of the correct 
stimulus was randomly determined for all stimulus cards. 
Within each matrix, values of the dimensions of size, 
shape, color, or pattern (superimposed on each stimulus), or 
some combination varied. Additionally, one or more 
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dimensions were scrambled across the rows or columns as 
opposed to being laid out logically. Each set of matrices 
that followed the same rules regarding the particular 
dimensions that varied and the degree to which they were 
scattered was referred to as a variant. Eleven variants 
were used in the present study and are described below (see 
figure 3 for examples of each variant). 
Stimulus cards and solution cards were made of 
posterboard, and measured 10.63 inches by 8.38 inches. On 
the stimulus cards, a lower right hand area measuring 3.5 
inches by 2.75 inches was cut away. Forms of various sizes 
and colors were professionally printed on the posterboard. 
The forms were circles, squares, isosceles right triangles, 
and five-point stars. At their greatest breadth, small, 
medium, and large instances of each were in an approximate 
ratio of 1:2:3, after Bryant, (1983). 
The breadth of small, medium, and large forms were 0.63 
inches, 1.31 inches, and 2.0 inches, respectively. The 
pattern attribute was applied to the stimuli of stimulus 
cards and choice cards via Letraset tape. Its width was 
0.13 inches. 
Variants used in training. Four variants were employed 
during training. In all instances of variant 1 (V-l), shape 
was the only dimension that varied, with each value (e.g. 
square) uniform within each row. In all instances of V-l.5, 
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color was the only dimension that varied, with each 
attribute (e.g. blue) uniform within each column. 
All instances of V-2 varied on both shape and color 
dimensions. Each value of shape was uniform within each 
row, and each color attribute was uniform within each 
column. Each V-2 matrix was thus a combination of V-l and 
V—1.5. Instances of V-3 varied on the color dimension only. 
It differed from V-l.5 in that attributes of colors were 
uniform not within rows or columns, but on the diagonal axis 
giving a scattered appearance. 
Variants used In testing. Examples of the four 
variants described above also appeared in pretest and 
posttests. Seven others appeared uniquely in the pretest and 
posttests. V-l was identical to V-l of training, except 
that values of size, not shape, were uniform within each 
row. V-2 of testing was identical to V-2 of training except 
that values of size, not shape, were uniform within each 
row, and attributes of pattern, not color, were uniform 
within each column. V-3 of testing was identical to V-3 of 
training, except that values of size, not color, were 
scattered. 
Instances of V-4 and V-5 varied on both color and shape 
dimensions. Unlike V-2 of training however, color 
attributes were scattered for V-4, and both color attributes 
and shape values were scattered for V-5. 
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Instances of V-6 and V-7 each varied on 3 dimensions. 
Instances of V-6 varied on shape, color, and size 
dimensions. Values of shape were uniform within each row, 
values of size were uniform within each column, and 
attributes of color were scattered. Instances of V-7 varied 
on shape, color, and pattern dimensions. Values of shape 
were scattered, attributes of colors were scattered, and 
attributes of pattern were uniform within each column. 
For all matrices, if the size of the stimuli varied, 
the correct choice.brought the frequency of the different 
sizes to parity. If shape varied, the correct choice 
brought the frequency of the different shapes to parity. If 
both size and shape varied, the correct choice brought the 
frequency of both the different sizes and shapes to parity, 
and so forth. Thus for all matrices, the correct choice 
brought the stimulus frequency of a relevant dimension to 
parity, with those dimensions that systematically vary being 
defined as relevant. 
An attempt was made to use progressively more difficult 
variants in each successive training day of the study. 
Proceeding across days, the critical stimulus features 
became more numerous or complex, building upon earlier 
variants. Thus, while the variant of the third day of 
training shared commonalities with those of the first day, 
they had different features as well. 
102 
On the basis of pilot and experimental data from Bryant 
(1983), variants were presented in the following manner to 
meet the requirements mentioned above: Training day one 
featured V-l and V-1.5; day 2 featured V-2, and day 3 
featured V-3. 
The testing variants were presented in blocks of 4 
examples, in a predetermined random order during pretest and 
each posttest. Two instances of each of the four training 
variants were presented during pretest and posttests,and 
served as an index of maintenance. There were four 
instances each of V-2, V-4, V-5, V-6, and V-7, and two each 
of V-l and V-3. These served as indices of generalization, 
as children received no exposure to them during training. 
There were thus 8 maintenance items and 24 generalization 
items. 
The Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM), set B, 
was also administered as part of the pretest and posttests. 
Similar to the training and testing variants, the RCPM 
required the child to select the one stimulus from a 
solution set of 6 stimuli that best completed the matrix. 
Unlike the variants, many of the RCPM matrices have been 
described as, "component parts that need closure," (Turner, 
Hall, and Grimmett, 1973, p. 358). As such, it was presumed 
that many of the RCPM items required different problem-
solving responses from those of the training and testing 
variants. Set B consisted of 12 items, bringing the total 
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number of items for the pretest and each posttest to forty-
four. 
During pretest, training, and posttests, poker chips 
served as token reinforcers. At the end of the daily 
session, children could exchange tokens earned for backup 
reinforcers such as balloons, marbles, and stickers. 
Whatever the amount of tokens earned each day, they could be 
exchanged for one, and only one backup reinforcer. This 
controlled for the amount of reinforcement across all 
training and testing days, and between training conditions. 
Design 
Following the informal screening of shape, color, size, 
and pattern identification, children were assigned to one of 
four experimental conditions: Multiple Exemplar (ME); Rule 
Discovery (RD); Problem-Solving Control (PSC), and; Rule 
Training (RT). Children in all conditions were exposed to 
the pretest, at least 3 days of training, and two posttests, 
the first unprompted and the second prompted. 
During training, all children received feedback. They 
were first told whether their choice was correct or 
incorrect. For all children, trainers then described the 
relevant characteristics of the correctly completed matrix. 
Children received no such feedback during the pretest and 
the posttests. Immediately prior to the presentation of 
pretest, training, and posttest materials, all children 
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received minimal verbal instructions to perform the tasks, 
and verbal prompts, as necessary, to continue working. 
Children in the ME condition were exposed to the 
progressively more complex sequence of materials of training 
days one through three. As no attempt was made to instruct, 
model, or prompt rules, or train problem-solving responses, 
this condition served as a control for the exposure to 
multiple exemplars in comparison to the remaining three 
conditions. 
In the RT condition, children were trained to verbalize 
a rule which specified a relationship between problem-
solving responses and outcome. They were also trained to do 
those problem-solving responses and related nonverbal 
problem-solving responses before choosing their answers. 
In the PSC condition, children were trained to emit the 
verbal and nonverbal problem-solving responses, but were not 
instructed or required to verbalize the rule. Nor was the 
rule ever modeled. 
Immediately prior to solving each matrix, trainers 
prompted children in the RD condition to say what they would 
do to find the right answer. 
Children worked on the matrices for approximately 20-40 
minutes each school day. For each child, the pretest 
occurred on two consecutive school days. The day after 
pretest, training began. It lasted three consecutive school 
days, for all but three children. Two children in the RD 
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condition required an extra training day for V-2. One child 
in the ME condition required one additional day for V-3. 
Children spent the next two school days working on the first 
posttest. They spent the following two days working on the 
second posttest. Barring absences, all children spent 9 or 
10 consecutive school days from the first to last day of the 
study (see table 5 for a design overview). 
Procedure 
Screening. Prior to the pretest, all children were 
informally screened with stimulus cards to determine and 
assure their competence in discriminating verbally all 
attributes of color and pattern, and all values of size and 
shape that were to appear on the matrices. Trainers 
corrected children's errors. To participate in the study, 
children had to identify correctly all values of a dimension 
twice consecutively, without prompting. For example, they 
had to identify the sequence, red-blue-green-yellow-red-
blue-green-yellow, without error or prompt. 
Pretest. On the pretest days, all children received 
exposure to a set of 32 matrices, composed of: two instances 
each of training variants 1, 1.5, 2, and 3; two instances 
each of testing variants 1 and 3, and; four instances each 
of testing variants 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Variants were 
presented in a predetermined random order of blocks of four 
to minimize acquisition and generalization via the logical 
programming of matrices during this phase. The Raven 
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Coloured Progressive Matrices <RCPM), set B, was also 
administered as a block within the matrices. It consists of 
twelve items, bringing the total number of pretest items to 
forty-four (see table 6). 
As the trainer presented each item, he or she simply 
instructed the child to, "Find the picture that belongs 
here," (pointing to the lower right hand position of the 
stimulus card) "from the ones here," (sweeping his or her 
hand across the solution card). No feedback was given 
regarding the accuracy of each child's answer. 
Trainers put a token in a plastic cup in front of the 
child on alternate matrices. After the child was given a 
few seconds to study the matrix but before he or she 
selected an answer, the token was delivered. At the same 
time the trainer said, "Here's a token for working so hard." 
The purpose of the pretesting was to assure that 
children could not reliably perform the matrices and to 
provide a baseline against which to compare the differential 
effectiveness of the various training conditions. 
Training 
Multiple Exemplar condition. In this condition, 
children were exposed to the sequence of progressively more 
complex and difficult tasks in training without the benefit 
of instruction or prompting of rules or labels: Nor were any 
problem-solving responses modeled or trained. 
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The child was given minimal instructions to, "Find the 
one that belongs here," (trainer pointed to the lower right 
hand position) "from the ones here," (trainer swept his or 
her hand across the solution set). This instruction and 
other verbal prompts were repeated by the trainers as often 
as necessary to sustain the child's on-task behavior. They 
were faded out as the child responded readily. 
After the child had a few seconds to study the matrix 
but before he or she could select an answer, the trainer 
placed a token in the . child's cup. At the same time the 
trainer said, "Here's a token for working so hard." 
Material reinforcement was given every trial of training, 
contingent upon on-task behavior only. 
Immediately after the child responded, he or she was 
given feedback regarding the accuracy of the choice. 
Selection of the correct choice was praised verbally: i.e., 
"Good jobi That's the right one." In the case of a wrong 
choice the trainer said, "Good try, but that's not the right 
answer. This is the one that belongs," (the trainer removed 
the child's incorrect choice and placed the correct choice 
in position). 
Correct or incorrect, at this point the trainer 
described the relevant characteristics of the correctly 
completed matrix: e.g., "This is the right one because you 
have three squares, three circles, and three triangles." 
The trainer permitted the child to observe the correct 
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choice in place for a few seconds, and then presented the 
next matrix. 
Rule Training condition. Children in this condition 
were exposed to the same task sequence, minimal 
instructions, praise, and feedback as were children in the 
ME condition. Additionally, a rule which specified the 
relationship between verbal problem-solving responses and 
task outcome was taught. The verbal and nonverbal problem-
solving responses were also taught. 
Immediately after the matrix was presented, the trainer 
modeled the appropriate rule. For a V-l matrix, where shape 
varied, the trainer said, "If I count the shapes, it may 
help me get the right answer." 
The trainer then modeled the verbal and nonverbal 
problem-solving. This entailed counting the frequency of 
each stimulus value for each relevant dimension, labeling 
the value, and calling out each needed (missing) value. With 
a V-2 matrix for example, the trainer would say, "One, two, 
three circles; one, two, three, squares; one, two 
triangles... I need a triangle. One, two, three, smalls; 
one, two, three mediums; one, two larges... I need a large." 
At the same time, trainers pointed with their fingers, 
tracking each stimulus in a corresponding manner. This was 
the nonverbal component of the problem-solving. The 
trainer then prompted the child to verbalize the rule, 
modeling as needed, and praising longer chains of behavior 
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across training trials. The trainer similarly prompted the 
child to emit appropriate problem-solving. The problem-
solving was further modeled as needed, and longer chains of 
behavior were praised across training trials. 
After the child verbalized the rule and emitted all the 
required problem-solving, but before he or she selected an 
answer,the trainer placed a token in the child's cup. At 
the same time the trainer said, "Here's a token for saying 
and doing all those things." Thus, material reinforcement 
was contingent upon emission of the entire rule and problem-
solving sequence. If necessary, the child was then 
encouraged to select an answer. Trainers modeled the 
rule and problem-solving responses on the first trial with 
each new variant. On successive trials, trainers faded out 
the modeling to wean children from reliance upon the 
trainer. If, on a given trial, the child was unsuccessful 
in emitting the rule or problem-solving sequence, he was 
prompted with the modeling of its initial portion. If still 
not sufficient, more was modeled until the child complied. 
Note that while modeled rules and problem-solving were 
faded, the child was required to verbalize the rule overtly 
and perform corresponding problem-solving responses 
throughout training. 
Problem-Solving Control condition. Children in this 
condition were exposed to the same task sequence, minimal 
instructions, praise, and feedback as were children in the 
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ME and RT conditions. As in the RT condition, children were 
trained to emit the appropriate problem-solving responses. 
However, they were not trained to verbalize the formal rule 
which specified the relationship between problem-solving 
responses and outcome. The trainer never modeled the rule, 
nor did the trainer instruct the child to verbalize the 
rule. 
Relative to the RT condition, the present condition 
thus controlled for the effects of the modeling of the 
problem-solving and the effects of the problem-solving 
behavior itself. 
After each matrix was presented, the trainer modeled 
counting the frequency of each stimulus value for each 
relevant dimension, labeling the value, and calling out each 
needed value. With a V-2 matrix for example, the trainer 
said, "One, two, three circles; one, two, three squares; 
one, two, triangles... I need a triangle. One, two, three, 
smalls; one, two, three, mediums; one, two, larges... I need 
a large." At the same time, the trainer pointed with his or 
her finger to each stimulus in a corresponding manner. 
After the child emitted all the required problem-
solving, but before he or she selected an answer,the trainer 
placed a token in the child's cup. At the same time the 
trainer said, "Here's a token for saying and doing all 
those things. " Thus, material reinforcement was contingent 
upon emission of the entire problem-solving sequence. If 
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necessary, the child was then encouraged to select an 
answer. 
As in the RT condition, trainers modeled the problem-
solving responses on the first trial with each new variant, 
and subsequently faded the modeling of problem-solving 
responses while praising longer problem-solving chains. As 
in the RT condition, the problem-solving sequence was 
prompted and modeled as necessary to assure that problem-
solving continued throughout training. 
Rule Discovery condition. Children in this condition 
were exposed to the same task sequence, minimal 
instructions, praise, and feedback as were children in the 
previous conditions. However, they were additionally 
prompted to identify rules regarding matrix solution. On 
every trial, immediately before the matrix was presented, 
the trainer prompted the child to name rules, specify 
problem-solving responses, or problem-solve by asking the 
child to, "Tell me out loud how to do this," or, "Tell me 
what you have to do to get the right answer." 
Children were enthusiastically praised for stating 
appropriate rules, specifying appropriate problem-solving 
responses, or for doing appropriate problem-solving. If 
for example, the child responded, "three circles, three 
squares, three triangles," on an appropriate V-l matrix, the 
trainer said, "Terrific! You did a really good job!" Before 
the child selected his or her answer, the trainer would put 
112 
a token in the child's cup saying, "Here's a token for doing 
such a good job telling me how to do it." 
If the child's verbal response did not meet these 
criteria, the trainer said, "Good try." Before the child 
selected his or her answer, the trainer would put a token in 
the child's cup saying, "Here's a token for trying to tell 
me how to do it." 
If the child failed to verbalize an appropriate rule, 
specify an appropriate problem-solving response, or do 
appropriate problem-solving, in response to the trainer's 
first prompt, the trainer prompted the child a second time 
on that trial. No matter what the child's verbalization in 
response to this second prompt, no third prompts were 
permitted on a given trial. Thus, children had either one 
or two opportunities to verbalize rules on each trial, 
depending on the appropriateness of their first attempt. 
Material reinforcement was contingent upon verbalization 
regardless of content, and only one token could be earned on 
each trial. 
As in the RT and PSC conditions, children were prompted 
if necessary to assure that the rules they came to emit 
remained overt throughout training. See appendix A for the 
protocols for all four training conditions. 
Meeting criterion. To advance from one training 
variant to another, or from variant 3 to posttest, all 
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children had to meet a criterion of three consecutive 
correct problems within each variant. 
Children in the RT condition had to meet an additional 
criterion: On two consecutive trials within each variant, 
they had to verbalize the appropriate rule and do 
appropriate problem-solving without modeling and prompting 
from the trainer. 
Similarly, children in the PSC condition had to meet 
the same criterion for problem-solving. Children in the RD 
condition had to verbalize rules on two consecutive trials 
without prompts from the trainer, regardless of the 
appropriateness of the rules. 
If on a given variant, the child met criterion on 
outcome before meeting the rule criterion, subsequent 
matrices were presented without the solution card. This 
enabled children to continue working toward the two-trial 
criterion for rules, without overlearning correct solutions 
to the matrices. 
Unprompted posttest. The unprompted posttest and its 
administration was identical to the pretest. In the two days 
of the unprompted posttest, children were exposed to the 
same set of 44 matrices as in the pretest. As in pretest, 
blocks of variants were presented in the same predetermined 
random order to avoid presentation of a logical sequence of 
matrices that might foster acquisition or generalization. 
Trainers' instructions and reinforcement contingencies 
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remained the same ae in pretest, and again no feedback 
regarding accuracy was given. 
The purpose of this poettest was to provide an 
assessment of maintenance via training variants 1 through 3, 
and an assessment of generalization across tasks via testing 
variants 1 through 7. The inclusion of RCPM items provided 
an index of far generalization. 
Prompted postteet. The prompted postteBt was always 
administered on the two school days immediately following 
the unprompted posttest. The prompted posttest and its 
administration was identical to the pretest and unprompted 
posttest with one exception: On each trial, immediately 
following the minimal instructions to do each problem, the 
trainers prompted children to use their formerly trained 
strategies. 
For children in groups RT, PSC, and RD the prompt was, 
"Remember to say and do the things you learned before you 
answer." For children in group ME, who had not learned to 
say anything during training, the prompt was, "Remember to 
do the things you learned before you answer." 
Consistent with Brown and Campione's (1978) notion of 
dynamic measures of transfer, the purpose of the prompted 
posttest was to provide a more sensitive measure of 
generalization effects in the event that differential 
training effects failed to materialize on the unprompted 
posttest. 
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Acquisition. Trials to criterion on variants 1 through 
3 of training served as measures of acquisition on materials 
immediately subjected to training. 
Maintenance. Eight examples of the four training 
variants were included in each posttest. The number correct 
thus served as an index of maintenance. 
Generalization across tasks. Thirty-two examples of 
the seven testing variants were included in each posttest. 
Not present during training, they served as an index of 
generalization. 
Far generalization. The number of items correct on set 
B of the Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM) 
provided an index of far generalization on each posttest. 
Trained rules and problem-solving strategies were not 
anticipated to be instrumental to RCPM solution. 
Process and Verbalization Measures 
In conditions RT and RD it was thought that the verbal 
behavior children came to emit during training would 
mediate generalization in altered settings by increasing the 
probability of behavior it specified. In contrast, group 
PSC was expected to exercise little influence upon 
children's verbalization of rules. Instead, generalization 
effects which occurred were likely to be the result of 
continued application of trained problem-solving responses. 
Given that different interventions were expected to 
have their Impact on different types of responses (rules 
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versus problem-solving), assessing the types of responses 
that occurred during training and testing became an 
important means of validating treatment elements. 
For all training conditions, children's pretest, 
training, and posttest verbalizations were recorded via tape 
recorder and trainer transcription to: assure that the 
various training regimens successfully determined 
children's rules and problem-solving during training, and; 
determine whether children's trained or prompted rules and 
problem-solving maintained during nontraining conditions, at 
least on an overt level. 
The recording of children's rules in the RT and RD 
conditions during training permitted a comparison of rule 
quality or face validity. In the event of group differences 
on measures of matrix solution, this comparison might have 
permitted those differences to be discussed primarily in 
terms of the process by which rules came to be emitted, and 
not the content. 
Coding. After the study's completion, children's 
verbal and nonverbal behavior was coded on every trial of 
pretest, training, and posttest. 
The coding scheme for children's verbal and nonverbal 
behavior reflected the problem-solving model which inspired 
the Rule Training and Problem-Solving Control training 
conditions. In the RT training, children were taught a rule 
which specified the relationship between a problem-solving 
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response and an outcome: e.g., "If I count the colors and 
shapes, it may help me get it right." Such responses were 
coded as rules (RULE-). 
Verbal responses were coded (SpPROB-) if they only 
specified the problem-solving response (e.g.,"If I count the 
colors and shapes."). They were coded (SOL) if they only 
specified the solution response or outcome (e.g., "It will 
help me get it right."). 
Both RT and PSC conditions taught children to engage in 
verbal problem-solving: e.g., "1,2,3 circles; 1,2,3 squares; 
1,2 triangles, I need a triangle. 1,2,3 blue; 1,2,3 reds; 
1,2 greens, I need a green." Such responses were scored 
(PROB-). The simple labeling of a relevant dimension or 
attribute (e.g., "circle,") was scored (LAB). 
Verbalizations with little face validity were scored as 
irrelevant (IRR). 
Both the RT and PSC conditions taught children to do 
nonverbal problem-solving as well. These children were 
taught to touch, in sequence, identical attributes of each 
relevant dimension. They would, for example, track with 
their fingers each of the three circles, then the three 
stars, then the three triangles followed by the three red 
forms, three blue, and three green. This was scored as 
tracking (T-). Complete failure to track was scored as no 
pointing (NP). 
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In addition to these categories, verbal and nonverbal 
responses were coded according to the accuracy with which 
they conformed to relevant dimensions. Responses that 
conformed to all relevant dimensions, a subset of relevant 
dimensions, or no relevant dimensions were coded as 
appropriate (ap>, partially appropriate <ptap), or 
inappropriate (lnap), respectively. 
To illustrate, consider a matrix with color and shape 
relevant. If the child said, "I have to count the colors 
and shapes," it was scored as (spPROB-ap), as all relevant 
dimensions were specified. "I have to count the colors to 
get the right answer," would be coded (RULE-ptap), because 
the shape dimension was not specified. 
Should the child problem-solve by counting, " 1,2,3 
big; 1,2,3 medium; 1,2 small," it would be scored (PROB-
inap), as neither shape nor color was referenced. 
Similarly, if the child tracked color but not shape with his 
or her fingers, it would be scored (T-ptap). 
Definitions and more examples of each coded category 
are presented in Appendix B. 
Trainers. The four trainers were: the experimenter; an 
M.A. level psychologist (trainer C); an M.S.W. (trainer A), 
and ; a graduate holding a B.S. degree (trainer N). 
Trainers receive approximately twelve hours of practice 
sessions in the administration of the experimental 
conditions. Trainers initially practiced with each other, 
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and then with several preschoolers. These sessions featured 
instruction, modeling, rehearsal, and feedback. All 
trainers demonstrated mastery of the training procedures 
prior to commencement of the study. During the course of 
training, trainers' performance was monitored occasionally 
by one another to assure that training was conducted 
properly. With the exception of the experimenter, all 
trainers were naive as to experimental questions and 
hypotheses. 
Reliabilities 
Reliability between pairs of trainers was obtained 
prior to commencement of the study with the help of pilot 
preschoolers from the Ulupono classroom. After the study's 
completion, audiotapes and videotapes of all training and 
testing sessions were reliably transcribed and then reliably 
coded. Also, transcribed nonverbal behavior was reliably 
coded. All reliabilities were calculated via the following 
formula: Reliability = no. of agreements/ (no. of agreements 
+ no. of disagreements) x 100. 
Pre-studv reliabilities. The prestudy reliabilities 
included trainers' monitoring on each trial: (1) the number 
corresponding to the chosen answer; (2) the answer's 
correctness; <3) the child's verbalization of the required 
rule, as trained in the RT condition; (4) the child's 
counting and naming aspects of all relevant dimensions, as 
trained in the PSC and RT conditions; (5) the child's 
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tracking values of each relevant dimension, as trained in 
the PSC and RT conditions, and; (6) the child's 
verbalization of self-determined rules as encouraged in the 
RD condition. Reliability was also obtained on the 
recording of: (7) children's tracking that did not conform 
to trained sequences. 
Trainers were randomly paired to work with each pilot 
child. A particular training variant or pretest and a 
particular training condition were selected for one trainer 
to implement and monitor while the other trainer sat nearby 
and simultaneously monitored children's verbal and nonverbal 
behavior. 
Trainers were seated so they could not observe each 
other's monitoring sheets. The pre-study reliabilities 
corresponding to each of the seven categories described 
above were: (1) 91.37. (42/46); (2) 95. 77. (44/46); (3) 100*/. 
(52/52); (4) 90.3*/. (65/72); (5) 98.6*/. (71/72); (6) 
undetermined--no self-rules observed by either trainer, and; 
(7) 66. 7Y. (2/3). 
Once the study had begun, reliability checks for these 
categories were again determined by pairs of trainers. The 
particular pair of trainers, child, training condition and 
training or testing phase for each check was not determined 
randomly but by the pragmatics of the situation: When a 
child was absent or otherwise unavailable, the free trainer 
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would assess reliability with the trainer of the next child 
to begin a session. 
Again corresponding to the seven categories above, the 
checks yielded reliabilities of: (1) 95.7% (154/161); (2) 
97.5*/. (157/161); (3) 100*/. (51/51); (4) 98.0*/. (50/51); (5) 
94.1*/. (48/51); (6) 87.5'/. (42/48), and; (7) 89.3*/. (25/28). 
It might be noted that recordings of items 3 through 6 
above, rule verbalization, verbal problem-solving, tracking, 
and discovered rules, served less as dependent measures per 
se than they did as self-check measures or markers which 
signaled to the trainer that training on a particular 
training variant was complete. For example when the trainer 
checklisted items (4) and (5) on two consecutive training 
trials in the PSC condition, training on that particular 
variant was complete (provided the child had, as well, 
produced three consecutive correct solutions on that 
variant). 
Post-study reliabilities. After training and testing 
were completed for all children, reliability between the 
experimenter and trainers C. and N. was determined for the 
transcription of verbal behavior from videotape (prompted 
posttest, first day only) and audiotape (all remaining 
testing and training sessions). Reliability was trained to 
a criterion of 85. 0'/.. When this criterion was met, the 
experimenter and trainers C. and N. independently 
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transcribed audio and videotapes with occasional 
reliability checks. 
After all transcription was complete, the reliability 
between the experimenter and trainer C. was determined for 
the coding of the transcribed verbalizations and the coding 
of the transcribed nonverbal behavior. Reliability was 
trained to a criterion of 85. 0%, after which the 
experimenter and trainer coded transcriptions independently 
with occasional reliability checks. 
Transcription. The reliability of transcription was 
assessed on 9. 8% of the total number of trials available for 
all children. Over the final 4. 7'/., reliability was 
achieved. Reliability for overall transcription between the 
experimenter and trainers C. and N. was 93. 054 (436/469). 
Adjusting for inflation by eliminating trials on which both 
trainers agreed no speech occurred yielded agreement of 
92.3'/. (398/431). Agreement that the same number of speech 
units occurred on each trial was 92.0% (276/300). 
Independent reliability checks revealed sufficiently 
high levels: overall transcription, 89.1% (172/193); 
adjusted for no-speech trials, 84.5% (93/110), and; number 
of speech units per trial, 86.4% (102/118). 
Coding of verbal behavior. The reliability for coding 
across all categories was 89.9% (286/318). Of the thirteen 
total speech categories, six categories each accounted for 
1.8% or fewer of all coded instances (table 7). 
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Reliabilities for these low occurrence categories were 
generally low: (LAB), 50.0*/. (2/4); (SQL), 25.0*/. (1/4); 
(spPROB-inap), 20.0% (1/5); and; (PROB-ap), 100% (6/6). 
Instances of these categories were arbitrated by the 
experimenter. The experimenter and trainer C. agreed that 
no instances of categories (INT) or <SpPR0B-ap) occurred. 
Reliabilities for the remaining categories, which each 
accounted for 4. 7% or more of all coded instances ranged 
from 80.0% to 100.0*/.: (PROB-ptap), 100*/. (22/22); (PR0B-
inap), 100*/. (74/74); (SpPROB-ptap), 80.0*/. (28/35); (RULE-
ap), 100*/. (15/15); (RULE-ptap), 94.4*/. (17/18); (RULE-inap), 
95.7*/. (45/47), and; (IRR), 85.2'/. (75/88). 
Independent reliability checks revealed sufficiently 
high levels summed across all categories: 87.2% (171/196). 
Three categories showed very low reliability, 0% (0/4), but 
these were very low occurrence categories as all three 
combined accounted for only 2.0% (4/196) of all coded 
instances (see table 7). The coding of these instances was 
arbitrated by the experimenter. 
Coding of nonverbal behavior. Reliability was assessed 
on 11.6% of the total number of trials available for all 
children. Over the final 9.0%, reliability was achieved. 
Reliability for overall coding of nonverbal behavior between 
the experimenter and trainer C. was 94.4% (510/540). 
Adjusting for inflation by eliminating trials on which 
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experimenter and trainer agreed no pointing occurred yielded 
agreement of 91.0% (294/333). 
The reliabilities for each category were: (T-ap), 
84. 5% (49/58); (T-ptap), 94.8'/. (128/135); (T-inap), 90.0*/. 
(117/130), and; (NP), 99.5*/. (216/217, see table 7). 
Independent reliability checks revealed sufficiently high 
levels across all categories: 95.0% (115/121). Over 90V. of 
the trials during the checks were coded NP (no pointing). 
Summary 
Thirty-eight preschoolers were assigned to one of four 
conditions and were trained with various sets of matrix 
completion tasks in a pre-post design. 
The Multiple Exemplar (ME) group received minimal 
instructions and feedback across training tasks, as did all 
groups. The Rule Training (RT) condition additionally 
required children to verbalize a rule and then perform 
specified problem-solving responses. The Problem-Solving 
Control (PSC) group isolated the impact of the rule training 
per se, by requiring problem-solving responses alone. Rule 
Discovery (RD) training encouraged children to verbalize 
task requirements. 
Following training, children were tested on the 
training matrices (maintenance), logical extrapolations 
(generalization), and matrices that required alternate 
strategies (far generalization). A second posttest was 
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administered on which children were prompted to use their 
formerly trained strategies. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Overview 
First, the differential effects of training on matrix 
solution, or outcome, was examined. There were five outcome 
measures: trials to criterion during training; number 
correct on maintenance items; number correct on 
generalization items; partial generalization scores, and; 
number correct on far generalization items. 
The Rule Discovery (RD) and Multiple Exemplar (ME) 
training, unlike the Rule Training (RT) and Problem-Solving 
Control (PSC) conditions, did not ensure that children would 
issue predetermined rules and problem-solving. For that 
reason, a brief description of the verbalizations of RO and 
ME children during training was next presented. 
Finally, rules, verbal problem-solving, and nonverbal 
problem-solving were examined during £osttests to validate 
training effects and to explore their relationship with 
outcome. 
Effects of Training on Trials to Criterion 
The number of trials to criterion during training was 
summed across the four training variants and subjected to a 
one-way analysis of variance. This analysis yielded a 
significant groups effect, F<3, 34) = 3.076, £<.05. Duncan 
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multiple range teste revealed that children receiving the 
Rule Training (RT) required significantly fewer trials to 
reach criterion than did children in the Rule Discovery (RD) 
condition (g<.05) and Multiple Exemplar (ME) condition 
( e<. 05). 
Children in the Problem-Solving Control (PSC) condition 
required fewer trials to criterion than children in the RD 
and ME conditions, though these differences were marginally 
significant (g<.10, table 8). Including these marginal 
differences then, the RT and PSC conditions were comparable 
and each superior to the RD and ME conditions (figure 4). 
These results are identical to those predicted by the first 
hypothesis. The first hypothesis predicted that the 
immediate training of problem-solving skills during this 
phase would be most facilitative. 
Method of Analyses 
To assess the differential effects of training, all 
maintenance and generalization measures were subjected to 
analyses of covariance on posttest scores with the 
respective pretest scores serving as the covariate. First, 
the maintenance items of the unprompted posttest were 
subjected to the ancova with the pretest score serving as 
covariate. Then the maintenance items of the prompted 
posttest were subjected to the ancova, again with the 
pretest score serving as covariate. 
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The same procedure was repeated for the generalization 
items, the partial generalization scores, and the far 
generalization items. These analyses of adjusted posttest 
scores served to eliminate the variance associated with 
chance differences among the treatment groups with respect 
to pretraining dependent measures. 
These analyses of maintenance, generalization, and far 
generalization measures were supplemented with two-way 
(groups X trials) repeated measures analyses of variance to 
determine absolute improvement over trials, for each 
training condition. Significant effects were examined via 
Duncan Multiple Range tests, applied to adjusted cell means 
in the case of ANCOVA. Significant interaction effects were 
followed by F-tests for simple effects and Duncan Multiple 
Range tests in the case of repeated measures ANOVA. 
Maintenance Items 
For maintenance items at the unprompted posttest, an 
analysis of covariance on the adjusted scores revealed a 
significant groups effect, F(3, 33) = 2.886, £<.05. Duncan 
Multiple Range tests revealed that children in the PSC and 
RT conditions outperformed children in the ME condition 
(g<.05). No other comparisons were significant (see figure 
5 and table 9). 
For maintenance items at the prompted posttest, the 
analysis of covariance on the adjusted scores revealed a 
significant groups effect, F (3, 33) = 3.360, £<.03. Duncan 
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Multiple Range tests revealed, as in the unprompted 
posttest, that children in the PSC and RT conditions 
outperformed children in the ME condition (£<.05), with no 
other comparisons significant (see figure 6 and table 10). 
These results were not anticipated on the basis of the 
second hypothesis, which predicted that RT children would 
outperform RD children, who would in turn outperform PSC and 
ME children. The rule component of the RT and RD conditions 
was presumed essential to maintenance. This hypothesis was 
not confirmed by the data. 
A two-way repeated measures analysis of variance on the 
maintenance items revealed a significant main effect for 
groups, F(3, 34) = 3.491, £.<.026, a significant main effect 
for trials, F(2, 68) = 99.895, £<.001, and a nonsignificant 
groups x trials interaction, F(6, 68) = 1.795, g>.113, 
(table 11). Of primary interest here was the trials effect. 
Duncan Multiple Range tests indicated that children's 
performance on maintenance items improved significantly from 
pretest to the unprompted posttest (£<.001), from the 
unprompted posttest to the prompted posttest (jd<.05), and 
from the pretest to the prompted posttest (g<.001), summed 
across groups (figure 7, bottom). 
Regarding the main effect for groups, Duncan tests 
indicated that children in the PSC and RT conditions 
outperformed children in the ME condition <£<.05), summed 
over trials. No other comparisons were significant (figure 
130 
7, top). These group differences were thus the same as 
those revealed by the covariance analyses of the unprompted 
and prompted posttests. On maintenance items then, RT and 
PSC training yielded comparable improvements, superior to 
that of ME training. RD training was not distinguished from 
any other training by its effects on maintenance items. 
Generalization Items 
For generalization items at the unprompted posttest, an 
analysis of covariance on the adjusted scores yielded a 
nonsignificant groups effect, F(3, 33) = 1.052, £>.383, 
(table 12). 
For generalization items at the prompted posttest, the 
ancova on the adjusted scores revealed a significant groups 
effect, F (3, 33) = 4.725, £<.008. According to Duncan 
Multiple Range tests, children in the RT condition 
outperformed children in both the RD (p_<.05) and ME (£<.005) 
conditions. Children in the PSC condition outperformed 
those in the ME condition (g<.05) and were marginally 
superior to those in the RD condition (g<.10, table 13, 
figure 8). Including the marginal differences, RT and PSC 
children were comparable and superior to RD and ME children, 
who also were comparable. Thus, on the generalization items 
of the prompted posttest, RT and PSC children displayed the 
greatest gains. 
A two-way repeated measures analysis of variance on the 
generalization items revealed a significant main effect for 
131 
groups, F(3, 34) = 4.024, £<.015, a significant effect for 
trials, F(2, 68) = 83.791, £<.001, and a significant groups 
x trials interaction, F(6, 68) = 2.542, £<.028, (table 14). 
F-tests for simple effects, conducted to determine which 
particular groups improved over trials, revealed that all 
improved: ME, F(2, 68) = 7.625, £<.01; RD, F_(2, 68) = 
14.063, £.<.001; PSC, F<2, 68) = 32.304, £<.001; RT, F<2, 68) 
= 40.084, £<.001, (figure 9). To determine the exact 
locus of these improvements, Duncan Multiple Range tests 
were applied. Children's scores . in the ME condition 
increased from pretest to the unprompted posttest (£<.005), 
and from pretest to the prompted posttest (£<.001), but not 
from the unprompted to the prompted posttest (£>.10). 
Similarly, the only significant increases for 
children's scores in the RD condition occurred from pretest 
to unprompted posttest <£<.001) and from pretest to the 
prompted posttest (£<.001). 
Children's scores on generalization items in the PSC 
condition increased from pretest to unprompted posttest 
(£<• 001), increased marginally from unprompted to prompted 
posttest (£<.10), and increased from pretest to prompted 
posttest <£<.001). 
Similarly, children's scores in the RT condition 
increased from pretest to unprompted posttest <£<.001), from 
unprompted to prompted posttest <£<.005), and from pretest 
to prompted posttest (£<.001). 
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To summarize, all groups improved from pretest to the 
unprompted posttest, but only the RT and PSC conditions 
improved from the unprompted to prompted posttests. This 
likely reflects the significance of the role played by the 
prompts to the RT and PSC training. 
The repeated measures anova provided an index of 
absolute improvement on generalization items from pretest to 
posttests. An alternate and independent means of doing so 
was via a large sample approximation of the binomial test. 
This test revealed that children in each of the four groups 
performed at or below chance levels on the 24 generalization 
items during pretest (alpha = .05, one-tailed test). 
Further, children in each of the four groups, including ME 
and RD, performed significantly above chance levels on the 
generalization items of both the unprompted and prompted 
posttests (alpha = .05, one-tailed test, table 15). Thus, 
these results were in agreement with the repeated measures 
anova for generalization items in suggesting that all groups 
improved significantly from pretest to posttests. 
Partial generalization scores. Given that most of the 
generalization items varied on two or three dimensions, it 
was possible for a child's incorrect answer to be correct on 
a subset of relevant dimensions. Partial generalization 
scores were derived from a pooling of each child's incorrect 
responses to yield a more sensitive index of generalization. 
Children were given credit for each appropriate or correct 
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attribute of their incorrect answers, and a percentage score 
was calculated. Given that correct choices did not directly 
contribute to this error analysis, the partial 
generalization measure was orthogonal to the generalization 
measure discussed above. 
An analysis of covariance on the adjusted partial 
generalization scores of the unprompted posttest yielded a 
nonsignificant groups effect, F(3, 33) = 1.146, p>.345, 
(table 16). 
An analysis of covariance on the adjusted scores of the 
prompted posttest indicated a significant groups effect, 
F<3, 33) = 4.439, q<.01. Duncan Multiple Range tests showed 
that children in group RT were superior to children in 
groups ME <E<.01) and RD (£<.05). Children in group PSC 
were superior to those in group ME <g<.05) and marginally 
superior to RD children <£<.10, table 17, figure 10). 
Including the marginal differences, RT and PSC children 
were comparable and superior to RD and ME children. This 
pattern of group differences replicated that of the 
generalization measure. A two-way repeated measures 
analysis of variance on the partial generalization scores 
revealed a significant groups effect, F(3, 34) = 3.258, 
jd<. 033, a significant trials effect, F(2, 68) = 34.363, 
£<.001, and a nonsignificant groups x trials interaction, 
F ( 6, 68) = 1.739, £>.125, (table 18). 
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Duncan tests indicated that children's partial 
generalization scores significantly improved from pretest to 
the unprompted posttest (jac.OOl), from the unprompted to the 
prompted posttest <£<.05), and from the pretest to the 
prompted posttest (g<.001>, summed across groups (figure 11, 
bottom). 
Unlike the generalization items then, the partial 
generalization scores revealed that all groups improved from 
the unprompted to the prompted posttest. 
Duncan tests showed that children's scores in the PSC 
condition were higher than those in the RD and ME conditions 
Scores in the RT condition were marginally higher 
than those of the RD and ME conditions (£<.10). Thus, 
including marginal differences, scores in the PSC and RT 
conditions were comparable and superior to those of the RD 
and ME conditions, which were also comparable (figure 11, 
top). This pattern of group differences is identical to 
that which resulted from the ANCOVAS performed on 
generalization and partial generalization measures of the 
prompted posttest. 
Results of these generalization and partial 
generalization measures were not consistent with the third 
hypothesis. It predicted that RT children would outperform 
RD children who would, in turn, outperform PSC and ME 
children. The rule component of the former two conditions 
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was presumed to be essential to broad generalization across 
tasks and time, as stated above. 
Far Generalization: (RCPM Set B) 
For RCPM items at the unprompted posttest, an analysis 
of covariance on the adjusted scores revealed a 
nonsignificant groups effect, F<3, 33) = 0.132, p>.940, 
(table 19). For RCPM items at the prompted posttest, the 
analysis of the adjusted scores also revealed a 
nonsignificant groups effect, F(3, 33) = 0.701, g>. 558, 
(table 20). 
Carlson and Wiedl (1976) subjected the RCPM to factor 
analysis and found that items 8 through 12 of set B loaded 
clearly on a dimension they labeled, "concrete and abstract 
reasoning (p. 176)." Perhaps a separate examination of 
these items would yield a measure more sensitive to training 
effects. An analysis of covariance on the adjusted scores 
for these items at unprompted posttest yielded a 
nonsignificant groups effect, F(3, 33) = 0.510, 678, 
(table 21). At prompted posttest, the analysis also yielded 
a nonsignificant groups effect, F(3, 33) = 0.285, g>.836, 
(table 22). 
The failure to find group differences on the far 
generalization measure was not consistent with the fourth 
hypothesis, which predicted that children's scores in the RD 
condition would exceed those of the ME condition, which 
would in turn exceed those of the RT and PSC conditions. 
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It was anticipated that the problem-solving training of 
groups PSC and RT would hinder performance on the novel RCPM 
items. At face value, counting appeared to be incompatible 
with the "abstract reasoning" requirement of the RCPM. It 
was also anticipated that RD training would facilitate 
children's identification of helpful rules as they 
encountered the novel problems. Apparently, this did not 
occur. 
Absolute improvements were explored via a two-way 
repeated measures analysis of variance on the RCPM items. 
This showed a nonsignificant main effect for groups, F(3, 
34) = 1.576, £>.213, a significant main effect for trials, 
F(2, 68) = 11.618, £<.001, and a nonsignificant group x 
trials interaction, F(6, 68) = 0.496, £>.809, (table 23). 
Duncan Multiple Range tests suggested that RCPM scores 
increased from pretest to the unprompted posttest (£<.005), 
and from pretest to the prompted posttest (£.<.001), but not 
from unprompted to prompted posttest (£>.10, figure 12). 
Process Measures: Did Training Do What it was Expected to? 
RD and ME children. During training, children in the 
RD condition were prompted once or twice on each trial with, 
"How are you going to do this to get it right?". ME 
children received no such prompting. Children's verbal and 
nonverbal responses on each trial were coded in the same 
manner as were their responses during pretest and posttests 
(see method section and appendix B). Three categories, 
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< SpPROB-ap), (SpPROB-inap), and (INT) were eliminated 
because they accounted for only two coded instances in the 
entire study. 
Results indicated that 61.7% (317/514) of RD children's 
prompted verbalizations during training were scored as 
irrelevant(IRR), while 95.7'/. (222/232) of ME children's 
responses were so scored (table 24). Recall that 
irrelevant(IRR) verbalizations included trials on which no 
verbalizations occurred at all. The bulk of the ME 
children's IRR responses consisted of these no verbalization 
trials (86.4% of total trials). 
RD children engaged in verbal problem-solving, 
partially appropriate, on 17.2% (PROB-ptap:49/285) of all 
trials, and inappropriately on 1.4% (PROB-inap:4/285). ME 
children engaged in verbal problem-solving on 1.8% (PROB-
ptap:4/221) of all trials. 
With respect to specification of problem-solving 
responses, RD children did so on 24.9% of all trials 
(SpPROB-ptap:71/285). ME children did so on 0% (0/221). RD 
children verbalized a solution response on 4.9% of all 
trials (SOL: 14/285), while ME children did so on 0.5% of 
all trials (1/221). 
Simple labeling of relevant stimulus aspects (LAB) 
occurred on 15.4% (44/285) of RD children's trials and 2.3% 
of ME trials (5/221). 
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Finally, RD children engaged in nonverbal tracking cr­
ap or T-ptap) on 14.7% of all trials (42/285). ME children 
did so on 0.9% of all trials (2/221). 
It is clear from these comparisons that RD training 
prompted more verbal problem-solving and specification of 
responses and outcomes than ME training. During the latter, 
children were preponderantly silent. See table 25 for 
examples of RD children's most frequent verbalizations. 
How successful, in absolute terms was the RD training 
in prompting viable rules and verbal problem-solving? It 
should be noted that only 5 of the 9 RD children verbally 
problem-solved (PROB-ap, -ptap, or inap) on one or more 
trials during training. These five did so on less than 1/3 
(30.8%, 49/159) of their training trials. 
With respect to verbal rules, 5 of 9 RD children had 
verbal responses scored (SpPROB-ptap) or (SOL) on more than 
one trial during training. These occurred on 54.6% (83/152) 
and 9.2% (14/152) of their training trials, respectively. 
Only one child, failed to emit any verbal problem-solving or 
any verbal rules. 
Most importantly, no child in the RD condition on any 
trial specified the appropriate contingency, e.g., "I have 
to count the colors to get it right," (RULE-ap), nor did 
they ever manage simply to say the appropriate problem-
solving response, e.g., "I have to count the colors," 
(SpPROB-ap). Thus, although RD children offered more 
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relevant verbalizations than ME children, in absolute terms 
they were only moderately successful in identifying rules. 
RT and PSC children. In these conditions, varying 
degrees of modeling, prompting, and shaping were used to 
assure that children engaged in specified rules, and verbal 
and nonverbal strategies on every trial of training. On 
every trial then, children in the RT group verbalized 
appropriate rules <RULE-ap), appropriate verbal problem-
solving (PROB-ap), and appropriate nonverbal tracking <T-
ap). PSC children engaged in appropriate verbal problem-
solving and appropriate nonverbal tracking (but no rules) on 
every trial. For an illustration of RT training, see 
appendix C. 
Training validation. Group differences emerged for 
generalization items at the second, prompted posttest but 
not at the initial, unprompted posttest. Given that the 
order of unprompted and prompted posttests was not 
counterbalanced, it cannot be concluded that prompting was a 
necessary condition for group differences to emerge, despite 
the intuitive appeal of such an argument. 
The expected effect of prompting was to increase the 
problem-solving of RT and PSC children from the unprompted 
to the prompted posttest. If this increase occurred, it 
could be argued more persuasively that prompts per se were 
responsible for group differences at prompted posttest. 
Conversely, if problem-solving did not increase from the 
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unprompted to the prompted posttest, the prompts would thus 
be shown unsuccessful in producing their desired effect, and 
group differences at prompted posttest could not readily be 
attributed to prompting. 
Dependent t-tests were employed to determine if 
problem-solving increased between posttest administrations. 
Because of the number of t-tests employed to address this 
and subsequent questions, an alpha level of .02 was adopted 
to provide some containment of experimentwise error rates. 
A t-test performed on the number of instances of verbal 
problem-solving (coded as PROB-ap, -ptap, or -inap) combined 
with the number of instances of nonverbal problem-solving 
(coded as T-ap,-ptap, or -inap), for PSC and RT children 
combined suggested significant increases between posttests, 
t_(19) = -3.407, ^<.01, (table 26). The same measures with 
respect to RT children alone yielded similar results, t(9) = 
-3.465, £<.01. Problem-solving for PSC children alone did 
not Increase between poettests, t<9) = -1.502, £>.10. 
It was noted however, that one child in the PSC 
condition problem-solved frequently at unprompted posttest 
(more than any other PSC child) but problem-solved very 
little at prompted posttest. Also, pertinent, Ken showed 
the greatest improvement in generalization from pretest to 
each posttest of any PSC child. Excluding his data, 
children in the PSC condition display a trend toward 
141 
increased problem-solving from unprompted to prompted 
posttest, t_(8) = -2.824, . 02<£<.05. 
For RT children, emission of the formal rule, which 
included instances coded as RULE-ap, -ptap, -inap, SpPROB-
ptap, and SOL, increased from unprompted to prompted 
posttest, t<9) = -3.743, £<.01, (table 27). The increase in 
problem-solving and rule recitation from unprompted to 
prompted posttest is consistent with the argument that group 
differences emerged at the prompted posttest as a function 
of prompting. 
Rule training distinguished the RT training from the 
PSC training condition. It was anticipated to increase the 
probability of problem-solving, particularly at the 
unprompted posttest. The failure of RT children to 
outperform PSC children on any of the outcome measures might 
suggest that the rule did not function effectively in this 
manner. However, it is also plausible that RT children did 
problem-solve more than PSC children at posttests but, for 
whatever reason or reasons, these differences were not 
reflected by the outcome measures. 
Independent t-tests were conducted on the combined 
number of instances of verbal and nonverbal problem-solving 
to examine the influence of the formal rule training. 
During the unprompted posttest, there was a marginal 
difference between PSC and RT children's problem-solving, 
t(18) = 2.351, . 02<e.<. 05. This difference however, was in 
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favor of PSC children, who tended to do more problem-solving 
during the unprompted posttest than RT children (see again 
table 26). At prompted posttest, RT children's problem-
solving approached that of PSC children, as no differences 
were apparent, t^(18) = -0.180, £>.80. It is clear from 
these results that RT children were not more likely to 
problem-solve at unprompted or prompted posttests than PSC 
children. In fact, at unprompted posttest they were 
somewhat less likely than PSC children. 
During training, RT and PSC children were taught verbal 
problem-solving that named values of shape, attributes of 
color, or both. Additionally, RT children were taught rules 
which specified the counting of shape and color dimensions. 
Sixteen of the twenty-four generalization items of the 
pretest and each posttest featured size, pattern, or both 
size and pattern as relevant and novel dimensions. 
Thus it was of interest to examine whether children's 
verbalizations changed . to reflect the newly relevant 
dimensions. This was addressed for children in all 
conditions and groups RT and PSC in particular, on the 
generalization items of posttests where size, pattern, or 
both were relevant. 
The measure of this form of generalization was the 
number of children who generalized appropriately on one or 
more trials of the posttests. 
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Six of the ten children in the RT group emitted verbal 
problem-solving that was appropriate to a novel dimension 
during the posttests. This was exemplified by an RT child 
who said, "1,2,3 big; 1,2,3 medium; 1,2 small," on item 9 of 
the prompted posttest. 
Five of the ten PSC children problem-solved in similar 
fashion. Three of nine RD children did so, while only one 
of nine ME children issued verbal problem-solving that 
reflected a novel dimension during posttests. 
Only one child in the RT condition verbalized rules 
which reflected a novel dimension. On several items of the 
prompted posttest, the child said, "If I count the big ones 
and small ones it will help me." 
Thus, while the majority of children in the RT 
condition issued verbal problem-solving that was appropriate 
to a novel dimension, only one child's rules were 
appropriate. The generalization of the formal properties of 
the rule appeared less probable than the generalization of 
the formal properties of the verbal problem-solving which 
the rule specified. 
One child in the PSC condition specified a problem-
solving response that was appropriate to a novel dimension: 
"Look at the lines. " 
No child in either the RD or ME condition emitted a 
rule or specified a problem-solving response that was 
appropriate to a novel dimension. 
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The limited effectiveness of the RD intervention in 
prompting verbal problem-solving and rules during training 
was discussed above. It would follow that such rules and 
problem-solving would be lacking at posttests as well. This 
was examined via independent t-tests using the multiple 
exemplar group for comparison, with an alpha level of .02. 
At unprompted posttest, results indicated that RD children 
were not more likely to say rules (RULE-ap, -ptap, or -inap, 
SpPROB-ptap, or SOL) than ME children, t_(16) = -1.000, 
E>.20, <table 28). Nor were RD children more likely to do 
so at the prompted posttest, t(16) = -1.356, E>.10). 
RD children were not more likely to do verbal problem-
solving (PROB-ap, -ptap, or -inap) than ME children at 
unprompted posttest, t_(16) = -0.899, £•>. 20, (table 29), nor 
were they more likely at prompted posttest, t(16) = -0.816, 
B>.20. Prompted rules and verbal problem-solving did not 
appear to generalize from training to posttests, when 
compared to the data of ME children. This is not surprising 
given the modest success in prompting rules from RD children 
during training. 
The Relationship Between Problem-Solving and Outcome 
To facilitate interpretation, coded verbalizations were 
retabulated to form three new categories: "Appropriate" 
verbalizations included appropriate verbal problem-solving 
and contingency specification (PROB-ap, RULE-ap); "Partially 
appropriate" verbalizations included partially appropriate 
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problem-eolving (PROB-ptap) and partially appropriate rules 
(RULE-ptap, SpPRQB-ptap, and SOL), the latter two categories 
entailing only a portion of the rule, and; 
"Inappropriate/Irrelevant" verbalizations which included 
simple labeling (LAB), inappropriate problem-solving (PROB-
inap), inappropriate rules (RULE-inap), and irrelevant 
verbalizations (IRR). 
Because it was the case that, for a given trial, 
several or all of the three categories could be represented, 
the following decision rule was imposed: Any trial that 
included an appropriate verbalization was scored as such, 
while any trial that included both partially appropriate and 
inappropriate/ irrelevant verbalizations was scored as 
partially appropriate. The relationship between problem-
solving and outcome was not examined on the 12 RCPM items of 
each posttest, because there was no reason to expect 
problem-solving, as employed in this study, to facilitate 
RCPM performance. The relationship was examined on the 
remaining items of the unprompted and prompted posttests 
combined, for PSC and RT children, combined. 
A chi-square test of homogeneity revealed that these 
three categories were not homogeneous in their relationship 
to correct outcomes, x2(2, N = 1240) = 66.254, £<.005, 
(table 30). Subsequent partitionings of chi-square revealed 
that appropriate verbalizations were more predictive of 
correct outcomes than partially appropriate verbalizations, 
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x2(l, N. = 1240) = 25.669, g_<.005), while partially 
appropriate verbalizations were, in turn, more predictive of 
correct answers than inappropriate/ irrelevant, x2(l, N = 
1240) = 7.546, £<.01. 
The four nonverbal categories were: tracking-
appropriate (T-ap); partially appropriate (T-ptap); 
inappropriate (T-inap), and; no pointing <NP). A chi-square 
test of homogeneity revealed that these categories were not 
homogeneous in their relationship to correct outcomes, x2(3, 
N = 1238) = 100.234, £<.005, (table 31). A partitioning of 
chi-square indicated that the "no pointing'' and inappropr­
iate nonverbal categories were not different from one 
another in their relationship to outcome, x2(l, N = 1238) = 
1.58Q, £>.10. Nor were "no pointing" and inappropriate 
combined different from partially appropriate x2(l, N = 
1238) = 1.367, £>.10). However, a comparison of these three 
combined categories with appropriate nonverbal problem-
solving revealed they were not homogeneous in their 
relationship to correct outcomes, x2(l, N = 1238) = 97.275, 
£<•005): Appropriate tracking was far more predictive of 
correct solutions than the 3 remaining categories, which did 
not differ from each other. 
The chi-square tests revealed the relative 
predictiveness of several verbal and nonverbal categories to 
correct outcomes. An alternative means of addressing the 
relationship between problem-solving and outcome in absolute 
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terms is to determine, for a given problem-solving category, 
if children were performing above levels expected by chance. 
A large sample approximation of the binomial test was 
applied to the data of PSC and RT children combined, at 
unprompted and prompted posttests combined, for all except 
RCPM problems. Results indicated that for all 3 of the 
verbal categories, appropriate, partially appropriate, and 
inappropriate/irrelevant, children were performing 
significantly above chance levels, one-tailed test, alpha 
=.05 (table 32). The same held true for the nonverbal 
problem-solving categories, with performance significantly 
above that expected by chance for no pointing, 
inappropriate, partially appropriate, and appropriate 
categories, one-tailed test, alpha=.05 (table 33). 
Thus, regardless of the degree of appropriateness of 
the verbal or nonverbal problem-solving on each trial for 
PSC and RT children during posttests, they answered 
correctly more often than would be expected by chance. 
Children in groups RD and ME issued relatively few 
verbal rules and virtually no problem-solving at posttests, 
and hence their data have not been subjected to the same 
analyses of problem-solving and outcome as data from PSC and 
RT children. 
Summary of Results 
Outcome. Groups RT and PSC reached criterion during 
training in a comparable number of trials. Groups ME and RD 
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also reached criterion in a comparable number of trials, but 
required more trials than did the RT and PSC groups (figure 
4). 
The pretest and posttests yielded measures of 
maintenance, generalization, partial generalization, and far 
generalization. The maintenance items were the only items 
to show differential training effects at the unprompted 
posttest (figure 5). At both the unprompted and prompted 
posttests, an analysis of covariance revealed that children 
in the RT and PSC conditions outperformed children in the ME 
condition, with no other comparisons significant. Summed 
across groups, children's scores improved from the pretest 
to the unprompted posttest, and from the unprompted posttest 
to the prompted posttest (figure 7, bottom). 
Generalization items revealed differential training 
effects at the prompted posttest. RT and PSC children were 
comparable and superior to RD and ME children, who also were 
comparable (figure 8). While all groups improved from the 
pretest to the unprompted posttest, only the RT and PSC 
children improved from the unprompted to the prompted 
posttest (figure 9). 
Partial generalization scores also revealed 
differential training effects at the prompted posttest. As 
with the generalization items, groups RT and PSC were 
comparable and superior to groups RD and ME, which also were 
comparable (figure 10). Summed across groups, partial 
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generalization scores improved from pretest to the 
unprompted posttest, and from the unprompted posttest to the 
prompted posttest (figure 11, bottom). 
Unlike the other measures, far generalization items 
failed to show differential training effects at either 
posttest. Summed across groups, children's RCPM scores 
increased from the pretest to the unprompted posttest but 
not from the unprompted posttest to the prompted posttest 
(figure 12). 
Process. During training, ME children were silent on 
86.4% of their trials. Although RD children specified 
problem-solving responses on 24. 9'/. of trials, and verbally 
problem solved on 17. 2Y. of trials, no RD child ever 
specified an appropriate rule. 
Problem-solving, as trained in the RT and PSC 
conditions, tended to increase between posttests for 
children in these conditions. This was consistent with an 
interpretation that the prompt of the prompted posttest was 
essential to differential training effects for the 
generalization items. 
Children who received training in the formal rule did 
not do more problem-solving at either posttest than PSC 
children. Thus, the rule training component did not appear 
to exercise special functional properties in increasing the 
probability of problem-solving. In fact the rule itself, 
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much as the problem-solving behavior it specified, increased 
as the result of the prompt of the second posttest. 
RD children did not verbalize more rules, nor did they 
do more problem-solving than ME children at posttests. 
For RT and PSC children at posttests, rules, verbal 
problem-solving, and nonverbal problem-solving were coded 
for their degree of appropriateness, on the basis of the 
portion of relevant dimensions captured. On a trial to 
trial basis, the appropriateness of rules and problem-
solving was predictive of correct outcomes. 
It was also true however, that regardless of the degree 
of appropriateness of rules or problem-solving, children 
performed above the level of responding predicted by chance. 
Failure to problem-solve appropriately, or failure to issue 
an appropriate rule by no means guaranteed an incorrect 
solution. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The present study evaluated the functional utility of 
rules and problem-solving in fostering generalization across 
tasks in a sample of normal preschool children. Trained 
rules, prompted rules, and problem-solving were examined in 
a learning context that featured the training of multiple 
exemplars. A discussion of the results as they pertain to 
the hypotheses will begin this chapter. 
Hypothesis I: Rule Training (RT) and Problem-Solving Control 
(PSC) Conditions Would Require Fewer Trials to Criterion 
than Rule Discovery (RD) and Multiple Exemplar (ME) 
Conditions 
The results were consistent with the first hypothesis. 
Children in the RT and PSC conditions required fewer total 
trials to criterion during training on variants 1 through 3 
than did children in conditions RD and ME. 
An operant account of problem-solving (Skinner, 1966) 
and an applied operant model (Grimm, Bijou, & Parsons, 1973) 
were presented in the introductory chapter. Initially, task 
and learning contexts set the occasion for problem-solving 
responses which alter the problem-situation and are 
reinforced for doing so. Stimuli associated with the 
altered problem situation set the occasion for solution 
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responses which produce reinforcement that maintains the 
entire chain. 
RT and PSC children were taught a series of problem-
solving steps designed to increase the probability of 
correct solutions. Specifically, children were taught to 
count, label, and track values of relevant dimensions. Once 
emitted, these problem-solving responses altered the task 
situation such that stimuli from the altered situation set 
the occasion for problem-solution. Counting, labeling, and 
tracking made relevant stimuli more discriminable, and 
Increased the probability of emission of a solution 
response. 
During the RT and PSC training, trainers ensured that 
appropriate problem-solving occurred on every trial. Hence 
the superior performance of these groups validated the 
utility of the problem-solving responses that were targeted 
for the training tasks. 
The formal rules taught to RT children specified a 
relationship between problem-solving responses and outcome. 
On trials - to criterion, RT training was not expected to 
yield greater effects than PSC training, as the rules simply 
specified the problem-solving that was already guaranteed to 
occur during training for both the RT and PSC children. 
For children in groups RD and ME, no explicit problem-
solving techniques were trained. RD children were prompted 
to verbally identify task demands on each training trial 
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with each variant. Their success in doing so was expected 
to increase over the course of trials and variants, with 
feedback. In contrast, the problem-solving common to groups 
RT and PSC was ensured from the very first training trial. 
Hence, children in groups RD and ME required significantly 
more trials to reach criterion than did children in groups 
RT and PSC. 
It should be noted that RD and ME children reached 
criterion on all four variants of training. These children 
may have learned covert problem-solving techniques of an 
undisclosed nature. Or they may simply have learned to 
discriminate correct choices on the basis of the feedback 
component of training. In either case, their performance 
was inferior to RT and PSC children as measured by trials to 
criterion. 
Hypothesis II; On the Maintenance Items of the Unprompted 
Posttest. Children in the RT Group Would Outperform Children 
in the RD Group. Who Would in Turn Outperform Children in 
the PSC and ME Groups 
The results of the present study failed to confirm the 
second hypothesis. The maintenance items of both the 
unprompted and the prompted posttests revealed that the RT 
and the PSC training did not differ from one another. Both 
were superior to ME training, and the RD training was not 
different from any other training condition. 
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One assumption that generated the second hypothesis was 
that trained rules would act as verbal mediators. Emitted 
rules are responses with stimulus functions. As salient 
common stimuli, they could be carried hypothetically from 
any training context to any testing context, and hence 
mediate generalization over time. Verbal responses are 
easily recalled, and make it easier to retain 
discriminations over time (Skinner, 1966). In the 
extratraining conditions of the posttests, the rules taught 
to RT children would be more readily emitted than the 
problem-solving responses that the rules specified. If this 
were so, RT children might outperform PSC children in 
solving the matrices. However, RT training effects failed 
to surpass the effects of the PSC training on maintenance 
items. 
What was the locus of this failure within the problem-
solving sequence that was taught to RT children? Three 
possibilities presented themselves: (1) The testing context 
failed to control rule emission at posttests; (2) rule 
emission occurred at posttests, but it failed to control the 
problem-solving it specified; (3) rules and problem-solving 
responses occurred at posttests, but problem-solving did not 
control solution responses. These issues are also germane 
to the third hypothesis, and will be explored there. 
As in the RT condition, the RD condition was expected 
to exert its effects beyond those of the PSC and ME groups 
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as a function of the rules emitted over the course of 
training. To the extent that RD children learned to 
identify viable rules, these group differences would be 
evident. The RD training was not superior to PSC and ME 
training on maintenance items. Its effects did not differ 
from any other training condition at either the unprompted 
or prompted posttest. Correspondingly, RD children did not 
emit more rules or verbal problem-solving than did ME 
children at either posttest. These results might be 
expected, however, if the RD intervention was less than 
successful in prompting viable rules from children during 
training. 
Apparently, this was the case. As reported in the 
previous chapter, process data indicated that RD children 
were only moderately effective in producing appropriate 
verbalizations during training: During training, the 
majority of RD children's verbalizations were coded as 
irrelevant; On no trial did any RD child specify that 
counting was an appropriate strategy. 
Conceptual impetus for the RD intervention came from 
the assumption that the process by which rules were emitted 
was important in determining the maintenance and 
generalization of behavior the rules specified. Rules that 
were prompted and differentially reinforced might control 
behavior more strongly than a rule of identical topography 
that was modeled and instructed. During training however, 
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the RD intervention did not generate verbalizations 
comparable to the rules that were taught to RT children. As 
such, the RD intervention could not address the validity of 
this assumption. Conceptual and pragmatic implications of 
the RD intervention will be discussed below. 
RT and PSC training effects were comparable and 
superior to the Multiple Exemplar training. Common to the 
former training regimens was the inclusion of problem-
solving that required children to count and track values of 
relevant stimulus dimensions. The problem-solving responses 
altered the task situation and set the occasion for problem 
solution. The ME training did not feature the training of 
problem-solving strategies. 
Thus, the problem-solving component may have mediated 
generalization on maintenance items relative to the ME 
condition. However, the effects of the RT and PSC training 
were not different from that of the RD training, which, like 
the ME training, did not include training in problem-
solving. The fact that RD training effects did not differ 
from RT and PSC training effects, nor from ME training 
effects is not readily explained. The role of the problem-
solving component will be addressed further in the 
discussion of the third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis III; On the Generalization Items of the 
Unprompted Posttest. Children in the RT Group Would 
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Outperform Children in the RD Group. Who Would in Turn 
Outperform Children in the PSC and ME Groups 
Analyses of the generalization items on both the 
unprompted and the prompted posttests failed to confirm the 
third hypothesis. There were no group differences on the 
unprompted poettest. On the prompted posttest, the RT and 
PSC conditions were comparable and superior to the RD and ME 
conditions, which also did not differ. The analysis of the 
partial generalization scores revealed an identical pattern 
of group differences: No groups differed at the unprompted 
posttest, and; groups RT and PSC outperformed groups RD and 
ME at the prompted posttest. 
The same assumption that generated the second 
hypothesis generated the third: In extratraining 
conditions, appropriate rules, as readily emitted behavior, 
would act as verbal mediators to facilitate the problem-
solving behavior specified. In turn, the problem-solving 
behavior would increase the probability of correct solutions 
to the matrices. But the generalization items, like the 
maintenance items, revealed no greater effects for RT 
training than PSC training. 
The failure of RT effects to surpass PSC effects on the 
generalization and maintenance items raised questions that 
differentially implicated the source of the failure in the 
problem-solving model: Did the rule training component of 
the RT condition fail to facilitate the occurrence of 
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problem-solving at posttests? or; did rule training 
effectively facilitate problem-solving at posttests, but 
this increase, for whatever reason, was not reflected by 
correct outcomes? 
Before proceeding, a caveat is called for regarding the 
inferences drawn from the process data. Measures of 
children's overt emission of rules and problem-solving were 
dependent variables. The relationships established between 
rules and problem-solving and each with outcome were thus 
correlational in nature. Causality could not be determined 
as it could from a true experimental manipulation. 
Moreover a measurement problem, common to rule training 
paradigms, complicated matters further. It was conceivable 
that rules and problem-solving were emitted covertly at 
posttests. These covert responses might have had important 
stimulus properties which led to correct solutions. If 
rules and problem-solving occurred covertly and facilitated 
matrix solution, observed relationships between these 
process and outcome variables would necessarily be lowered. 
Nonetheless, the relationships that emerged between 
process measures permitted plausible causal inferences given 
the training, testing, and task contexts of the present 
study. The requirement for overt verbalization and problem-
solving was never relaxed during training. Thus training 
did not encourage children to emit any problem-solving or 
rules at a covert level. The Soviet developmental 
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literature has suggested that increases in the level of task 
difficulty will increase the probability of overt self-
regulatory speech in young children (Vygotsky, 1962; 
Roberts, 1979). The bulk of posttest items were difficult 
and complex in comparison to training items. Thus this 
literature suggests that task difficulty would serve to 
maintain children's overt verbalizations at posttests. 
Covert problem-solving might only minimally mitigate 
observed relationships between process measures. The 
relationships between process measures are explored 
tentatively, in the hope of elaborating the results 
generated by the true experimental manipulations. 
Returning to the question posed above, the process data 
presented in the preceding chapter implicated the former 
event: rule training failed to facilitate problem-solving 
at posttests. Relative to the PSC children, the RT children 
did no more verbal and nonverbal problem-solving at each 
posttest. In fact, at the unprompted posttest, children in 
the PSC condition tended towards greater amounts of problem-
solving than RT children. 
The fact that RT children did no more problem-solving 
at posttests than did PSC children raised another critical 
question: Did RT children fail to emit rules at the 
unprompted posttest? Or was it the case that RT children 
successfully emitted rules at the unprompted posttest, but 
these rules failed to control corresponding problem-solving? 
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The former situation appeared to be accurate. Rather 
than inadequate control of problem-solving by rules, it was 
simply the case that RT children verbalized a rule on only 
9.5 percent (42/440) of trials at the unprompted posttest 
(see table 34). 
The functional control exercised by RT children's rules 
appeared strong. When a rule was verbalized by RT children 
at the unprompted posttest, problem-solving followed 
immediately 92.9 percent (39/42) of the time. In the 
absence of rules, problem-solving occurred on only 2.3 
percent (9/398) of trials. This strong relationship between 
rules and problem-solving may be a function of the 
reinforcement contingency for both during training. 
Given these results, the assumption above will again be 
addressed. The rules that RT children were trained to emit 
were effective in controlling specified problem-solving at 
posttest. However, they emitted these rules only 
infrequently at the unprompted posttest. Rules did not 
appear to function at the unprompted posttest as readily 
emitted behavior. They were emitted with no greater 
frequency than the problem-solving responses (counting and 
tracking) they specified. 
Why did RT children emit rules infrequently at 
posttest? One possibility was that in the absence of 
prompts, the stimuli of the task and learning context did 
not control rule emission. To reduce this possibility, 
161 
prompts for rules and problem-solving were faded during 
training. On two consecutive trials of each training 
variant, RT children were required to emit the entire rule 
and problem-solving sequence without any prompts or aid from 
the trainers. 
Alternatively, it was possible that rules were not 
emitted because reinforcement was no longer contingent upon 
rules or problem-solving at either posttest. And it may be 
the case that for these preschoolers, correct matrix 
solutions did not serve as reinforcers, maintaining earlier 
problem-solving including rule emission. Brown and DeLoache 
(1978) suggested that preschoolers' failure to regulate and 
monitor necessary steps followed from a "lack of familiarity 
with the game at hand," (p. 128). If the game is to do well 
in school, their statement points to the possibility that 
answering questions and solving problems have not yet 
acquired reinforcing properties for the typical preschooler. 
As such, it may be necessary to arrange contingent 
reinforcement to ensure continued success in problem 
solution and problem-solving. 
As discussed above, the RD intervention was only 
moderately effective in prompting appropriate verbalizations 
during training and was ineffective in prompting rules. It 
was not surprising then, that it yielded no greater training 
effects than the ME condition at either posttest. 
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On the generalization items of the prompted posttest, 
RT and PSC training proved comparable and superior to the ME 
training, as was the case with maintenance items. Unlike 
the maintenance items, the generalization items of the 
prompted posttest also revealed that RT and PSC training 
were each superior to the RD training. RD and ME training 
did not reveal differential training effects on the 
generalization items. 
Given that both RT and PSC training featured the 
training of problem-solving strategies, and RD and ME 
training did not include problem-solving training, it was 
probable that the problem-solving component mediated 
generalization to novel tasks on the prompted posttest. 
Convergent support for this supposition, albeit 
correlational in nature, came from a variety of sources. 
First, recall that group differences were manifest at 
prompted posttest only. It was observed that problem-
solving occurred on a high percentage of generalization 
items for RT and PSC children at prompted posttest, but only 
a small percentage of items on unprompted posttest (see 
again table 34). This increase in problem-solving between 
posttests was significant. 
Evidence that the problem-solving of RT and PSC 
children mediated correct outcomes came from data that 
showed that the degree of appropriateness of rules and 
problem-solving was directly related to correct outcomes on 
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the posttests. Rules and verbal problem-solving were more 
predictive of correct matrix solutions when they reflected 
all relevant dimensions than when they represented only a 
subset. 
In turn, rules and verbal problem-solving that 
reflected a subset of relevant dimensions were more 
predictive of correct solutions than were inappropriate or 
irrelevant verbalizations. A similar relationship held for 
nonverbal problem-solving or tracking, as the tracking of 
all relevant dimensions predicted correct solutions more 
than tracking a subset of dimensions or tracking no 
dimensions at all. 
Thus, the degree of appropriateness of verbal and 
nonverbal problem-solving predicted correct solutions at 
both posttests. However, significantly more problem-solving 
occurred at the prompted posttest, and this was where group 
differences emerged for both generalization items and 
partial generalization scores. Group differences emerged 
at prompted posttest as the result of the problem-solving 
training common to groups RT and PSC. But problem-solving 
exercised its differential effects at the prompted posttest 
as the result of the prompting. The fact that the frequency 
of occurrence of rules and problem-solving increased 
significantly from unprompted to prompted posttests is 
consistent with the conclusion that prompting was a 
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necessary condition for the problem-solving training to 
exercise differential training effects. 
In sum, this was the picture of the generalization 
data: The prompts of the prompted posttest frequently cued 
problem-solving responses for RT and PSC children. This 
problem-solving may have been instrumental in facilitating 
correct matrix solution. At the first posttest, without 
prompts to use previously trained strategies, problem-
solving occurred infrequently. 
Contrary to expectation, RT children's rules also 
occurred infrequently. The few occasions on which RT 
children emitted rules at the unprompted posttest, the rules 
appeared to effectively control corresponding problem-
solving. Thus, emitted rules did not appear deficient in 
controlling problem-solving at the unprompted posttest. 
Unprompted, they simply were not emitted with any 
regularity. 
Hypothesis IV; Qn the Far Generalization (RCPM Set B) Items 
of the Unprompted Posttest. Children in the RD Group Would 
Outperform Children In the ME Group. Who Would in Turn. 
Outperform Children in the RT and PSC Groups 
Analyses of the RCPM items at both the unprompted and 
prompted posttest failed to confirm the fourth hypothesis: 
There were no group differences at either the unprompted or 
prompted posttest. It was hoped that RD children would have 
verbally identified appropriate strategies on the RCPM 
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items, having been taught to do so on the training items. 
As discussed above, however, RD children gave few relevant 
verbalizations during training and no appropriate rules. 
On the posttests, including the prompted posttest, RD 
children failed to emit any more rules or verbal problem-
solving than ME children. Children in the RD condition had 
not. reliably learned to verbally identify task requirements 
during training. Therefore, they did not outperform ME 
children on the RCPM items at posttests. 
The rules and problem-solving taught to RT and PSC 
children during training were not amenable to the bulk of 
the RCPM items. To the extent that RT and PSC children 
continued to emit these strategies, performance was expected 
to be depressed relative to ME children, who received no 
rules or problem-solving training. RT and PSC children 
problem-solved on RCPM items approximately half as 
frequently as they did on remaining maintenance and 
generalization items, even on the prompted posttest (see 
table 34). Thus, RT and PSC children discriminated to some 
degree that trained problem-solving strategies were 
inappropriate on RCPM items. 
The failure of group differences to emerge on RCPM 
Items was explained by the fact that: RD children did not 
learn to verbally identify appropriate rules during 
training, and RT and PSC children discriminated that 
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formerly trained problem-solving was inappropriate to RCPM 
completion. 
As a sidelight, the failure to find group differences 
on RCPM items in favor of groups RT and PSC helped rule out 
trainer enthusiasm or other nonspecific factors as 
determinants of the group differences on the generalization 
items. 
The Rule Discovery (RD) Intervention 
Process data suggested that children in this condition 
were only moderately successful at verbalizing relevant 
problem-solving steps during training. They were clearly 
unsuccessful in identifying viable rules that specified a 
relationship between problem-solving responses and outcomes. 
At subsequent posttests, RD children emitted rules and 
verbal problem-solving with no greater frequency than ME 
children. 
Children in the RD condition did not emit rules that 
were comparable to those taught to RT children. Thus, the 
RD training failed to permit an evaluation of the process by 
which rules were emitted and the impact of that process upon 
generalization. However this failure was not without 
conceptual and practical implications. RD children were 
given only one or two prompts on each trial to identify 
appropriate rules during training. This limit was imposed 
to minimize the aversiveness of repeated questioning. It 
was also true that trainers never modeled appropriate rules 
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to ensure that this procedure remained distinct from other 
training conditions. 
But it was also the case that RD children failed to 
verbally identify relevant rules despite the fact that they 
all learned each of the four training variants to criterion. 
Additionally, trainers provided elaborated feedback which 
entailed the verbal identification of relevant stimulus 
characteristics of correctly completed matrices (e.g., "This 
is the right answer because there are 3 blue, 3 green, and 3 
red"). 
Difficulty in prompting young children's verbalizations 
of task requirements has been noted elsewhere (Crisafi & 
Brown, 1983). Further, discovery methods that have led 
children to identify viable rules (and yielded superior 
generalization) may not have constituted discovery methods 
at all. Schleser, Meyers, Cohen, & Thackwray (1983) 
employed discovery training with third and fourth graders. 
The experimenter "rephrased" the child's responses if 
necessary and had the child cumulatively rehearse all 
"discovered" statements. Clearly this intervention entailed 
much more than the prompting and shaping of rules, and may 
well have provided more practice with "discovered" 
statements than with instructed statements of the comparison 
conditions. 
Thus, data from various studies including the present 
one have suggested that a relatively great degree of 
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environmental support is necessary for children to emit 
ostensibly valid rules. Perhaps then, developmental factors 
hindered children's identification of viable rules in the RD 
condition. Perhaps these factors limited the effectiveness 
of the rule component of the RT training as well. 
There are data that suggest that developmental factors 
should not be overemphasized as strict determinants of the 
present results. As discussed in the first chapter, 
difficulty in shaping rules has been observed even with 
sophisticated subjects and seemingly simple response 
requirements. Catania, Matthews, and Shlmoff (1982) 
successfully shaped guesses of "press fast," or "press 
slow," in not quite half of their sample of college 
students. 
What may be critical to successful rule emission is a 
relevant learning history with similar rules and 
circumstances. Just as generalized task performance is 
facilitated by training multiple exemplars, generalized 
rules may result from training multiple rule instances. 
The present results offered some support for this 
conceptualization of rule discovery. Verbal problem-solving 
that was appropriate to novel dimensions appeared most 
frequently among children in groups RT and PSC. Eleven of 
the fifteen children who named and counted values of novel 
dimensions on generalization items were in the RT and PSC 
groups. Having been trained to count values of colors and 
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shapes during training, they counted values of size or 
pattern at posttest. This occurred despite its never having 
been prompted or reinforced at any time. 
Training which is successful in producing the verbal 
identification of task contingencies likely entails 
substantial amounts of prompting and environmental supports, 
<?r a history of appropriate rule identification with similar 
task demands. 
Were developmental factors responsible for the failure 
of the rule component of RT training to produce training 
effects beyond those of PSC training? 
The five-year olds of the present study were at or near 
the age at which the child's speech is said to begin to be 
transformed into thought and goes underground, as a function 
of the child's social-psychological history (Luria, 1961). 
It is in this five to seven year age range that language 
comes to exercise a mediational function. 
Metastrategic behavior has been observed in children as 
young as three years (Flavell, Ritter, & Wellman, 1975, 
cited in Flavell & Wellman, 1977), while metastrategic 
failure has been observed in adults. As an example of the 
latter, Gick and Holyoke (1983, cited in Crisafi & Brown, 
1983) found that explicit instructions to generalize had 
been required for generalization to occur in their adult 
sample. 
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Higa, Tharp, and Calkins (1978) found that requiring 
young children to verbalize as they performed a nonverbal 
task interfered with its execution. For kindergartners 
versus second graders, self-instructions retarded 
performance. In the present study, rules and verbal 
problem-solving, as well as problem solution, were all 
independently trained to criterion to minimize interference 
generated by dual task requirements. Reinforcement during 
training was contingent on the joint occurrence of the rule 
and specified problem-solving for RT children. This is 
precisely the means by which correspondence has been 
produced in preschool children (e.g., Risley & Hart, 1968). 
Thus, the ability to verbally self-regulate behavior 
does not appear to be a strict function of age. More 
important perhaps in predicting the effectiveness of rule 
training is the child's learning history with specified 
tasks and rules. Task and rule complexity has elsewhere 
been implicated as a critical variable in the learning of 
rules and their effective application (Carnine, Kameenui, & 
Maggs, 1982). 
Summary Implications 
There is a paucity of research investigating the impact 
of verbal antecedents upon the generalization of training 
effects to extratraining conditions. The results of applied 
studies generated by diverse theoretical paradigms have 
typically failed to isolate the effects of rule-based 
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interventions from those of alternative training components, 
including the training of multiple exemplars. 
The present study procedurally isolated a rule-training 
component from the multiple task exemplars that the rule was 
designed to address. Additionally, it uniquely controlled 
for the influence of the problem-solving behaviors specified 
by the rules. An implicit assumption of both the self-
instructional training studies and the metastrategy training 
studies was that instructed rules or trained self-
verbalizations would control the behaviors or strategies 
specified. It was further assumed implicitly in these 
paradigms that whereas the trained strategies or behavior 
might fail to maintain in extratraining conditions, the 
metastrategy or rule would itself maintain and subsequently 
control behavior in superordinate fashion. 
For children in groups RT and PSC, a problem-solving 
sequence entailing verbal and nonverbal components was made 
overt and reinforced during training. The problem-solving 
was appropriate to the range of training tasks, but was 
appropriate beyond that range as well. This problem-solving 
training yielded greater generalization effects than the 
multiple exemplar training alone, to tasks which lay beyond 
the training range at prompted posttest. 
Although prompting was necessary for differential 
training effects to occur, this constituted generalization 
as defined by Stokes and Baer (1977): 
172 
Generalization may be claimed when no 
extratraining manipulations are needed for 
extratraining changes; or may be claimed when some 
extra manipulations are necessary but their cost or 
extent is clearly less than that of the direct 
intervention, (p. 350). 
According to the same writers, the teaching of problem-
solving during training constituted mediated generalization: 
A response was established, 
as part of the new learning that [was] likely to be 
utilized in other problems as well, and [constituted] 
sufficient commonality between the original learning 
and the new problem to result in generalization, (p. 
361). 
In addition to multiple exemplar training and problem-
solving, RT children were trained to verbalize formal rules 
which specified the contingency between problem-solving and 
outcome. This training yielded no greater training effects 
than the training of problem-solving in conjunction with 
multiple exemplars, despite the rule-correspondence feature 
of the RT training. 
The rules of RT children appeared to strongly control 
problem-solving at the unprompted posttest, most likely as 
the result of the reinforcement contingency for 
correspondence between rules and problem-solving during 
training. Rules simply occurred at low frequencies at the 
unprompted posttest. The prompts of the prompted posttest 
were necessary to do what was hoped the rule training would 
do: promote high frequencies of problem-solving. 
The findings of Guevremont, Osnes, and Stokes (1986) 
have some noteworthy parallels to the present results. 
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These experimenters employed a correspondence training 
procedure to develop consistency between children's 
verbalizations and their subsequent behavior across settings 
and time. For each of three preschool children, once 
correspondence was established in one or two settings, with 
one or two target behaviors, behaviors became modifiable 
merely by prompting relevant antecedent verbalizations. 
When verbalizations were no longer prompted, however, 
corresponding targeted behaviors did not usually maintain. 
Similarly, in the present study, correspondence between 
rules and problem-solving was established for RT children 
during training. At the unprompted posttest, neither rules 
nor corresponding problem-solving were prompted, and 
differential treatment effects were not observed. At 
prompted posttest, rules were prompted. These likely 
controlled corresponding problem-solving which yielded 
differential treatment effects. 
If the goal of intervention is to maximize correct 
outcomes in the absence of any form of intervention, it may 
be necessary to arrange for solution responses that generate 
their own reinforcement, or fade arbitrary reinforcers. 
Verbal antecedents and problem-solving might then maintain 
as long as they were instrumental to correct solutions. 
Should rules be trained? In the present paradigm, 
their training appeared to have no special generalization 
properties over and above the training of behaviors they 
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specified. For a given child and target behavior, if rules 
are functional, prompting them might prove more expedient, 
if not more effective, than prompting specified behavior. 
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Table 1 
Withdrawn and Participating Children 
(Mean PPVT Scores in Parentheses). 
Children 
withdrawn 
because: 
Children withdrawn Children withdrawn 
prior to group 
assignment and 
first training 
day. 
after group 
assignment and 
first training 
day. 
Total 
Inadequate requi­
site skills (nam- 6 (87.8) 
ing colors & 
shapes, counting). 
Failed training 
criterions (for 
correct answer or 
problem-solving). 
Pretest ceiling 
(> 507. correct 
on maint. or 
gen. items). 
12 (108.5) 
Parents with­
drew children 1 (99.0) 
from preschool. 
Children re­
fused. 0 
2 (82.5) 
1 (70.0) 
2 (95.0) 
12 
Total withdrawn. 
Total partici­
pating. 
Percent partici­
pating. 
19 (101.5) 5 (85.0) 24 (98.1) 
38(101.0) 
61. 3 
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Table 2 
Number of Children Withdrawn from Each Training Group 
Following Assignment. 
Problem-
Training Multiple Rule Solving Rule 
group: Exemplar Discovery Control Training Total 
Children withdrawn 
after group assign­
ment and 1st train­
ing day because: 
Failed criterion 
for unprompted 
rule verbalization. 
Failed criterion 
for correct 
answers. 
0 
Parents withdrew 
children. 
0 
Children refused. 0 0 
Total 0 
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Table 3 
Assignment of Children to: Groups and Trainers: 
Groups and Schools, and: Trainers and Schools. 
Group x trainer 
Group: 
Trainer: 
ME RD PSC RT Tot; 
Experimenter 3 4 3 4 14 
Trainer C„ 3 2 5 2 12 
Trainer N. 2 2 1 3 8 
Trainer A. 1 1 1 1 4 
Total 9 9 10 10 38 
Group x school 
Group: 
School: 
ME RD PSC RT Toti 
Ulupono 2 1 1 1 5 
Nanaikapono 2 2 2 2 a 
Nanakuli 2 3 2 2 9 
Na Lei 3 3 5 5 16 
Total 9 9 10 10 38 
Trainer x school 
Trainer: 
School: 
E. C. N. A. Toti 
Ulupono 5 0 0 0 5 
Nanaikapono 0 0 4 4 8 
Nanakuli 5 4 0 0 9 
Na Lei 4 a 4 0 16 
Total 14 12 a 4 38 
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Table 4 
Qne-vav Analysis of Variance on Children's Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) Scores. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Group 319.726 3 106.575 0.995 p>.25 
Error 3641.222 34 107.095 
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Table 5 
Design and Measures. 
Group: Multiple 
Exemplar 
Rule 
Training 
Problem-
Solving 
Control 
Rule 
Discovery 
Minimal 
instructions. 
Minimal 
instr. 
Minimal 
instr. 
Minimal 
instr. 
Multiple 
Train- exemplars, 
ing 
Feedback. 
High­
lights: 
Multiple 
exemplars. 
Feedback. 
Train rules. 
Train prob­
lem solving. 
Multiple 
exemplars. 
Feedback. 
Train prob­
lem solving. 
Multiple 
exemplars. 
Feedback. 
Prompt 
rules. 
Pretest. 44 items totals 8 maintenance items identical to 
those of training; 24 generalization items (logical 
extrapolations of maintenance items); 12 far generalization 
items (novel matrices of RCPM). 
Training day Is Variants 1 and 1.5 to criterion. 
Training day 2: Variant 2 to criterion. 
Training day 3: Variant 3 to criterion. 
Unprompted posttest (2 days). 44 items total: identical to 
pretest. 
Prompted posttest (2 days). 44 items total: identical to 
pretest except all children were reminded to, "Say and do 
the things you learned, before you answer," as needed. 
Dependent measures. 
Outcome: Trials to criterion during training. 
Number correct during posttests, for 
maintenance, generalization, and far 
generalization items. 
Process: Prompted rules during training. 
Rules and problem-solving at posttests. 
Relationship between rules, problem-solving, 
and outcome. 
laa 
Table 6 
Description and Position of Variants 
Comprlaing Pretest and Postteats. 
Item nos. Name of variant 
I-4 Testing V-5 
5-8 Testing V-4 
9-10 Testing V-l 
II-12 Testing V-3 
13-16 Testing V-7 
17-20 Testing V-6 
21-22 Training V-l 
23-24 Training V-l.5 
25-36 RCPM, set B 
37-38 Training V-2 
39-40 Training V-3 
41-44 Testing V-2 
Properties: ? dimensions 
uniform within ? axes. 
Shape-diagonal; Color-diagonal 
Shape-horizontal; Color-
diagonal 
Size-horizontal 
Size-diagonal 
Shape-diagonal; Color-
diagonal; Pattern-vertical 
Shape-horizontal; Color-
diagonal; Size-vertical 
Shape-horizontal 
Color-vertleal 
Closure, abstract reasoning. 
Shape-horizontal; Color-
vertical 
Color diagonal 
Size-horizontal; Pattern-
vertical 
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Table 7 
Reliability of Coding and Reliability Checks. 
Verbal coding Training to Reliability 
categories criterion ('/.) checks ('/.) 
(LAB) 2/4 50. O 6/8 75. 0 
(SOL) 1/4 25. 0 (no occurrence) 
(PROB-ap) 6/6 100. 0 1/1 100. 0 
(PROB-ptap) 22/22 100. 0 4/5 80. 0 
(PROB-inap) 74/74 100. 0 0/1 0 
(SpPROB-ap) (no occurrence) (no occurrence) 
(SpPROB-ptap) 28/35 80. 0 0/2 0 
(SpPROB-inap) 1/5 20. 0 0/1 0 
(RULE-ap) 15/15 100. O (no occurrence) 
(RULE-ptap) 17/18 94. 4 (no occurrence) 
(RULE-inap) 45/47 95. 7 (no occurrence) 
(IRR) 75/88 85. 2 160/178 89. 9 
(INT) (no occurrence) (no occurrence) 
Overall: 286/318 89. 9 171/196 87. 2 
Nonverbal cod­
ing categories 
< T-ap) 49/58 84. 5 2/3 66. 7 
(T-ptap) 128/135 94. 8 3/6 50. 0 
(T-inap) 117/130 90. 0 1/3 33. 0 
(NP) 216/217 99. 5 109/109 100. 0 
Overall: 510/540 94. 4 115/121 95.0 
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Table 8 
One-way (Group) Analysis of Variance on 
Trials to Criterion Purina Training 
and Duncan Multiple Range Teats. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Group 1041.710 3 347.237 3.076 p<.05 
Error 3838.511 34 112.897 
RT PSC ME RD 
Group 
means: 13.50 15.10 24.56 24.89 r CV.05 CV.10 
RT 13.50 -- 1.60 11.06* * 11.39** 4 10.77 9.01 
PSC 15.10 -- 9.46* 9.79* 3 10.44 8.72 
ME 24.56 -- 0.33 2 9.93 8.26 
RD 24.89 
** p<.05 
* p<.10 
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Table 9 
Analysis of Covarlance on Maintenance Items of 
Unprompted Posttest. Adjusted for Pretest. 
and Duncan Multiple Range Test. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Covariate 4.064 1 4.064 0.906 0.348 
Group 38.827 3 12.942 2.886 p<.050 
Error 147.978 33 4.484 
Total 190.868 37 5. 159 
ME RD RT PSC 
Adjusted 
means: 4.15 5.46 6.55 6.70 r CV.10 CV.05 
ME 4.15 -- 1.31 2.40* 2. 56» 4 1.80 2.15 
RD 5.46 -- 1.09 1.24 3 1.74 2.08 
RT 6.55 -- 0.15 2 1.65 1.98 
PSC 6.70 
* p<. 05 
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Table 10 
Analysis of Covarlance on Maintenance Items of 
Prompted Posttest. Adjusted for Pretest. 
and Duncan Multiple Range Test. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Covariate 6.845 1 6.845 2.197 0.148 
Group 31.412 3 10.471 3.360 p<.030 
Error 102.822 33 3.116 
Total 141.079 37 3.813 
ME RD RT PSC 
Adjusted 
means: 5.06 5. 91 7. 12 7. 30 r CV. 10 CV. 05 
ME 5.06 -- 0.86 2.07* 2. 25« 4 1.50 1.79 
RD 5.91 — 1.21 1.39 3 1.45 1.74 
RT 7.12 -- 0.18 2 1.37 1.65 
PSC 7.30 
* p<. 05 
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Table 11 
Two-way (Groups x Trials) Repeated Measures Analysle 
of Variance on Maintenance Items, and Duncan 
Multiple Range Tests for Main Effects. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares 
Groups 
Error 
Trials 
Group x 
trials 
Error 
57.732 
187.426 
357.619 
19.281 
121.718 
3 
34 
2 
6 
68 
19.244 
5. 513 
178.810 
3. 214 
1. 790 
F Significance 
3.491 p<. 026 
99.895 
1. 795 
p<.001 
. 113 
ME 
Group 
means: 3.74 
ME 3.74 --
RD 4. 52 
PSC 5.43 
RT 5.47 
RD 
4. 52 
0. 78 
PSC 
5. 43 
1. 69# 
0. 91 
RT 
5. 47 
1. 73* 
0. 95 
0. 04 
r 
4 
3 
2 
CV. 10 
1. 15 
1.  11  
1. 05 
CV. 05 
1. 37 
1. 33 
1. 27 
* p<.05 
Trial 
means: 
Pre. 
Unprompted 
Pretest posttest 
2. 32 
2. 32 
Unpr. 5.76 
post. 
Prpt. 6.39 
post. 
5. 76 
3.44** 
Prompted 
posttest 
6. 39 r 
4.07** 3 
0. 63* 2 
CV. 05 CV. 001 
0.65 1.10 
0. 61 1. 06 
** p<.001 
* p<.05 
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Table 12 
Analysis of Covarlance on Generalization Items 
of Unprompted Posttest. Adjusted for Pretest. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Covariate 206.583 1 206.583 13.819 p<.001 
Group 47.162 3 15.721 1.052 0.383 
Error 493.308 33 14.949 
Total 747.053 37 20.191 
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Table 13 
Analysis of Covarlance on Generalization Items 
of Prompted Posttest. Adjusted for Pretest, 
and Duncan Multiple Range Test. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Covariate 160.460 1 160.460 12.693 p<.001 
Group 179.218 3 59.739 4.725 p<.008 
Error 417.190 33 12.642 
Total 756.868 37 20.456 
ME RD PSC RT 
Adjusted 
means: 7. 15 8. 84 11. 63 12. 88 r CV. 10 CV. 05 CV. 005 
ME 7.15 -- 1.69 4.49** 5.74*** 4 3.02 3.61 5.25 
RD 8.84 -- 2.79* 4.04** 3 2.92 3.50 5.12 
PSC 11.63 -- 1.25 2 2.77 3.33 4.92 
RT 12.88 
*** p<.005 
** p<.05 
* p<.10 
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Table 14 
Two-wav (Groups x Trials) Repeated Measures Analysis 
of Variance on Generalization Items. F-tests for 
Simple Effects, and Duncan Multiple 
Range Tests for Simple Effects. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Groups 
Error 
Trials 
Groups x 
trials 
Error 
300.928 
847.563 
998.791 
90.912 
405.281 
3 
34 
2 
6 
68 
100.309 
24.928 
499.395 
15.152 
5. 960 
4. 024 
83.791 
2. 542 
p<.015 
p<.001 
p<.028 
Source 
ME 
RD 
PSC 
RT 
Error 
Mean Squares 
45. 444 
S3.815 
192.533 
238.900 
5. 960 
F 
7. 625 
14.063 
32.304 
40.084 
Significance 
p<. 01 
p<.001 
p<.001 
p<.001 
Pre. 
Trial means 
at ME: 2.44 
Pre. 2.44 --
Unpr. 5.89 
post. 
Prpt. 6.67 
post. 
Unpr. 
post. 
5. 89 
3. 45* 
Prpt. 
post. 
6. 67 
4. 23< 
0. 78 
r CV.10 CV.005 CV.001 
3 1.98 3.40 4.01 
2 1.87 3.27 3.88 
•* p<.001 
* p<.005 
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Table 14 <continued) 
Two-way (Groups x Trials) Repeated Measures Analysis 
of Variance on Generalization Items. F-tests for 
Simple Effects, and Duncan Multiple 
Range Tests for Simple Effects. 
Pre. 
Trial means 
at RD: 2.56 
Pre. 2.56 --
Unpr. 6.89 
post. 
Prpt. 8.44 
post. 
* p<.001 
Unpr. 
post. 
6. 89 
4. 33* 
Prpt. 
post. 
8. 44 
5. 88* 
1. 55 
r 
3 
2 
CV. 10 CV.001 
1. 98 
1. 87 
4. 01 
3. 88 
Pre. 
Trial means 
at PSC: 3.70 
Pre. 3.70 --
Unpr. 10.10 
post. 
Prpt. 12.10 
post. 
** p<.001 
* p<. 10 
Unpr. 
post. 
10. 10 
6.40** 
Prpt. 
post. 
12. 10 
a.40** 
2. 00* 
r CV.10 CV.001 
3 1.98 4.01 
2 1.87 3.88 
Pre. 
Trial means 
at RT s 3.50 
Pre. 3.50 --
Unpr. 9. 40 
post. 
Prpt. 13.20 
post. 
** p<.001 
* p<.005 
Unpr. 
post. 
9. 40 
5.90** 
Prpt. 
post. 
13. 20 
9.70** 
3. 80* 
r CV.005 CV.001 
3 3.40 4.01 
2 3.27 3.88 
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Table 15 
Total Number of Generalization Items Correct. Groups x 
Trials (Critical Values for Chance Responding 
Yielded bv a Large Sample Approximation of 
the Binomial Test. Appear In Parentheses). 
Group: ME RD PSC RT 
Trials 
Pretest 22 23 37 35 
Unprompted post. 53* 62* 101* 94* 
Prompted post. 6Q* 76* 121* 132* 
CV (46.1) (46.1) (50.7) (50. 
* p<. 05, 1-tailed. 
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Table 16 
Analysis of Covarlance on Partial Generalization Scores 
of Unprompted Posttest. Adjusted for Pretest. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Regression 12,979.488 1 12,979.488 3.207 0.083 
Constant 103,085.343 1 103,085.343 25.468 p<.001 
Group 13,917.720 3 4,639.240 1.146 0.345 
Error 133,573.401 33 4047.679 
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Table 17 
Analysis of Covarlance on Partial Generalization Scores 
of Promoted Posttest. Adjusted for Pretest, 
and Duncan Multiple Range Test. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Regression 1444. 071 1 1444. 071 0. 255 0. 617 
Constant 255, 804. 356 1 255, 804. 356 45. 156 P<* 001 
Group 75, 431. 444 3 25, 143. 815 4. 439 p<. 010 
Error 186, 941. 018 33 5, 664. 879 
ME RD PSC RT 
Adjusted 
means: 419. 1 428. 3 497.0 524. 6 r_ CV. 10 
>
 
ul 
05 • 
>
 
U
 01 
ME 419. 1 -- 9. 2 77.9* *  105. 5* * * 4 63. 85 76. 34 101. 41 
RD 428. 3 68. 7*  96. 3# * 3 61. 79 74. 00 98. 69 
PSC 497. 0 _ _ 27. 6 2 58. 54 70. 40 94. 63 
RT 524.6 
##* p<.01 
*» p<.05 
* p<.10 
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Table 18 
Two-way (Groups x Trials) Repeated Measures Analysis 
of Variance on Partial Generalization Scores, and 
Duncan Multiple Range Tests for Main Effects. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Groups 64,475.051 3 21,491.684 3.258 p<.033 
Error 224,255.204 34 6,595.741 
Trials 244,232.944 2 122,116.472 34.363 p<.001 
Group x 37,077.858 6 6,179.643 1.739 .125 
trials 
Error 241,653.230 68 3,553.724 
ME RD RT PSC 
Group 
means: 395.04 395.48 436.73 447.70 r CV.10 CV.05 
ME 395.04 -- 0.44 41.69* 52.66** 4 39.75 47.51 
RD 395.48 — 41.25* 52.22** 3 38.47 46.05 
RT 436.73 -- 10.97 2 36.44 43.81 
PSC 447.70 
** p<.05 
* p<.10 
Unpr. Prpt. 
Pretest post. post. 
Trial 
means: 356.76 433.61 469.55 r CV.05 CV.001 
Pre. 356.76 -- 76.85** 112.79** 3 28.82 48.95 
Unpr. 433.61 -- 35.94* 2 27.40 47.39 
post. 
Prpt. 469.55 
post. 
** p<.001 
* p<.05 
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Table 19 
Analysis of Covariance on RCPM (Set B Items) of 
Unprompted Posttest. Adjusted for Pretest. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Covariate 8.057 1 8.057 1.858 0.182 
Group 1.714 3 0.571 0.132 0.940 
Error 143.097 33 4.336 
Total 152.868 37 4.132 
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Table 20 
Analysis of Covarlance on RCPM (Set B Items) 
of Prompted Posttest. Adjusted for Pretest. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Covariate 14.411 1 14.411 2.366 0.134 
Group 12.803 3 4.268 0.701 0.558 
Error 200.997 33 6.091 
Total 228.211 37 6.168 
20<4 
Table 21 
Analysis of Covarlance on RCPM (Set B Items 8-12) 
of Unprompted Posttest. Adjusted for Pretest. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Covariate 0.703 1 0.703 1.321 0.259 
Group 0.814 3 0.271 0.510 0.678 
Error 17.562 33 0. 532 
Total 19.079 37 0.516 
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Table 22 
Analysis of Covarlance on RCPM (Set B Items 8-12) 
of Prompted Posttest. Adjusted for Pretest. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Covariate 3.654 1 3.654 4.442 p<.043 
Group 0.703 3 0.234 0.285 0. 836 
Error 27.143 33 0. 823 
Total 31.500 37 0.851 
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Table 23 
Two-way (Groups x Trials) Repeated Measures 
Analysis of Variance on RCPM Items. 
and Duncan Multiple Range Test. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Significance 
Groups 34.777 3 11.592 1.576 .213 
Error 250.074 34 7.355 
Trials 59.416 2 29.708 11.618 p<.001 
Groups x 7.610 6 1.268 0.496 .809 
trials 
Error 173.881 68 2.557 
Unpr. Prpt. 
Pre. post. post. 
Trial 
means: 2.58 3.76 4.32 r CV.10 CV.005 CV.001 
Pre. 2.58 -- 1.18* 1.74** 3 0.648 1.113 1.313 
Unpr. 3.76 -- 0.56 2 0.613 1.071 1.271 
post. 
Prpt. 4.32 
post. 
** p<.001 
* p<.005 
Table 24 
Frequency of Verbal and Nonverbal Codes 
for Groups RD and ME During Training. 
Group: RD. ME 
Coded verbal 
(LAB) 44 5 
(SQL) 14 1 
(PROB-ap) 0 0 
(PROB-ptap) 49 4 
(PROB-inap) 4 0 
(SpPROB-ptap) 84 0 
(RULE-ap) 0 0 
(RULE-ptap) 0 0 
(RULE-inap) 0 0 
(IRR) 317 222 
Trials to criterion: 285 221 
Trials silent: 0 191 
Coded nonverbal 
(T-ap) or (T-ptap) 42 2 
(T-inap) or <NP) 243 219 
208 
Table 25 
Most Frequent Verbalizations Prompted from each Child in 
the RD Condition Purina Training (Codes in Parentheses). 
Child 
Brent (S-10) 
Jan (S-ll) 
Kimo (S-12) 
Joan (S-17) 
Delia (S-18) 
Verbalization 
This one (IRR); Listen to my teacher (IRR). 
This one match this one (SpPROB-ptap). 
This one (IRR); Three blue, three red, 
three yellow (PROB-ptap). 
Karen (S-13) You have to put it down (IRR). 
Lani (S-14) Match 'em with this one (SpPROB -ptap). 
Dan (S-15) Find the right one (SOL). 
Kenni (S-16) Three circles, three squares. three 
(PROB-ptap). 
From saying it (IRR). 
Three blues, three greens, three reds 
(PROB-ptap). 
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Table 26 
Frequency of Verbal Problem-solvina <PR0B-ap. -ptap. or 
-inap) and Nonverbal Problem-solvina (T-ap, -ptap. or 
-inaD) for RT and PSC Children at Unprompted 
and Prompted Poettests • 
Unprompted [ posttest Prompted posttest 
Problem-solving Problem -solving 
Verbal Nonverbal Verbal Nonverbal 
Group 
PSC (S-19) 12 12 33 26 
(S-20) 6 6 15 15 
(S-21) 3 3 43 26 
(S-22) 30 29 3 4 
(S-23) 20 11 13 11 
(S-24) 14 14 42 42 
(S-25) 8 10 a 8 
(S-26) 0 0 0 0 
(S-27) 19 11 33 26 
(S-28)_ 22 23 33 31 
X = 13. 4 11. 9 22. 3 18. 9 
RT (S-29) 0 0 8 8 
(S-30) 0 0 0 0 
< S-31) 0 2 43 30 
(S-32) 0 3 44 31 
(S-33) 0 0 43 43 
(S-34) 0 1 1 1 
(S-35) 12 12 25 25 
(S-36) 10 9 17 16 
(S-37) 7 8 26 23 
(S-38) _ 16 15 27 25 
X = : 4. 5 5. 0 23. 4 20. 2 
Table 27 
Frequency of: Rules; Specification of Problem-aolvinq 
and Specification of Outcomes. Combined (RULE-ap. 
-ptap. -lnap; SpPROB-ptap; & SQL), for RT and PSC 
Children at Unprompted and Prompted Posttests. 
Group 
PSC 
RT 
Unprompted Prompted 
posttest posttest 
(S-19) 6 2 
< S-20) 0 0 
(S-21) 0 3 
(S-22) 4 1 
(S-23) 41 61 
(S-24) O 0 
(S-25) 0 0 
(S-26) 0 0 
(S-27) 3 0 
(S-28) _ 0 0 
X= 5. 4 6. 7 
(S-29) O a 
< S-30) 0 0 
(S-31) 12 42 
(S-32) O 42 
< S-33) O 43 
(S-34) 0 2 
(S-35) 9 25 
(S-36) 10 22 
(S-37) 6 38 
(S-38) _ ii. 23 
X= 5. 3 24. 5 
Table 28 
Frequency of; Rules: Specification of Problem-solving 
and Specification of Outcomes. Combined <RULE-ap. 
-ptap. -inapi SpPRQB-ptap; & SOL), for ME and RD 
Children at Unprompted and Prompted Posttests. 
Group 
ME 
RD 
Unprompted Prompted 
posttest posttest 
(S-l > 0 0 
(S-2) 0 0 
(S-3) 0 0 
(S-4) 0 0 
(S-5) 0 0 
(S-6) 0 0 
(S-7) 0 0 
(S-fl) 0 0 
(S-9) 0 0 
X= 0 0 
(S-10) 1 123 
(S-ll) 0 0 
(S-12) 0 0 
< S-13) 0 0 
(S-14) 0 43 
(S-15) 0 0 
(S-16) 0 3 
(S-17) 0 0 
(S-18) 0 0 
X = 0. 11 18. 
Group 
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Table 29 
Frequency of Verbal Problem-solving (PRQB-ap. 
-ptap. & -lnap) for ME and RD Children 
at Unprompted and Prompted Postteets. 
Unprompted Prompted 
posttest posttest 
ME (S-l) 0 0 
(S-2) 0 1 
(S-3) 1 4 
(S-4) 0 0 
(S-5) 2 1 
<S-6> 0 0 
(S-7) 0 0 
(S-8) O 0 
(s-9) _ g o 
X= O. 33 0.67 
RD (S-10) 1 1 
(S-ll) O 0 
(S-12) 0 1 
(S-13 > 0 1 
(S-14) 0 0 
(S-15) O 0 
(S-16) 20 17 
< S-17) 0 0 
(s-18) _ o g 
X= 2. 33 2. 22 
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Table 30 
Overall Chl-sauare and Partltlonlnas of Chi-sauare on Ap­
propriateness of Verbalizations x Outcome. Data for RT 
and PSC Children Combined, and each Posttest Combined, 
excluding RCPM Items (Expected Means in Parentheses). 
Verbalizations 
Partially Inapprop./ 
Appropriate appropriate Irrelevant Total 
Outcome 
Example 
correct: 154 (106.2) 175 (168.6) 375 (429.2) 704 
Example 
incorrect: 33 (80.8) 122 (128.4) 381 (326.8) 536 
Total: 187 297 756 1240 
Source df 
Overall: Ap. vs. Ptap. vs. Inap. 2 
x2 Significance 
66.254 p<. 005 
Partition I: Ptap. vs. Inap. 1 7.546 p<.01 
(Ptap.--Inap. ) vs. Ap. 1 58.708 p<. 005 
Partition II: Ap. vs. Ptap. 1 25.669 p<.005 
(Ap.--Ptap. ) vs. Inap. 1 40.585 p<. 005 
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Table 31 
Overall Chl-sauare and Partitioning of Chl-sauare on Appro­
priateness of Tracking x Outcome. Data for RT and PSC 
Children Combined, and each Posttest Combined, exclud­
ing RCPM Items (Expected Means in Parentheses). 
Tracking 
No 
Inapprop. Pointing Total 
Partially 
Appropriate Approp. 
Outcome 
Example 
correct: 161(101.1) 157(164.8) 31(40.8) 362(404.3) 711 
Example 
incorrect: 15 (74.9) 130(122.2) 40(30.2) 342(299.7) 527 
Total 176 287 71 704 1238 
Source df 
Overall: Ap vs. Ptap vs. Inap vs. NP 3 
x2 Significance 
100.234 p<. 005 
Partition: Inap vs. NP 1 1.588 p>.10 
Ptap vs. (Inap--NP) 1 1.367 p>.10 
Ap vs. (Ptap--Inap--NP) 1 97.275 p<.005 
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Table 32 
Correct Examples x Appropriateness of Verbalizations, with 
Data for RT and PSC Children Combined, and both Posttests 
Combined. Excluding RCPM Items. Critical Values for 
Chance Responding. Yielded by a Large Sample Approx­
imation of the Binomial Test, are in Parentheses. 
Verbalizations 
Partially Inappropriate/ 
Appropriate Appropriate Irrelevant 
Outcome 
Example 
correct: 154» 175* 375* 
Example 
incorrect: 33 122 381 
Total 187 297 756 
CV (41.9) (63.8) (152.0) 
* p<.05, 1-tailed 
216 
Table 33 
Correct Examples x Appropriateness of Tracking, with Data 
for RT and PSC Children Combined, and Both Posttests 
Combined. Excluding RCPM Items. Critical Values for 
Chance Responding. Yielded by a Large Sample Approx­
imation of the Binomial Test, are in Parentheses. 
Tracking 
Partially No 
Appropriate Appropriate Inappropriate Pointing 
Outcome 
Example 
correct: 161* 157* 31# 362* 
Example 
incorrect: 15 130 40 342 
Total 176 287 71 704 
CV (39.7) ( 6 1 . S )  ( 1 8 .  0 )  (142.1) 
* p<.05, 1-tailed 
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Table 34 
Proportion of Maintenance Items. Generalization Items, and 
RCPM Items on which Children Problem-solved Verbally 
(PRQB-ap.-ptap. or -lnap) and Emitted Rules 
(RULE-ap.-ptap. or -inao). Data Examined for 
Groups RT and PSC at Both Posttests. 
Items 
Unprompted 
Posttest 
Prompted 
Posttest 
Rules: RT group 
Maint. 
Gen. 
RCPM 
. 050 
. 158 
(4/80) 
<38/240) 
(0/120) 
.613 (49/80) 
.613 (147/240) 
.417 (50/120) 
All 095 (42/440) 559 (246/440) 
Verbal Problem- Maint. 
Solving: RT & Gen. 
PSC combined. RCPM 
.281 (45/160) 
.267 (128/480) 
.008 (2/240) 
569 (91/160) 
608 (292/480) 
288 (69/240) 
All .199 (175/880) 514 (452/880) 
Verbal Problem-
Solving: Group 
RT only. 
Maint. .100 
Gen. .167 
RCPM 0 
(8 /80 )  
(40/240) 
(0/120) 
575 (46/80) 
625 (150/240) 
325 (39/120) 
All .109 (48/440) 534 (235/440) 
Verbal Problem- Maint. .463 (37/80) .563 (45/80) 
Solving: Group Gen. .367 (88/240) .592 (142/240) 
PSC only. RCPM .017 (2/120) .250 (30/120) 
All .289 (127/440) .493 (217/440) 
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Figure 3 
Examples of Variants Used in Training and Testing. 
Training 
V-l 
Shape-horizontal k k k 
• • 
V-l. 5 
Color-vertical 
V-2 
Shape-horizontal 
Color-vertical 
k k 
k • 
V -3 
Color-diagonal 
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Figure 3 (continued) 
Examples of Variants Used in Training and Testing. 
Testing 
V-l 
Size-horizontal 
V - 2 
Size-horizontal 
Pattern-vertical 
V-3 
Size-diagonal 
V-4 
Shape-horizontal 
Color-diagonal 
k k 
Figure 3 (continued) 
Examples of Variants Used in Training and Testing 
Testing 
V-5 
Color-diagonal 
Shape-diagonal 
• k 
V-6 
Shape-horizontal 
Size-vertical 
Color-diagonal 
V-7 
Shape-diagonal 
Color-diagonal 
Pattern-vertical 
• • 
+ 
* -
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Figure 4 
Mean Trials to Criterion During Training, as a 
Function of Training Group (V-1 through V-3 Combined) 
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Figure 5 
Mean Number Correct on Maintenance Items of Unprompted Post-
test, as a Function of Training Group, Adjusted for Pretest. 
ME RD PSC 
Training group 
RT 
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Figure 6 
Mean Number Correct on Maintenance Items of Prompted Post-
test , as a Function of Training Group, Adjusted for Pretest. 
ME RD PSC 
Training group 
RT 
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Figure 7 
Mean Number Correct on Maintenance Items as a 
Function of Training Group, and as a Function of Trials. 
ME RD PSC RT 
Training group (summed over trials) 
7 _ 
£ 
± 1 1 
Pretest Unprompted post. Prompted post. 
Trials (summed over training groups) 
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Figure 8 
Mean Number Correct on Generalization Items of Prompted Post-
test, as a Function of Training Group, Adjusted for Pretes"tT 
13 
12 
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10 
4* 
ME RD PSC 
Training group 
RT 
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Figure 9 
Mean Number Correct on Generalization Items as a 
Function of Training Group and Trials; Interaction Effect, 
14 
12 
10 
. PSC 
• ME 
Pretest Unprompted post. Prompted post. 
Trials 
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Figure 10 
Mean Percent Correct on Partial Gen. Scores of Prompted Post-
test, as a Function of Training Group, Adjusted for PretestT 
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Figure 11 
Mean Percent Correct on Partial Gen. Scores, as a 
Function of Training Group, and as a Function of Trials. 
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Figure 12 
Mean Number Correct on RCPM Set B 
Items, as a Function of Trials 
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Appendix A 
Pretest/Posttest and Training Protocols 
Pretest 
Today, we're going to see how you do with some puzzles. 
Some of the puzzles are easy. Many of the puzzles are very 
hard, so it's O.K. if you don't get them all right. All I 
want you to do is try your best, O.K.? Later on, we're 
going to give you some hints to do them. I'm not going to 
tell you today if you're right or wrong--I just want to see 
how well you do them. 
O.K., let's start. (T. takes first matrix and solution 
set and lays it out before the child). I'm going to show 
you puzzles with a piece missing like this one. Here are 
some pieces and you need to figure out which one finishes 
the puzzle--which one makes the most sense. Only one of the 
pieces here (T. gestures) is the right one. 
Pretest and Posttest 
(Before each trial, T. says) Look at all of these (T. 
gestures) and all of these (T. gestures) and find the one 
from here that goes here (T. points). 
Do not offer praise after the child selects his answer, 
right or wrong. Occasional "O.K."'s noncontingently are 
permissible. "Let's try the next one," is preferred. 
Deliver material reinforcement immediately prior to 
child response, contingent upon on-task behavior only. 
Material reinforcement may be earned on alternate trials 
only. 
If child appears discouraged, you may repeat, "These 
are real hard, just try your best," as needed. 
ME Training Protocols 
PRODUCT: The essence of this condition is to teach 
children by providing feedback only on each trial. 
The child is given no training in verbal or 
nonverbal problem-solving, or rule verbalization. 
The trainer accomplishes this by doing the 
following on all training trials: 
PROCESS: (1) Trainer asks child to look at all stimuli in 
matrix and solution set. 
(2) Trainer delivers social and material reward 
noncontingently, and immediately before the 
child selects an answer. 
(3) Trainer praises correct answer, corrects 
incorrect, and "explains" correct choice. 
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For example: 
First trial only: 
T. (Child's name), now we're going to begin 
helping you do these problems. When you do them, 
you'll get a chip. At the end of the day, you can 
trade in your chips for the prizes we showed you 
before. 
All trials: 
T. O.K., (child's name). Look at all of these 
(T. gestures) and all of these (T. gestures) and 
find the one from here (T. gestures) that goes 
here (T. points). Before the child responds, 
"Good! You're working really hard and here's a 
token," (T. puts a token in the child's cup). Now 
what's your answer? (if necessary). 
C. Child selects answer. 
T. (If correct) That's right! That's the right 
answer 1 Very good! That's right because 3 
yellows, 3 greens, and 3 blues (T. gestures). 
T. (If incorrect) Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
yellows, 3 greens, and 3 blues (T. gestures). 
RD Training Protocols 
PRODUCT: The essence of this condition is to teach 
children on each trial to verbally identify what 
they do as they attempt each task. The idea is to 
strike some balance between: 
(1) Repeatedly prompting the child on a given 
trial to verbalize an appropriate rule, and; 
(2) Accepting on a given trial 
response the child offers. 
any verbal 
The trainer accomplishes this 
following on all training trials: 
by doing the 
PROCESS: (1) Trainer asks child to look at 
matrix and solution set. 
all stimuli in 
(2) Trainer prompts child to verbalize what he 
needs to do to solve the matrix: 
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T. But first, tell me, how are you 
going to do this? 
or, T. But first, tell me what you have to 
do to get the right answer? 
(3) Trainer delivers praise enthusiastically 
contingent upon child's verbalizing the: 
(a) contingency (e.g., count the shapes to 
get it right) ; 
(b) specification of a problem-solving 
response (e.g., count the shapes); 
(c) problem-solving (e.g., 'cause 3 green, 3 
red & 2 blue). 
T. delivers material reinforcement, prompts 
child to answer, and gives feedback. 
(4) If the child verbalizes: 
(d) the relevant stimulus only (e.g., the 
square one) 
(e) anything else (e.g., just do it; I don't 
know), 
then T. offers a follow-up prompt: 
T. What makes you think that's the 
right answer? 
(5) Again, if the child verbalizes the 
contingency, specifies a p.s. response, or 
verbally problem-solves, praise 
enthusiastically and reinforce materially. 
(6) If the child verbalizes anything else, offer 
no more follow-up prompts and materially 
reinforce. Say, "Here's a token for trying 
to tell me how to do it." 
(7) Trainer praises correct answer, corrects 
incorrect, and explains correct choice. 
Keep in mind: 
Material reinforcement for verbalizing, without regard 
for content. 
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Strong social reinforcement contingent upon verbalizing 
the contingency, specifying a problem-solving response, or 
verbal problem-solving. 
Maximally one Introductory prompt to verbalize and one 
follow-up prompt per trial. 
This is illustrated by the following examples: 
First trial: 
T. (Child's name), now we're going to begin 
helping you do these problems. I want to see if 
you can tell me how you're doing them. When you 
tell me how you're doing them, you'll get a chip. 
At the end of the day, you can trade in your chips 
for the prize we showed you before. 
(Child's name), look at all of these (T. 
gestures) and all of these (T. gestures) and find 
the one from here that goes here (T. points). But 
first tell me what you have to do to get the right 
answer? 
C. It's this one. r i 
T. What makes you think that's the right answer? 
C. I know it. 
T. Here's a token for trying to tell me how to 
do it (puts token in cup). Now what's your 
answer? 
C. (Child responds). 
T. (If correct), That's right 1 That's the right 
answer 1 Very goodl That's right because 3 reds, 3 
yellows, and 3 blues (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
reds, 3 yellows, and 3 blues (T. gestures). 
Next trial: 
T. (Child's name), look at all of these (T. 
gestures) and all of these (T. gestures) and find 
the one from here (T. gestures) that belongs here 
(T. points). But first tell me, what do you have 
to do to get this right? 
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C. This one. 
T. What makes you think that's the right answer? 
C. Because 2 yellows and you need one more. 
T. Very good! That's terrific! You did a great 
job telling me how to do it, and here's your token 
(puts token in cup). Now what's your answer? 
C. (Child responds). 
T. (If correct) That's right! That's the right 
answer 1 Very good! That's right because 3 
greens, 3 reds, and 3 yellows (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect) Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one. (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
greens, 3 reds, and 3 yellows. 
PSC Training Protocols 
PRODUCT: The essence of this condition is to teach 
children on each trial to count, label, and touch 
values of each relevant condition, prior to 
selecting an answer. 
Over the course of training, children should 
learn to count values of relevant dimensions 
(identifying those relevant), independent of aid 
from the trainer. 
The trainer accomplishes this by doing the 
following on all training trials: 
PROCESS: (1) Trainer asks child to look at all stimuli in 
matrix and solution set. 
(2) Trainer models, as needed, problem-solving: 
counting and labeling values of relevant 
stimulus dimensions while touching stimuli in 
a corresponding manner. 
(3) Trainer prompts child, as needed, to problem-
solve. 
(4) Trainer delivers social and material reward 
contingent upon counting/ labeling/ tracking 
regardless of aid required, and then 
encourages child to select answer. 
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<5) Trainer praises correct answer, corrects 
incorrect, and explains correct choice. 
Over the course of training trials, models and prompts 
are faded. Instead of simply providing the child with what 
he needs to do and say on each new trial, the trainer tests 
to see if the child can generate required responses without 
aid, and if he cannot, he leads the child toward required 
responses. 
The procedure, including the fading element, is 
illustrated by the following examples: 
First trial: 
T. (Child's name), now we're going to begin 
teaching you some things to do to help you with 
these problems. When you do these things, you'll 
get a token. At the end of the day, you can trade 
in your chips for the prizes we showed you before. 
O.K., (child's name). Look at all of these 
(T. gestures) and all of these (T. gestures) and 
find the one from here that goes here (T. points). 
But first I want you to do this: 
(T. gestures) One, two, three yellows. One, 
two, three greens. One, two blues, I need a blue. 
Now you try. 
C. N.R. 
T. (tracking) 1, 2, 3 yellows. 
C. 1, 2, 3 yellows (tracking). 
T. Goodl (C. pauses). 1, 2, 3 greens (tracking). 
C. 1, 2, 3 greens (tracking). 
T. Good! (C. pauses). 1, 2 blue. I need a blue 
(tracking). 
C. 1, 2 blue. I need a blue (tracking) 
T. Goodl Here's a token for doing and saying 
all those things (puts token in cup). Now what's 
your answer? 
C. (Child responds). 
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T. (If correct). That's right! That's the right 
answer 1 Very goodl That's right because 3 
yellows, 3 greens, and 3 blues (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
yellows, 3 greens, and three blues (T. gestures). 
A few trials later: 
T. Look at all of these (T. gestures) and all of 
these (T. gestures) and find the one from here (T. 
gestures) that goes here (T. points) but first... 
(T. pauses). 
C. (Child starts to count along horizontal axis 
although colors are uniform on vertical). 
T. Wait. Count this way. (T. sweeps finger 
down first column). 
C. 1, 2, 3 (tracking; then pauses). 
T. Three what? 
C. Triangles. 
T. 1, 2, 3 blues (tracking). Say that. 
C. 1, 2, 3 blues (tracking). 
T. Goodl (C. pauses). Keep counting. 
C. 1, 2, 3 yellow. 1, 2, 3 green (tracking). 
T. How many green? Count them again. 
C. 1, 2 green (tracking). (C. pauses). 
T. 1, 2 greens. I need a green (tracking). 
C. 1, 2 greens. I need a green (tracking). 
T. Very goodl Here's a token for doing and 
saying all those things (puts token in cup). 
What's your answer? 
C. (C. selects answer). 
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T. (If correct), That's right! That's the right 
answer 1 Very good! That's right because 3 blues, 
3 yellows, and 3 greens (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
blues, 3 yellows, and three greens (T. gestures). 
Later: 
T. Look at all of these (T. gestures) and all of 
these (T. gestures) and find the one from here (T. 
gestures) that belongs here (T. points). But 
first... 
C. Triangle, triangle, triangle (tracking). 
T. Wait. What do you need to count? 
C. Colors (C. pauses). 
T. Go ahead. 
C. Red, red, red (tracking). 
T. 1, 2, 3 reds 
C. 1, 2, 3 reds (tracking; C. pauses). 
T. Keep counting. 
C. 1, 2, 3 yellows. 1, 2 greens (tracking; C. 
pauses). 
T. I need a... 
C. I need a green. 
T. Terrific! Here's a chip for doing and saying 
all those things (puts token in cup). What's your 
answer? 
C. (C. selects). 
T. (If correct), That's right 1 That's the right 
answer! Very good! That's right because 3 reds, 
3 yellows, and 3 greens (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
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correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
reds, 3 yellows, and 3 greens (T. gestures). 
For V-2, shape and color relevant: 
T. Look at all of these (T. gestures) and all of 
these (T. gestures) and find the one from here (T. 
gestures) that belongs here (T. points). But 
first... 
C. 1, 2, 3 reds. 1, 2, 3 yellows. 1, 2 greens, I 
need a green (tracking). 
T. Good 1 
C. (Pauses). 
T. Count the shapes. 
C. N.R. 
T. 1, 2, 3 circles. . . 
C. 1, 2, 3 circles. 1, 2, 3 squares. 1, 2 
triangles (tracking). (C. pauses). 
T. I need a... 
C. I need a triangle. 
T. Goodt Here's a chip for doing and saying all 
those things (puts token in cup). 
C. (C. selects answer). 
T. (If correct), That's right 1 That's the right 
answer 1 Very good! That's right because 3 reds, 
3 yellows, 3 greens (T. gestures), and 3 circles, 
3 squares, 3 triangles (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This ie the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
reds, 3 yellows, 3 greens (T. gestures), and 3 
circles, 3 squares, 3 triangles (T. gestures). 
Later training trial, V-1.5 problem: 
T. Look at all of these (T. gestures) and all of 
these (T. gestures) and find the one from here (T. 
gestures) that belongs here (T. points). 
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C. 1, 2, 3 blues. 1, 2, 3 yellows- 1, 2 red 
(tracking; C. begins to pick answer). 
T. Wait. 1, 2 red. I need a ... 
C. Red. 
T. Say it. 
C. I need a red. 
T. Good 1 Here's a chip for doing and saying all 
those things (puts chip in cup). 
C. (C. selects answer). 
T. (If correct), That's right I That's the right 
answer! Very good I That's right because 3 blue, 
3 yellow, and 3 reds (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its place) because there are 3 
blue, 3 yellow, and 3 red (T. gestures). 
RT Training Protocols 
PRODUCT: The essence of this condition is to teach 
children to; say the rule; and count, label, and 
track values of each relevant dimension, prior to 
selecting their answers. 
Over the course of training, children should 
learn to say the rule, and count values of 
relevant dimensions (identifying those relevant) 
independent of aid from the trainer. 
PROCESS: (1) Trainer asks child to look at all stimuli in 
matrix and solution set. 
(2) Trainer models, as 
the rule. 
needed, verbalization of 
(3) Trainer models, as needed, rule following: 
counting and labeling values of relevant 
stimulus dimensions while tracking stimuli in 
a corresponding manner. 
(4) Trainer prompts child, 
verbalize the rule. 
as needed, to 
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(5) Trainer prompts child, as needed, to problem-
solve. 
<6> Trainer delivers social and material reward 
contingent upon rule verbalization and 
counting/ labeling/ tracking regardless of 
aid required. He then encourages the child 
to select an answer. 
(7) Trainer praises correct answer, corrects 
incorrect, and explains correct choice. 
Over the course of training trials, models and prompts 
are faded. Instead of simply providing the child with what 
he needs to do and say on each new trial, the trainer tests 
to see if the child can generate required responses without 
aid, and if he cannot, he leads the child to required 
responses. 
The procedure, including the fading element, is 
illustrated by the following examples: 
First trial: 
T. (Child's name), now we're going to begin 
teaching you some things to say and do to help you 
with these problems. When you say and do these 
things, you'll get a chip. At the end of the day, 
you can trade in your chips for the prizes we 
showed you before. 
O.K., (child's name). Look at all of these 
(T. gestures) and all of these (T. gestures) and 
find the one from here (T* gestures) that goes 
here <T. points). But first I want you to say: 
If I count the different colors, it may help 
me get it right. 1, 2, 3 yellows. 1, 2, 3 greens. 
1, 2, blues. I need a blue (tracking). Now you 
try. 
C. N.R. 
T. If I count the different colors... 
C. If I count the different colors...(C. pauses). 
T. it may help me get it right. 
C. it may help me get it right. 
T. Good 1 O.K., now count. 
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c. N. R. 
T. 1, 2, 3 yellows (tracking). 
C. 1, 2, 3 yellows (tracking). 
T. Good t (C. pauses). 1, 2, 3 
C. 1, 2, 3 greens (tracking). 
T. Good 1 (C. pauses). 1, 2 blue. I need a blue 
(tracking). 
C. 1, 2 blue. I need a blue (tracking). 
T. Very good! Here's a chip for doing and saying 
all those things (puts token in cup). Now what's 
your answer? 
C. (Child selects answer). 
T. (If correct), That's right 1 That's the right 
answer I Very Good 1 That's right because 3 
yellows, 3 greens, 3 blues (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 
three yellows, 3 greens, and 3 blues (T. 
gestures). 
A few trials later: 
T. Look at all of these (T. gestures) and all of 
these <T. gestures) and find the one from here (T. 
gestures) that goes here (T. points). But first, 
what do you say? 
C. (C. pauses). 
T. If I count the colors. Say that. 
C. If I count the colors...(C. pauses). 
T. It may help me get it right. 
C. It may help me get it right. 
T. Goodt Now count the colors. 
C. (C. starts to count along horizontal axis 
when colors are uniform on vertical). 
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T. 
C. 
T. 
C. 
T. 
C. 
T. 
C. 
T. 
C. 
T. 
C. 
T. 
C. 
T. 
Later: 
T. 
C. 
T. 
C. 
Wait. Count this way. (T. sweeps finger down 
first column). 
1, 2, 3 (tracking; pauses). 
3 what? 
Triangles. 
1, 2, 3 blues (tracking). 
1, 2, 3 blues (tracking). 
Goodi Keep counting. 
1, 2, 3 yellows. 1, 2, 3 greens (tracking). 
How many greens? Count them again. 
1, 2 green (tracking; C. pauses). 
1, 2 greens. I need a green. 
1, 2 greens. I need a green (tracking). 
Very goodl Here's a chip for doing and saying 
all those things (puts token in cup). What's your 
answer? 
(Selects answer). 
(If correct), That's right I That's the right 
answer 1 Very Good! That's right because 3 blues, 
3 yellows, and 3 greens (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
blues, 3 yellows, and 3 greens (T. gestures). 
Look at all of these (T. gestures) and all of 
these (T. gestures) and find the one from here (T. 
gestures) that goes here (T. points). But first... 
If I count... (C. pauses). 
What are you going to count on this one? 
the colors it will help me get it right. 
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T. Very good! 
C. N. R. 
T. Go ahead, count. 
C. Triangle, triangle, triangle (tracking). 
T. Wait, you said you'd count what? 
C. Colors (C. pauses). 
T. Go ahead. 
C. Red, red, red (tracking). 
T. 1, 2, 3 reds. 
C. 1, 2, 3 reds (tracking; C. pauses). 
T. Keep counting. 
C. 1, 2, 3 yellows. 1, 2, greens (tracking; C. 
pauses). 
T. I need a... 
C. I need a green. 
T. Terrific! Here's a token for doing and saying 
all those things (puts token in cup). What's your 
answer? 
C. (C. selects answer). 
T. (If correct), That's right I That's the right 
answer! Very Good! That's right because 3 reds, 
3 yellows, and 3 greens (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
reds, 3 yellows, and 3 greens (T. gestures). 
For V-2, shape and color relevant: 
T. Look at all of these (T. gestures) and all of 
these (T. gestures) and find the one from here (T. 
gestures) that goes here (T. points). But first, 
what do you say? 
C. If I count... <C. pauses). 
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T. Count what? 
C. the colors it may help me get it right. 
T. the colors and... 
C. the colors and shapes (C. pauses). 
T. it may... 
C. it may help me get it right. 
T. Very good 1 
C. N.R. 
T. Go ahead, count the colors and shapes. 
C. 1, 2, 3 reds. 1, 2, 3 yellows. 1, 2 greens 
(tracking). I need a green. 
T. Very good I 
C. N.R. 
T. What else did you tell me you'd count? 
C. N.R. 
T. 1, 2, 3 circles. . . 
C. 1, 2 ,  3 circles. 1, 2 ,  3 squares. 1, 2 
triangles (tracking; C. pauses). 
T. I need a... 
C. I need a triangle. 
T. Very good! Here's a token for doing and 
saying all those things (puts token in cup). 
C. (C. selects answer). 
T. (If correct), That's right 1 That's the right 
answer! Very Good! That's right because 3 reds, 
3 yellows, 3 greens (T. gestures) and 3 circles, 3 
squares, 3 triangles (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
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reds, 3 yellows, 3 greens (T. gestures) and 3 
circles, 3 squares, 3 triangles <T. gestures). 
Later, V-1.5 problem: 
T. Look at all of these (T. gestures) and all of 
these (T. gestures) and find the one from here (T. 
gestures) that goes here (T. points). 
C. If I count the colors, it may help me get it 
right. 1, 2, 3 blue. 1, 2, 3 yellow. 1, 2 red 
(tracking). 
T. 1, 2 red. I need a. . . 
C. red. 
T. Say 1, 2, red. I need a red. 
C. 1, 2 red. I need a red. 
T. Terrific 1 Here's a token for doing and 
saying all those things (puts token in cup). 
C. (Child selects answer). 
T. (If correct), That's right 1 That's the right 
answer! Very Good 1 That's right because 3 blues, 
3 yellows, and 3 reds (T. gestures). 
(If incorrect), Good try, but that's not the 
right answer. This is the right one (T. places 
correct answer in its spot) because there are 3 
blues, 3 yellows, and 3 reds (T. gestures). 
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Appendix B 
Verbal and Nonverbal Coding; Definitions and Examples 
(Defining Elements of Examples are Underlined). 
Verbal Coding 
I. (LAB.). Labeling of attributes of relevant 
dimensions. If the child labels stimulus aspects 
relevant to matrix solution, or if he or she labels a 
relevant dimension, without meeting the criteria for 
any verbal categories below. 
Examples: 
fYl fRl ( R )  
O O O 
ts. L ^ 
• • I 
Triangles. 
Square. 
Red, red, red. 
Color. 
Shapes. 
I need a square. 
Get the right shape. 
II. (SQL.). Solution response. Scored if the child's 
verbal response includes specification of the solution 
response. 
Examples: 
Find the right one. 
Put the answer here. 
I have to finish the puzzle. 
Find the one from here that goes here. 
Put down the right piece. 
III. (PROB-) Problem-solving response. To be scored if 
the verbal response, at face value, constitutes a 
problem-solving response. 
(lnap). Inappropriate. Child incorrectly labels all 
attributes, or labels attributes of irrelevant 
dimensions only; child simply counts. 
(ptap). Partially appropriate. Counts and labels or 
just labels all attributes of at least one relevant 
dimension (but not all relevant dimensions); or, counts 
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or labels attributes of the underrepresented color, 
shape, size and/or pattern of at least one relevant 
dimension (but not all relevant dimensions). 
(aje.). Appropriate. Child counts and labels, or 
just labels all attributes of all relevant dimensions 
and says, "I need a [relevant attribute3", for one or 
more dimension, or: child counts or labels attributes 
of the underrepresented color, shape size, and/or 
pattern in all relevant dimensions, and says, "I need a 
[relevant attribute]" for one or more relevant 
dimensions. 
Examples: 
(Y) (Y) (Y) 
k k k 
o o o 
• • 1 
(PRQB-lnap). 
1, 2, 3 blue, 1, 2, 3 blue, 1, 2 blue. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, red. 
1,2, triangles. 
1,2 orange. 
(Y) (FO (B) 
o o o 
k k. k 
• • I 
(PRQB-ptap >. 
1,2,3 triangles, 1,2,3 circles, 1,2 squares. 
Yellow, yellow, yellow; red, red, red; blue, blue. 
1,2 blue. 
1,2 squares. 
(PRQB-ap). 
1, 2, 3 t. , 1, 2, 3 c. , 1, 2 sq. , I need a square. 
1,2,3 y., 1,2,3, r., 1,2, b. 
t. , t. , t. , c. , c. , c. , sq. .sq. , y. , y. , y. , r. , r. , r. , 
b.,b., I need a blue. 
1, 2, sq, I need a square. 1, 2, b. 
2 sq., 2b., I need a blue. 
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<SpPRQB-). Specification of a problem-solving response. 
Scored if the vebal response specifies a problem-
solving response and referent (relevant dimensions or 
attributes). 
(ajg.). Appropriate. Child verbalizes a problem-solving 
response and all relevant dimensions. 
(ptap). Partially appropriate. Child names some but 
not all relevant dimensions. 
(inap). Inappropriate. Child names dimensions, none 
of which are relevant. 
Examples: 
, m (R) (B) 
k Cs. IV 
O O O 
• • | 
(SpPRQB-ap). 
Look at all the colors and shapes. 
Count the colors and shapes. 
Match the blue, match the square. 
(SpPRQB-ptap). 
Match this with this. 
Count 'em. 
Look at all of these. 
Try my best. 
Count the colors. 
(SpPROB-inap). 
Count the sizes. 
Match the patterns. 
Look at all the sizes. 
(RULE-)Scored if the child's verbal response includes 
specification of both a problem-solving response and 
outcome. 
(RULE-ap). Scored if the child names the problem-
solving response, all relevant dimensions, and outcome. 
(RULE-ptap). Child names problem-solving response, one 
or more relevant dimensions (but not all), and outcome. 
(RULE-lnap). Child names problem-solving response, 
irrelevant dimensions only, and outcome. 
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Examples: 
m_jRj ££}_ 
k k. k 
o o o 
• • 
(RULE-ap). 
If I count the shapes and colors it will help me. 
Look at all the shapes and colors to get it right. 
Count the shapes and colors to get a 
chip/prize/toy. 
Match the blue and the square to get it right. 
(RULE-ptap). 
Count the shapes to get a chip. 
Look at all to get it right. 
Match 'em to get it right. 
(RULE-inap). 
Look to get it right. 
Look at all the sizes to get it right. 
Count the patterns to get a token. 
VI. (IRR).Irrelevant. If child's verbal response fails to 
specify problem-solving responses, rules, or outcomes, 
and fails to identify relevant stimulus dimensions or 
attributes. Also scored if no verbal response. 
Examples: 
Just do it. 
I don't know. 
Look at 'em. 
(No response). 
My brother has a new bike. 
VII. (INT). Interfering. Specification of an irrelevant 
plan of action. A verbal response that, at face value, 
might lead the child toward behavior incompatible with 
problem solution. 
Examples: 
Say the alphabet. 
Sing my songs. 
250 
Nonverbal Coding 
I. (T-).Tracking. Scored if the child uses his finger(s) 
to "mark" sequences of stimuli on the matrix completion 
cards. 
(ajD). Scored if the child systematically points to or 
touches all stimuli of all relevant dimensions, or: 
Scored if the child points to or touches all stimuli of 
the underrepresented color, shape, size or pattern, for 
all relevant dimensions. 
(ptap).Scored if the child systematically points to or 
touches all stimuli of at least one dimension <but not 
all), or: Scored if the child systematically points to 
or touches all stimuli of the underrepresented color, 
shape, size, or pattern for at least one relevant 
dimension (but not all). 
(inap).Any pointing or touching of stimuli that does 
not meet the criterion for above two categories. 
Examples: 
(Y) (R) (B) 
k k. 
o o o 
• • I 
(T-ap). 
(To triangles), (to circles), (to squares), (to 
yellows), (to reds), (to blues). 
(To squares), (to blues). 
(T-ptap). 
(To triangles), (to circles), (to squares). 
(To squares). 
(T-inap). 
(To triangles), (to circles). 
II. (NJP). No pointing. Scorable if child fails to point 
to the matrix completion card. 
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Appendix C 
Transcript of Rule Verbalization Training with Don (S-31). 
CV-1, trial #1] 
E Watch what I do. If I count the shapes it may 
help me get it right. Let me hear you say that. If I 
count the shapes... 
C (no response) 
E Say that out loud. If I count the shapes... 
C If I count the shapes... 
E It may help me get it right. 
C It may help me get it right. 
E Good J Terrific! Now watch what I do. 1,2,3 
squares (tracking with fingers) 1,2,3 triangles, 1,2 
stars, I need a star. Let me see you do that. Start 
up here (pointing to top left stimulus). 
C 1,2,3-3 squares. 
E good 1 
C 1,2,3... 
E 3 triangles. 
C triangles. 1, 2 stars... 
E I need a. . . 
C I need a star. 
E Terrific! Here's a chip for doing and saying all 
those things. Let's see your answer. 
C (child selects answer). 
E O.K. terrific. That's the right answer because you 
have 3 squares, 3 triangles, and 3 stars(E gestures to 
each form). Let's do another one. 
CV-1, trial #23 
E Look at all of these and all of these (E gestures) 
and figure out which one goes here (pointing to empty 
space). But first say, if I count the shapes... 
C If I count the shapes... 
E It may help me get it right. 
C It may help me get it right. 
E Goodl Go ahead, count. 
C 1,2,3-3 stars. 
E Good. 
C 1,2,3-3 circles. 
E Good. 
C 1,2-2 squares... 
E I need... 
C I need one square. 
E Terrific! Here's a chip for doing and saying all 
those things. Let's see your answer. 
C (child selects answer). 
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E Okay, that's exactly right. That's the right 
answer because you have 3 stars, 3 circles, and 3 
squares (E gestures to each form). Very good. 
C2 trials later, V-l.5, trial #13 
E Look at all of these and all of these (E 
gestures), and figure out which one goes here (E points 
to empty space) but first say, If I count the colors... 
C If I count the colors... 
E It may help me get it right. 
C It may help me... 
E get it right. 
C get it right... 
E Go ahead. 
C It's mixed up colors 1 
E Go ahead, count the colors. 
C 1,2,3-3... 
E 3 yellow. 
C 3 yellow. 1,2,3-3 blue. 
E Good. 
C 1,2 greens. 
E I. . . 
C (no response) 
E I need.. . 
C I need a green circle. 
E Good jobl Here's a chip for doing and saying all 
those things. 
C (Child selects answer). 
E O.K., and that's the right answer because you have 
3 yellow, 3 blue, and 3 green (E gestures to each 
color). 
C4 trials later, V-l.5, trial #5 (Don has reached criterion 
on outcome, and is presented the matrix without the solution 
s£t present)]. 
E Go ahead, do this one. 
C If I count these colors it will help me. 
E Good jobl 
C 1,2,3-3 blue square. 
E 0. K. 
C 1,2,3-3 green square. 
E Good i 
C 1,2-2 yellow square. I need one... 1,2-2 yellows. 
I need one more yellow square. 
E Good job, terrific 1 Here's a chip for doing and 
saying all those things. And that's the right answer 
'cause 3 blues, 3 greens, 3 yellows (E gestures to 
colors). 
253 
[Next day, V-2, trial #13. 
E Look at all of these, and all of these, but I want 
you to say, If I count the shapes and colors. it may 
help me get it right. 
C If I count the shapes and colors. 
E It may help me.. . 
C it may help me. 
E Good I Now watch. 1,2,3 triangles, 1,2,3 squares, 
1,2 circles, I need a circle. 1,2,3 blue, 1,2,3 red, 
1,2 yellow, I need a yellow. Let me see if you can say 
all that. 
C 1,2,3-3 triangles. 
E Good i 
C 1, 2, 3-3 squares. 
E Good. 
C 1,2 circles. . . 
E I need a... 
G I need a circle. 
E Now count this way (gestures across vertical axis). 
C 1, 2, 3. . . 
E Blue. 
C 3 blue, 1,2,3 wait, (you) no tell me. Red. 
E Good i. 
C 1,2-2 yellows, I need a yellow. 
E Terrific! Here's a chip for doing and saying all 
those things. Let's see your answer. 
C (Child selects). 
E That's a good try. That's not quite the right 
answer. Let me show you which one is right (E puts 
correct answer in place). This is the right answer 
because you have 3 triangles, 3 squares, 3 circles, and 
you have 3 blue, 3 red, and 3 yellow. Let's try 
another. 
C5 trials later, V-2, trial # 6]. 
E Look at all of these and these (E gestures), and 
figure out which one goes there (E points). 
C If I count the colors and shapes, it will help me. 
E Good t 
C 1,2,3-3 stars. 
E Good. 
C 1,2,3-3 rectangles. 
E Triangles. 
C Triangles. 1,2-2 circles. I need a... I need a 
circle. 
E 0. K. , good. 
C 1,2,3-3 blues. 
E Good. 
C 1,2,3-3 greens. 
E Um-hmm. 
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C 1,2-2 reds. 
E Um-hmm. 
C I need a red. 
E Terrific job doing and saying all those things. 
Let's see your answer. 
C (Child selects). 
E O.K., and that's the right answer, because you 
have 3 stars, 3 triangles, 3 circles; 3 blue, 3 green, 
and 3 red (E gestures). 
